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Introduction
Natural Order and the Revolution
The Russian Revolution of 1917 came as a surprise not only to 
millions of Russians but also to the elites in the rest of the world. 
Few scholars, politicians and historians both in Russia and abroad 
had suspected that the highly conservative and rural country 
could overtake the Western powers on their way to economic 
egalitarianism. In fact, there was a precedent seven years before: 
the Mexican Revolution. The main problem, however, was not 
in Russia’s lack of readiness but in the fact that after the tragic 
events of 1917 the state seemed to have completely changed its 
own system of values. 
Russia under the old regime can be described as an empire: 
a kind of state which is neither completely national nor completely 
universal. Upon establishing the Russian Empire in 1721, Peter 
the Great could not draw a clear definition of the new political 
being. However, one has to remember that the vast plains east of 
Poland underwent essential rather than accidental changes several 
times before the Russian empire was officially established. Before 
862, according to the Primary Chronicle, it was a badly organized 
collection of East Slavic settlements. Then it began to be ruled by 
a Scandinavian elite, gaining the new Germanic name – Rus’, and 
becoming a semi-military organization economically based on 
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several burghs and on the route toward the Black Sea. The next step 
was taken by Prince Volodimir the Great, who decided to baptize 
himself and his people according to the Byzantine rite tradition. 
The East Christian (after 1054 – Orthodox) Old Rus’, whose main 
center moved from Novgorod to Kiev, broke apart after the death 
of Yaroslav the Wise, a brilliant ruler, and the capital moved again 
– to Vladimir on Klazma (Primary Chronicle, transl. of 1953).
At the end of the 1230s, the municipalities were invaded by 
Batu-Khan, the leader of the Mongol Western (Golden) Horde. 
After that, the East of historical Rus’ was subordinated to the 
despotic leadership of the Golden Horde and was permeated 
with the Mongol principles of militarism, centralism and absolute 
monarchy where the will of the leader was the only source of 
law. However, the Orthodox church was an exception: it enjoyed 
relative respect and was in no way affected by the despotic Crimean 
state. The situation was different in the western part of the old 
Kievan domain, which was liberated from the Mongol hegemony 
and annexed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and (in the case of 
Galicia) by Poland. 
When in the 15th century Moscow became the leading power 
in the area controlled by the Horde, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, 
which in 1547, thanks to the ambitions of Ivan the Terrible, was 
named Tsardom of All Rus’, adopted some essential Mongol 
political standards, but at the same time it cultivated the myth of 
the Third Rome – the bedrock of the only true faith. Moscow was 
different from the Catholic and Protestant West and glorified its 
own uniqueness (as emphasized by the German emperor’s envoy, 
Herberstein, 1557). 
At the beginning of the age of Enlightenment, Peter the Great 
dispelled the myth of the unique Orthodox domain and began to 
construct a new state – the Russian Empire, which was supposed 
to become one of the leading European powers. The mission of the 
state was in the state itself: the Tsar, who was now officially titled 
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Emperor, exercised all key prerogatives, even the ones that referred 
to the church since the institution of patriarchy was abolished.
A short review was provided to illustrate the fact that the 
Russian state changed its origin myth several times. As it was 
expressed by Petr Chaadaev, the founder of Russian intellectual 
westernism, in his famous First Philosophical Letter, Russia has 
no history – it has built its own civilization from scratch several 
times:
Our memories reach back no further than yesterday; we are, as 
it were, strangers to ourselves. We move through time in such 
a singular manner that, as we advance, the past is lost to us forever. 
That is but a natural consequence of a culture that consists entirely of 
imports and imitation. Among us there is no internal development, 
no natural progress; new ideas sweep out the old, because they 
are not derived from the old but tumble down upon us from who 
knows where. We absorb all our ideas ready-made, and therefore 
the indelible trace left in the mind by a progressive movement of 
ideas, which gives it strength, does not shape our intellect. We grow, 
but we do not mature; we move, but along a crooked path, that is, 
one that does not lead to the desired goal. We are like children who 
have not been taught to think for themselves: when they become 
adults, they have nothing of their own – all their knowledge is on the 
surface of their being, their soul is not within them. That is precisely 
our situation.
Peoples, like individuals, are moral beings. Their education takes 
centuries, as it takes years for that of persons. In a way, one could 
say that we are an exception among peoples. We are one of those 
nations, which do not seem to be an integral part of the human 
race, but exist only in order to teach some great lesson to the world 
(Chaadaev, 1829). 
Does that mean that the Russian Revolution of 1917 should 
not be treated as a disaster and at the same time something 
extraordinary in the history of the great country? The answer 
is not easy since the essence of the problem lies in the criteria 
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one could apply for the analysis. In the same way as it was after 
the Petrine Reforms, the conservatives (national traditionalists), 
such as the Slavophiles, tried to emphasize the fact that the radical 
change humiliated the nation and acted against its spiritual 
essence (Alschen, 2013, p. 26). After the revolution of 1917, 
countless thinkers complained about the violation of Russian 
values: nationalists such as Ivan Ilyin, Christian philosophers with 
Nikolai Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov and Petr Struve at the helm, the 
liberal camp headed by Pavel Milyukov and even revolutionary 
socialists such as Victor Chernov criticized and demonized Lenin 
(Чернов, 1924).
The main objective of this book results from the dilemma 
of total change and is to determine at least some of the essential 
characteristics of the Russian Revolution that reveal themselves 
in some closer and further consequences. This means that one of 
the basic assumptions of the book is that it is possible to trace old 
mental constructions in contemporary processes even though, as 
it was mentioned above, Russia has a strong inclination toward 
total annihilation of former formulas.
The first task was to draw a comprehensive image of the new 
legal principles that underlay the revolutionary reforms. This way, 
in Chapter 1, we try to reconstruct the Bolshevik understanding 
of law and state, which became the obligatory set of norms for 
several generations of people who spent most of their lives under 
the communist rule.
Chapter 2 briefly analyzes the relation between state, business 
and society before and after the revolution of 1917. The intention 
of the text is to point out the traditional forms of the relation and 
the new, unexpected ones, which lead to different practical results. 
We assume that the mechanisms worked out in the times of Witte 
and Stolypin were in fact deconstructed or even totally negated in 
the following years, which led to various kinds of socio-economic 
disaster. That is why the Russian state has to seek new forms of 
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public and economic management with the main imperatives of 
democratic incentive and economic effectiveness.
The next two chapters focus on questions concerning selected 
problems which affected Russia after the collapse of the USSR. 
One of them refers to Russia’s foreign policy – to the secessions in 
the post-Soviet area, which are treated as consequences of an odd 
interpretation of international law. The purpose of the chapter is 
to analyze the Russian elite’s attitude to the customary, relatively 
established norms that underlie the world order and to provide 
material for conclusions about the revolutionary legacy as an 
explanatory factor for aggressive international behaviors.
Chapter 4, which refers to contemporary processes, is nominally 
about something that has not happened: a hypothetical, potential 
revolution which is supposed to introduce another paradigm of 
the Russian state. We ask the question about the probability of 
a nationalist revolt in Russia, which was proclaimed by many 
thinkers but never realized by the angry people. We thus suggest 
that Russia’s present-day identity is somewhat unclear and that 
a search for another origin myth makes sense. 
Last but not least, looking for the core of revolutionary thinking, 
we would like to present a study of political gnosis which underlies 
many radical changes. Gnostic thinking has always been based on 
axiological oppositions: equality and inequality, progressivity and 
reaction, paving the road to violence in the name of the light side 
of the Force. This way we try to suggest that the gnostic paradigm 
can be an efficient explanatory device for the description of 
a revolutionary mentality.
Those who accuse the revolutionary thinking of being 
responsible for particular crimes as well as for social and 
spiritual destruction in general usually emphasize the violation 
of “naturalness”. Revolutions are charged with the imposition 
of artificial and harmful intellectual simplifications which are 
opposed to the spontaneous and natural order of things. The 
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understanding of natural order, however, has varied throughout 
centuries and depended mainly on the ideological position of 
theoreticians. The notion of natural order is related to the concept 
of natural law, which has been explored in philosophical and 
theological doctrines several times. We understand natural order 
as a state of beings (including humans) that allows them to 
behave according to natural law without restrictions. The scope 
of these two notions may include various areas; in our book they 
refer to the social, political and economic spheres of the state. 
Natural law is not necessarily equal to the state of nature, which 
we understand as a spontaneous outcome of the functioning of 
nature (even if “nature” refers to the functioning of humans). This 
term usually refers to the pre-social or pre-civilizational state 
of mankind, to a theoretical rather than historical wilderness. 
If we look at the most customary understanding of natural 
law, we realize that it is generally depicted as a set of principles 
that lead people to goodness. This concept of natural law was 
initiated by classical Greek philosophers such as Empedocles, 
Plato and Aristotle, who is usually treated as the philosopher 
who formulated the problem in the most complete form in the 
ancient times (Aristotle, 1998, p. 58). The concept of natural law 
was in a way tackled in Genesis, in the description of Cain’s sin 
and in Abraham’s hesitation about God’s intentions concerning 
Sodom (Genesis, 18,25), and by St. Paul in his Epistle to Romans 
(Romans, 2, 14–15). Natural law was treated with proper attention 
by the Fathers, including St. Augustine, and by medieval thinkers, 
including St. Thomas Aquinas, who claimed that it is because of 
natural law that rational beings can participate in eternal law. 
Since the latter is not entirely intelligible for imperfect humans, 
they have to resort to Divine Law, which is given by God to save 
people from errors and eternal condemnation (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, I-II, qq. 90–106). The authority of natural law also lies 
behind Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, which elaborates 
on basic human rights rather than obligations. 
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If we consider the topic of the state of nature, the vision might 
not be that optimistic because the understanding of nature is not 
necessarily associated with rights; it can also be comprehended 
as the perceived world of living organisms. One of the oldest 
concepts of naturalness comes from Hobbes, whose vision of the 
nature of man seems quite pessimistic: 
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of 
quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. 
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and 
the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves 
Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the 
second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, 
a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct 
in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their 
Nation, their Profession, or their Name.
There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby 
it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power 
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For 
WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in 
a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently 
known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in 
the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the 
nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but 
in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of 
War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition 
thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All 
other time is PEACE.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where 
every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the 
time, wherein men live without other security, than what their 
own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. 
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit 
thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by 
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Sea; no comimodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and 
removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of 
the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no 
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of 
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, 
and short (Hobbes, 1651, ch. 13).
The state of nature depicted in such a way seems to be an 
obstacle rather than a proper environment for human activity. In 
other words, the natural man cannot put up with the state of nature, 
which is described as bellum omnium contra omnes and interferes 
with the divine commandment to be fruitful and multiply. This 
way we realize that natural law (as the emanation of eternal law), 
which is an intelligible structure of moral goodness and prosperity, 
takes people away from the state of nature and locates the source of 
naturalness in another order. It is not necessarily true that Locke’s 
treatise provides a polemic narrative against Hobbes; it is rather 
a tale about another kind of nature, one which is able to overcome 
terrestrial physical inequality and subordinate all men to a law 
that is in a way perceived in one’s life experience but does not 
refer to the physical world. What both Hobbes and Locke aimed at 
is the liberation from spontaneous brutality and the construction 
of the “state of predictability”, which is entirely different from 
the state of nature. The latter is structurally expressed in social 
Darwinism, where the death of the weak is perceived as natural 
and even advisable for developing species. 
The notion of natural order is also associated with some other 
understandings. In some concepts, natural order is artistic: art 
may create forms which either reflect higher “natural” harmony 
or distort it. Even within the blurry category of art one can realize 
that people as social beings tend to invoke a higher order which is 
supposed to be natural in a non-physical sense of naturalness. 
In the tradition of economic liberalism, naturalness and 
natural order refer to the wealth of nations, which is supposed to 
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grow only if the authorities open the state’s economy to the power 
of the invisible hand of the free market. The classical principle of 
no governmental support and no barriers, which was suggested 
by Adam Smith, was later expressed in some other incarnations 
of liberalism including the works of Friedrich von Hayek. Hayek 
makes a distinction between two kinds of order. One of them 
is achieved by arranging the relations between the parts according to 
a preconceived plan we call in the social field an organization. The 
extent to which the power of many men can be increased by such 
deliberate co-ordination of their efforts is well-known and many of 
the achievements of man rest on the use of this technique. 
The other one 
...which is characteristic not only of biological organisms (to which 
the originally much wider meaning of the term organism is now 
usually confined), is an order which is not made by anybody but 
which forms itself. It is for this reason usually called a “spontaneous” 
or sometimes (for reasons we shall yet explain) a ‘polycentric’ order. 
If we understand the forces which determine such an order, we can 
use them by creating the conditions under which such an order will 
form itself (Hayek, 1981).
As a matter of fact, Hayek’s understanding of natural order in 
economy still sticks to the Darwinian scheme since the state of 
naturalness in the circumstances of a free market is unpredictable. 
The libertarian concepts (such as the one of Robert Nozick) do not 
add anything important to this narrative apart from the idea of the 
minimum state. It seems, however, that a deeper understanding of 
the question has been proposed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who 
criticizes democracy (as opposed to monarchy) because of its 
natural inclination to promote elites that lack basic moral values. 
A truly democratic elite is a bunch of expropriators who in the 
long run are unable to foster production. That is why a “private 
government” seems more productive:
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The defining characteristic of private government ownership is that 
the expropriated resources and the monopoly privilege of future 
expropriation are individually owned. The appropriated resources 
are added to the ruler’s private estatе and treated as if they were 
a part of it, and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation 
is attached as a title to this In contrast, with a publicly owned 
government the control over the government apparatus lies in the 
hands of a trustee, or caretaker. The caretaker may use the apparatus 
to his personal advantage, but he does not own it. He cannot sell 
government resources and privately pocket the receipts, nor can he 
pass government possessions onto his personal heir. He owns the 
current use of government resources, but not their capital value. 
Moreover, while entrance into the position of a private owner of 
government is restricted by the owner’s personal discretion, entrance 
into the position of a caretaker-ruler is open. Anyone, in principle, 
can become the government’s caretaker.
From these assumptions two central, interrelated predictions 
can be deduced: (1) A private government owner will tend to 
have a systematically longer planning horizon, i.e., his degree 
of time preference will be lower, and accordingly, his degree of 
economic exploitation will tend to be less than that of a government 
caretaker; and (2), subject to a higher degree of exploitation the 
nongovernmental public will also be comparatively more present- 
-oriented under a system of publicly owned government than 
under a regime of private government ownership. (1) A private 
government owner will predictably try to maximize his total wealth; 
i.e., the present value of his estate and his current income. He will not 
want to increase his current income at the expense of a more than 
proportional drop in the present value of his assets, and because 
acts of current income acquisition invariably have repercussions 
on present asset values (reflecting the value of all future-expected- 
-asset earnings discounted by the rate of time preference), private 
ownership in and of itself leads to economic calculation and thus 
promotes farsightedness.
In the case of the private ownership of government, this implies 
a distinct moderation with respect to the ruler’s incentive to exploit 
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his monopoly privilege of expropriation, for acts of expropriation 
are by their nature parasitic upon prior acts of production on the 
part of the nongovernmental public. Where nothing has first been 
produced, nothing can be expropriated; and where everything is 
expropriated, all future production will come to a shrieking halt 
(Hoppe, 2001, pp. 45-46).
Upon examining the history of Russia in the early decades of 
the 20th century, one may come to the realization that the Hoppean 
scheme describes the situation of Russia’s society and economy. 
Before the beginning of WW1, the growth of production in this 
country was in almost all sectors one of the fastest in Europe. The 
legal regulations in Russia’s absolute monarchy provided sufficient 
stability for investors and capital could be accumulated in an 
atmosphere of security. The revolution, which was an outcome of 
the highly destructive war, abolished these conditions and led to 
an economic and social disaster, especially during the time of War 
Communism. Russia became subject to a totalitarian experiment, 
where expropriation became the principle of new justice: “rob 
what has been robbed” (see brilliant descriptions of the process in 
Wolfe (1969) and Lohr (2003)). 
What has to be emphasized, however, is the fact that the idea 
of expropriation cannot be separated from the problem of social 
stratification. The red camp – the Bolsheviks – and, in the “soft” 
version, the democratic leftists such as the Mensheviks or the 
Socialist Revolutionaries, proclaimed far-reaching egalitarianism. 
Its range stretched from the abolition of private property of land 
to the nationalization of industry and banks. This way the new 
authorities got rid of the old economic elite, which had been 
formed over decades (or even centuries), but in the other spheres 
the situation was by no means better: most of the Orthodox 
clergymen were either shot on the spot or placed in labor camps, 
white officers who did not manage to escape had to account for 
being shot (if they were lucky enough to avoid torture), most 
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academic and high school teachers, lawyers etc. had to escape 
from Russia to become cabbies or janitors in Western Europe or 
put up with gradual marginalization and, in the Stalin era, with 
ultimate physical liquidation, which usually involved a long and 
“active” interrogation. 
This way the new incarnation of Russia – the Soviet Union 
– had to be conducted by its new elite, which was nominally 
“democratic” in the sense that it tried to appreciate “the people”. 
The new leaders were originally recruited from the Bolshevik 
Party, VKP(b), which was a collection of radical leftists who 
generally belonged to the margin of the imperial society. The 
most prominent ones were either entirely uprooted or had dark 
biographies like Stalin, the leading expropriator and experienced 
murderer, who earned money for the party by robbing banks 
(Sebag Montefiore, 2007). The dramatic events that took place in 
1917 and in the following years formed a dysfunctional system 
which was supposed to be a negation of both absolute monarchy 
and liberal democracy. The new regime tried to disqualify the 
tyranny based on the domination of one person and the ideological 
superstructure of the Orthodox faith combined with the imaginary 
pressure of Great Russian chauvinism. It also refuted the liberal 
dreams which, as they believed, led to appalling social inequality 
and to the establishment of the bourgeoisie – a parasitic false elite 
that deterred the proletariat from genuine development. These 
convictions not only led to such things as the physical liquidation 
of the liberal and socialist opposition as well as the imperial family, 
but they also wiped out the institution of private property. 
The Bolsheviks and a number of useful idiots in the West, 
according to the principles of Marxism, believed that the 
experiment may open new opportunities to the development 
of humanity and become an alternative to the older systemic 
solutions. However, as it was emphasized by Hoppe, the search for 
a more humane order (i.e. one that incites positive development) 
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may consist in something entirely different. The legitimacy of 
monarchical rule “appears to have been irretrievably lost” but
 ...at the same time, and still more importantly, a positive alternative 
to monarchy and democracy – the idea of a natural order – must 
be delineated and understood. On the one hand, this involves 
the recognition that it is not exploitation, either monarchical 
or democratic, but private property, production, and voluntary 
exchange that are the ultimate sources of human civilization. 
On the other hand, it involves the recognition of a fundamental 
sociological insight (which incidentally also helps identify precisely 
where the historic opposition to monarchy went wrong): that the 
maintenance and preservation of a private property based exchange 
economy requires as its sociological presupposition the existence of 
a voluntarily acknowledged natural elite – a nobilitas naturalis. 
The natural outcome of the voluntary transactions between 
various private property owners is decidedly non-egalitarian, 
hierarchical, and elitist. As the result of widely diverse human talents, 
in every society of any degree of complexity a few individuals quickly 
acquire the status of an elite. Owing to superior achievements of 
wealth, wisdom, bravery or a combination thereof, some individuals 
come to possess “natural authority,” and their opinions and 
judgments enjoy widespread respect. Moreover, because of selective 
mating and marriage and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance, 
positions of natural authority are more likely than not passed on 
within a few noble families. It is to the heads of these families with 
long-established records of superior achievement, farsightedness, 
and exemplary personal conduct that men turn with their conflicts 
and complaints against each other, and it is these very leaders of 
the natural elite who typically act as judges and peacemakers, often 
free of charge, out of a sense of obligation required and expected of 
a person of authority or even out of a principled concern for civil 
justice, as a privately produced “public good” (Hoppe, 2001, p. 71).
To conclude, we realize that such a concept of natural order 
provokes several questions referring to the legacy of the Russian 
Revolution, which broke out to boost the self-esteem of the 
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Russian people. First of all, we are entitled to ask about the nature 
of unnaturalness, which is supposed to be the core of social evil. 
Next, we also have to explore the issue of equality: the problem of 
the people and of the elite in the context of revolutionary ideas and 
events. Another issue lies in the relation between the revolution 
and the natural order, which is the basic question of our book. 
Last but not least, we also have to examine the Russian Revolution 
in the context of natural order from the pragmatic perspective. In 
other words, we assume that the unclear intuition of naturalness 
in the spheres of politics (both internal and international), 
economy and social life reveals itself in the commonly perceived 
and mathematically articulated prosperity and security.
Adam Bosiacki*
University of Warsaw
Chapter 1
Shaping the First Totalitarian State
The Political and Legal System at the Beginning  
of the Russian Revolution (October 1917–1921)  
and its Implications
This chapter describes the first concepts of law and the political 
system under the Bolshevik rule1. Obviously and paradoxically, 
these concepts have not been studied so far for several reasons.
The first reason is the almost complete absence of materials, 
sources of knowledge about the law of the studied period. Many 
Soviet lawyers and political analysts writing in those years 
continued their work also after the end of the war communism 
era, yet they often changed their previous stance for a variety of 
reasons. Hence, their earlier ideas have often remained almost 
completely unknown.
* Prof. dr hab., University of Warsaw, Faculty of Law and Administration.
1  To some extent the present text refers to the author’s monograph (Bosiacki, 
2012).
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Another reason is the total change in the legal ideology of 
the Bolshevik state at the end of the described period. In 1922, 
a completely new legal system was introduced: the unwritten law 
was replaced by a new one. First of all, under the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) the institution of civil law as a whole was reintroduced; 
in this way the institution of property law, a civil code, was 
developed. This implied, among other things, the reintroduction 
of civil rights (to a limited extent). In this sense, the legal system 
of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) after 
1922 was a total negation of the earlier legal concepts. This does 
not mean, however, that the previously developed system, or 
more precisely a number of conceptions of war communism in 
Bolshevik Russia, were not transferred into the legislation of the 
subsequent period. Conversely, the concepts of civil war law were 
widely introduced not only into the Soviet Union’s legal system of 
the 1920s and the Stalinist period, but also into the legal systems 
of other communist countries under Soviet influence after World 
War II. Some of the institutions born in Lenin’s country continue 
to exist within the Polish law until now. There is also no question 
about the fact that the model of a state, society and law which 
was specific for the entire Soviet-style communist system was 
developed in Soviet Russia during the period of war communism. 
In this sense, the Bolshevik concept of the state and the normative 
order was the first totalitarian conception of the Soviet system. It 
was also the first model of a totalitarian state existing in reality in 
the 20th century.
The present work uses nearly all the legal literature of the 
Bolshevik state written between the years 1917–1921, which was 
sometimes scarcely available. The author analyzed periodicals and 
books published in that period (over 600 titles). He also succeeded 
in gaining access to the archival materials from the Central State 
Archive of the Russian Federation (former Central State Archive of 
the October Revolution) and the collections of the St. Petersburg 
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Museum of History. Using the documents of the former USSR 
Ministry of Transport and family archives, the author studied the 
life and career of one of the most outstanding Soviet experts in 
civil law, Alexander Grigorevich Goikhbarg (1883–1962), whose 
ideas were spread not only to the real socialism countries but also, 
to some extent, to other countries.
Owing to the archival materials, the author was able to obtain 
unpublished information and data on the Bolshevik science of law, 
their work on designing the first Soviet constitution (July 1918), 
the work of the revolutionary tribunals, the People’s Commissariat 
of Justice, the Cheka and, finally, biographical materials of the 
leading lawyers of the period.
The work was preceded by a kind of prelude consisting in 
an analysis of Lenin’s viewpoint on the law before the October 
Revolution2 in connection with the still surviving number of myths 
and oversimplified opinions about the Bolshevik leader. We know 
that Lenin, an educated lawyer, was somehow connected with the 
profession of a barrister. As a charismatic leader, he was the father 
and sole leader of the Bolshevik party, an organism resembling 
a conspiratorial organization rather than a political party and 
maybe for this reason called by him a party of a new type.
An analysis of Lenin’s writings justifies the conclusion that 
he had never written about law and that he never presented any 
consistent view on this subject. The Bolshevik leader’s practice as 
an attorney was rather unimpressive (also during his university 
years). The subject of law does not exist as his point of interest in 
the subsequent editions of all his works. This is not a coincidence. 
The term “law” was used relatively seldom in the Soviet Union after 
the early 1930s and it was replaced by the word zakon meaning 
the Act of Law. This was, of course, in tune with the Marxist and 
Leninist understanding of what law actually is.
2  A separate investigation on this subject was published in Bosiacki (1997).
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Lenin’s attitude towards law, however, was somewhat more in- 
-depth. Being a Marxist, the Bolshevik leader very soon (in 1894, 
that is, at the age of 24) adopted the thesis that law is the will of the 
ruling class and is shaped by this class to serve its own interests 
which are opposite to the interests of the other social classes 
(Lenin, 1983, pp. 120–121). In this construction, law is always 
a variable category; it is shaped by the ruler (class rule).
In the quoted article, Lenin (1983) described (in an indirect 
way, as can be observed above) his attitude toward law as the 
“critical revision of the Hegelian philosophy of law” consistent 
with the spirit of Marxism. More interestingly, however, a peculiar 
“product of the era” was Lenin’s linking of the Marxist idea of law 
with Russian “legal nihilism”3, popular in the country at the turn 
of the centuries. The synthesis of these ways of thinking led to the 
conviction that law as a social phenomenon was an instrument of 
the struggle of classes and, being the expression of the will of the 
ruling class, it could not limit this will in any way. Lenin had all his 
life believed that law performed first of all the repressive function 
and was eagerly identified with the unwritten law.4
At least several passages from Lenin’s works written in the pre-
revolution years can be cited to support this view. For example, 
an expert in this subject, Andrzej Walicki, quotes the Leninist 
definition of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in his description 
of the Leninist system:
The scientific conception of dictatorship means nothing else but 
power not limited by anything, unrestricted by any laws, any rules 
what so ever, any regulations, and relying directly on violence 
(Walicki, 1995, p. 104).
3  This term generally meant the conviction that written law could not reflect 
the eternal and universal legal ideas: justice, good, and even beauty. As time 
passed, this attitude led to the tradition of criticizing the law. Comp. e.g. Walicki 
(1995, pp. 17–114).
4  A similar opinion was first presented in Bosiacki (1997, p. 42).
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Lenin had (marginally) voiced similar views more than 
once before the revolution. He kept saying that the regulations 
of the constitution (Lenin, 1986a, p. 327), “all questions of law- 
-abidingness” (Lenin, 1987a, p. 200) and the existence of law as 
a general question “independent of the configuration of (class, 
A. B.) forces” (Lenin, 1986b, p. 114) remained for him just 
“fictitious” concepts. 
Before the revolution, Lenin had described at least several ideas 
of the future model of government. Researchers particularly quote 
one passage of Lenin’s (Lenin, 1987b, p. 244) statement written in 
1915 and describing the future system in a very clear way:
Let us look at contemporary army. Here is one of the good examples 
of organization. Organization is good only when it is flexible and, 
at the same time, is able to dictate uniform intention to millions of 
people. Today these millions are sitting at their homes in various 
ends of the country. Mobilization order comes tomorrow, and they 
gather at the mobilization points. Today they are lying in trenches, 
sometimes over long months. Tomorrow they are attacking in 
a different frontline arrangement. Today they make miracles 
avoiding bullets and shrapnel. Tomorrow they make miracles in 
open battle (…). This is what we call organization, when millions 
of people pursuing one goal, guided by unanimous will, change the 
form of their co-existence and action, change the place and methods 
of their activities, change tools and weapons according to changing 
circumstance and needs of battle. This also applies to the struggle of 
the working class against the bourgeoisie.5
Let us note that when understood directly, the above is actually 
an expressis verbis definition of the principle of the militarization 
of labor, which was ascribed to the name of Leon Trotsky (1879– 
–1940) during the years of war communism. This principle stated 
that workers were to be treated as soldiers on the labor front line. 
This implied subjecting workers to regulations for which military 
5  The underlined words were underlined by Lenin himself.
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rigors were typical and involving all the consequences of this fact. 
For example, leaving a job was equal to desertion and was subject 
to military revolutionary tribunals (Danishevsky, 1920, p. 21; 
Solzhenitsyn, 1990, p. 287). A similar principle, not expressed 
expressis verbis, was included in the first Bolshevik Labour Code 
adopted in the middle of 1918.
After the tsar’s reign collapsed and before the Bolsheviks 
took power, they could implement their ideas more easily. They 
distinguished themselves from the other political parties in 
Russia AD 1917, in this case, by a specifically unusual political 
program. Legally published shortly after the February Revolution 
(but designed much earlier), it provided for the restoration of 
the death penalty, and “proletarian compulsion starting from 
shooting to death (as a) method of modeling a communist man 
from human material of the capitalist era” (The Programme of the 
Russian Socialdemocratic Worker Party, 1917, p. 10). Apart from 
this, it did, however, propose a number of measures considered 
“progressive” by contemporary people: broad powers of local self-
government, “the right for self-determination of all nations in the 
state”, or “equal rights of women”. The programme of Lenin’s faction 
of the Russian Socialdemocratic Workers Party also included the 
proposal of “election of judges by the people” and “change of the 
professional army into levy in mass”. The most important postulate 
was, however, about the agrarian question (agrarnyi vopros). The 
RSDWP programme proposed, in this case, the “confiscation” of 
all private land in the country without any compensation (The 
Program of the Russian Social-Democratic Worker Party, 1917, 
p. 13).
Apart from this, the Bolsheviks did not make any broader 
presentation of their postulates concerning the introduction of 
some new law before they took power. It appears that the only 
exception here was an article by one of the few lawyers in Lenin’s 
party, Petr Ivanovich Stuchka (1865–1932), published by Pravda 
at the end of May 1917. Stuchka proposed building two legal 
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systems: the common courts and, in addition to them, out-of- 
-court verdicts on enemies of the revolution. The Bolshevik lawyer 
also claimed that “as soon as the law ceases to conform with the 
social relations, it will simply turn into a piece of paper.” “You 
cannot”, he called on the lawmakers, “use the old laws as the basis 
for the new social development just like those old laws could not 
create the old social relations” (Stuchka, 1917a, pp. 1–2; Stuchka, 
1964, pp. 225–227).6 To reinforce his statement, Stuchka (1964) 
quoted Marx who proposed to “deprive the old regime forces” 
of their protection by law.7 With this quotation in mind, Stuchka 
proposed to “start at least from research (rozysk) in the old and 
new collections of laws (ulozheniyakh) looking for paragraphs 
permitting to bring the deposed tsar and his arrested supporters 
to trial” (Stuchka, 1964). 
While compromising with some of the existing concepts, the 
Bolshevik lawyer proposes issuing a special retroactive decree 
(osobyidekret s obratnoysiloy) against such people and leaves no 
doubt as to the punishment he would choose for them. Punishment 
which was not preceded by any court procedure was an even better 
solution for him (Stuchka, 1964). 
“K. Marx also addressed this problem,” Stuchka wrote. “When 
a successful revolution takes place, the opponents can be hanged 
but there must not be any court verdicts on them. They can be 
eliminated (ubrannye)8 like defeated enemies, but they must not be 
on trial like offenders.” Stuchka (1964) believed that this solution 
6  This quotation is also discussed in Blum (1965, pp. 190–191).
7  Part of this quotation read as follows: “[The laws mentioned above] grew 
from old [social] relations and they should die (pogibnut) together with them... 
This preservation of the letter of law (pochvy zakonnosti) is intended to preserve 
such private interests (chastnykh interesov) as binding while in fact they are no 
longer binding”. The underlined words as in the original.
8  The Russian word ubrat’ can mean „remove” as well as „murder.” It seems 
that the intention was to convey the second meaning to the reader, especially 
during the revolution time.
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could prevent “wasting time on looking for paragraphs and 
offenses at least for the miserable arrested spies and provokers”. The 
presented reflections were the first transparent announcement that 
the Bolsheviks were planning a new extraordinary legal system.
Profound legal transformations were the permanent objectives 
of the October Revolution. These objectives had the form of four 
postulates: immediate withdrawal of Russia from the war, that is, 
declaring ceasefire, the liquidation of what they called large land 
property (pomeshchich’ya sobstvennost’ na zemlyu), worker control 
of production, and the appointment of the Soviet Government. 
These postulates paved way for the complete cancellation of any 
property rights in the country and towns.
The Land Decree immediately cancelled private property 
of land with no compensation.9 The document included an 
unprecedented statement saying that “private ownership of land 
is cancelled for ever” and land is to become the “property of the 
whole nation”. Land was given out to any people demanding it 
but not as their property, as Soviet historiography had often 
suggested. Possessors had to use the land whilst having no title 
to it. Land could be given to all people who were willing to work 
on it. This was the leading criterion of allocating land. The Land 
Decree banned employing any hired labor on land and cancelled 
all transactions involving land (sale, lease, or disposal in any other 
way). This was what they called the socialization of land (since the 
1930s it was referred to as nationalization in the USSR for political 
reasons) which the Bolsheviks had accepted from the Party of 
Socialist-Revolutionaries. The implementation of this conception 
9  Regulations of the Decree are quoted according to: Собрание узаконений 
и разпоряжений рабочего и крестьянского правителства (СУиРРиКП) 
(further cited as: SU), 1917/1918, No. 1, item 3, paragraph 1. The text of the 
document is in extenso quoted by Dekrety Sovetskoy Vlasti, op. cit., vol. 1, 
p. 17. The discussion of the document in the Polish language is given by, e.g., 
Encyklopedia Rewolucji Październikowej, op. cit., p. 82.
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allowed to materialize the peasants’ utopia which had long existed 
in the minds of Russian peasants. However, at the same time all 
of them were stripped of their ownership title for land, something 
that had never happened in any country (Goikhbarg, 1921, p. 3).
From the very beginning of the Bolshevik state, the most 
dynamically developing branch of the law was criminal law. The 
Bolshevik leader identified penal regulations with repression 
against the enemies of the revolution. In the beginning, the 
Bolsheviks had intended to use the pre-revolution lawyers in 
the new legal system (especially justices of the peace, who were 
introduced under the reform of courts in 1864) (Stuchka, 1917b, 
p. 1). This idea was, however, abandoned in connection with 
strong resistance from some lawyers. As a result, the Bolsheviks 
decided to reject the entire pre-revolutionary legal system as 
a one-off move. It was done by the Decree on Courts issued by the 
Council of People’s Commissars on November 24, 1917, which is 
usually referred to by historians as the Decree on Courts No. 1 (SU, 
1917/1918, No. 4, item 50).
The decree abolished “all the hitherto existing general court 
organs (obshchie sudebnye ustanovleniya) such as: district courts, 
court chambers” and “the ruling senate (the decree used lowercase 
letters here, A. B.) together with all its departments, military 
navy courts of all levels, as well as the commercial courts; all this 
was replaced with court organs appointed by way of democratic 
election”.
The decree also abolished “the so far existing institutions of 
magistrates, prosecutor’s supervision, and the institution of sworn 
and private attorneys”.
To replace the abolished court organs, they appointed local 
courts (mestnye sudy) consisting of one permanent judge and two 
additional people’s lay-judges summoned to the court sittings 
from the list compiled by the local councils of delegates. The 
decree stated that the local courts were appointed through direct 
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democratic election, and this election was to be carried out by the 
appointed local councils of worker, soldier, and peasant delegates.
The Decree on Courts No. 1 ruled out the application of the 
whole pre-revolutionary law. The application of laws existing 
before the Bolshevik coup was allowed only in cases when they 
“were not abolished by the revolution and were not contradictory 
to the revolutionary conscience (revolutsyonnaya sovest’) and 
revolutionary legal awareness (revolutsyonnoe pravosoznaniye)” 
(Decree on Courts No. 1, paragraph 5).
This was legal nihilism as understood by the new authorities, 
permitting to sentence anyone on principles of total discretion 
on the grounds of unwritten legal norms. Since the institution of 
appeal was also abolished (the only cassation was allowed in cases 
of formal deficiencies), all verdicts were final. 
But it would be wrong to think that the local courts established 
by the Decree on Courts No. 1 (people’s courts after March 1928) 
performed the administration of justice in the Bolshevik state. 
They had the power to judge property cases up to the total worth 
of 3, 000 roubles and to impose penalties of up to 3 years of prison 
(Soviet terminology: “deprivation of freedom”). All other cases 
were judged by the “revolutionary tribunals” established to:
fight against the counter-revolutionary forces in order to establish 
barriers separating them (miery odgrozhdeniya) [the counter- 
-revolutionary forces, A. B.] from the revolution and its attainments, 
and to solve matters concerning the control of marauding 
(maroderstvo) and sabotage (khishchnichesvo) subversion and other 
fraud by merchants (torgovtsy) industrialists, civil servants, and 
other persons (Decree on Courts No. 1, paragraph 5).
There was no possibility to appeal against the verdicts issued 
by the revolutionary tribunals. The appointment of these tribunals 
was, in this case, the materialization of the above-mentioned 
proposals made by Stuchka in May 1917. This led to the emergence 
of legal dualism in the Bolshevik state: the system of ordinary 
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and extraordinary courts judging political cases. After the 
reintroduction of the death penalty in February 1918, this penalty 
became the most frequent punishment used by the tribunals. 
In the years of war communism, the Bolshevik state had, at 
different periods, a whole chain of revolutionary tribunals. There 
existed ordinary revolutionary tribunals, military revolutionary 
tribunals, the revolutionary tribunals of print, and the railway 
revolutionary tribunals famous for being very cruel in their verdicts 
on perpetrators of railway and transport subversion. Punishments 
employed by the revolutionary tribunals were not precisely defined 
in any of the normative acts. There were only norms of a technical 
character; instructions describing the sequence of phases in the 
procedures for the juries did not have ex lege education in law.
Unwritten law was strongly promoted in Bolshevik Russia 
during the entirety of the war communism period. For example, 
the implementation of the people’s law (narodnoye pravo) was 
supported, the law which “should be expressed directly by the 
judges in which these judges should not be restricted by the bonds 
of written law” (Portnov, Slavin, 1990, p. 36). They also officially 
rejected the principle of the independence of courts. Stuchka 
wrote about this rule in the middle of 1918: “the right to elect 
judges should belong to the councils as organs holding all power 
and the sole exponent of the outlooks and desirers of the worker- 
-peasant democracy” (Stuchka, 1918, p. 5).
The councils of delegates were the organs authorized to 
determine the date of the election and tenure of the judges:
The elected courts, the author went on, can be recalled (otozvany) at 
any time by the given council. In this way the People’s Judge is deprived 
of the previously alleged “independence” and “irremovability” of the 
bourgeois judge but he obtained a durable (prochnaya) autonomy 
which earns him people’s trust (narodnoe doverie). No one can exert 
pressure on his conscience by threatening to transfer him or apply 
disciplinary responsibility. The people’s judge depends only on the 
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people’s trust he enjoys. Plans and prospects (to build personal career, 
benefits) are not the motivation to become a judge. The motivation is 
only the social duty and social mission (obshchestvennoe prizvanie) 
(Stuchka, 1918, p. 5).
The Bolshevik state used a similar method to justify the absence 
of any law-abidingness guarantees (the very term law-abidingness 
was rejected at the beginning). The described concepts, although 
original in some respects, were employed to justify the purely 
political nature of reprisal. However, the revolutionary tribunals 
turned out to be not very efficient in use. 
The peak of repression came with the All-Russian Extraordinary 
Committee for the Fight Against Counterrevolution and Sabotage 
(Cheka) headed from its inception by F. Dzerzhinski (1877–1926). 
The Cheka was not established by any normative act. Hence, even 
the official name of this institution never existed. Sometimes it 
was named the Extraordinary Committee for the Fight against 
Counterrevolution, Sabotage, and Profiteering, sometimes this 
name was expanded by adding “...and Service Offenses”. The Cheka 
powers comprised preparatory proceedings, sending people to 
prison and concentration camps, issuing verdicts and executions.
The first chronicler of the described institution, deputy head 
of the Cheka Martin Ivanovich Lacis (1888–1938), provides the 
following account of the committee’s powers in a low circulation 
book published in Moscow in 1920:
Cheka is not an investigation committee or a court. It is not a tribunal 
either. It is a combat organ operating on the internal front of the 
civil war, using in its battles the powers (priemy) of investigation 
committees, courts, tribunals, and army troops (voennye sily). It 
does not try the enemy but destroys it. It does not pardon the enemy 
but turns into ashes (ispepelyaet) anyone who holds weapons on the 
other side of the barricade and who cannot be used (ispolzovan) by 
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us in any way (Лацис, 1921, p. 8).10
Further parts of the book tell us about the penal measures 
applied by the committee. According to Dzerzhynsky’s deputy, 
the Cheka “terminates without court proceedings on the offence 
site or isolates from society by sending to concentration camps 
(kontsentratsyonnyi lager), sends [the case] to the tribunal 
whenever the case requires a similar solution and broad publicity” 
(ibid.).
Reprisal was very widely used until the end of the war 
communism era. Sometimes this was done also on the grounds 
of the adopted normative regulations. Among the best-known of 
these were the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissaries, The 
socialist fatherland in distress (February 21, 1918), and the Decree 
on Red Terror dated September 5, 1918, which promoted overt 
and arbitrary terror. The most famous document, the Decree on 
Red Terror, said for instance, that “under the existing situation, 
protection of the hinterland with the use of terror is an absolute 
necessity”. The Decree therefore provided for 
sending a large number of responsible party comrades to the 
hinterland, the necessity to protect the Soviet Republic against 
class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps, shooting 
all persons who had been in contact (prikosnovennye) with White 
Guard organizations, conspiracy, and rebels (SU, 1917/1918, No. 65, 
item 710).11
No  comprehensive  list  of  penal  measures  was  compiled  in 
Bolshevik Russia until the end of war communism. Criminal law 
10  Some excerpts from Lacis’s statements are quoted by, among other authors, 
R. Pipes (Pipes, 1994, p. 655), but in an imperfect translation.
11  Reprinted in: Ezhenedelnik Vecheka, 1918, No.1, p. 11 (where the resolution 
is signed only by the secretary of the Council of the People’s Commissaries and 
Lenin’s personal secretary L. Fotieva) and the Decrety Sovetskoy Vlasti, 1964, 
pp. 291–192.
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also adopted the principle of analogy, thus rejecting the principle of 
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. But a normative act was issued 
to mention examples of penal measures. Such an act, described as 
the Guiding Principles of Russian Penal Legislation, and published 
in December 1919, listed the following penal measures:
a) reproach (vnushenye), b) public reproach, c) compelling to 
action which was not a physical offence (e.g. attending an education 
course), d) announcing a boycott [of a given person] (obyavlenie 
pod boykotom), e) relegation from a union (obedinenya) for 
a specific time (navremya) or forever, f) return or, whenever this 
was impossible, reparation of the wrongs, g) deposition, h) ban from 
performing a specific activity or other activities or a specific job or 
other jobs, i) confiscation of all or part of the property, j) stripping 
of political rights, k) declaration of being an enemy of the revolution 
or the people (obyavlenie vragom revolutsyi ili naroda), l) forced 
labour (prinuditelnye raboty) without transfer to limited freedom 
establishments, m) imprisonment for a specified or unspecified 
period (neopredelennyi srok) until a given event (izvestnoe sobytie) 
takes place, n) outlawry (obyavlenie vne zakona), o) execution by 
shooting, p) combination of the above-mentioned penal measures 
(Руководящие начала по уголовному праву РСФСР, 1919, ch. VI, 
paragraph 25).
Bolshevik lawyers kept trying to establish a new science of law 
until the end of the civil war in Russia. The leading role in research 
work after the middle of 1918 was played by the Socialist Academy 
of  Social  Sciences  (among  the  members  were  A.  Goikhbarg, 
M. Reisner, P. Stuchka and others). New branches of law were 
also developed, such as labor law (trudovoe zakonodatelstvo) or 
agrarian law (zemelnoe pravo). But also in these cases the law 
was subordinated to political tasks. This applied also to civil law 
which the authorities had planned to eliminate after some time. 
So a number of legal acts were issued to limit the institution of 
property rights and later remove them entirely.
As regards rural property, this goal was achieved by the Decree 
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of the Council of People’s Commissaries on the Socialization of Land 
adopted in February 1918 (SU, 1917/1918, No. 25, item 346). The 
right to rural property was removed by the Decree on Cancelling 
Private Property in Towns (SU, 1918, No. 62, item 674), designed 
entirely by Lenin. In June 1918, hereditary rights were also 
abrogated (except for household goods). 
As mentioned above, the lawyers close to the new power center 
tried to promote the ideas of the new science of law during the 
years of war communism. They sometimes promoted the ideas of 
social solidarity, the extinction of law, and the need to abandon 
the written law in a communist society. The most outstanding 
specialist in civil law of that time, Goikhbarg (1918, pp. 9–10, cited 
in Goikhbarg, 1919, p. 37), contended that under the communist 
system
the period of social struggle and war will become just a legend (…) 
Compulsion as a category of inter-human relations will cease to 
exist. So will law as an instrument of compulsion in social relations, 
as the expression of continuous struggle between individuals, 
groups, and the state. With a deep consolidation [of the principles] 
of collectivism, not only civil law but law as a whole will cease to 
exist. The harmonious existence of people will not be built on the 
foundation of social compulsion and social need, in other words, on 
the foundation of law, but on the grounds of total social freedom.12
A similar theory which Goikhbarg linked with the name of 
Leon Duguit was described in the USSR as the theory of the law’s 
social functions. The reality of Bolshevik Russia was, however, 
totally different than that described by Goikhbarg, who was, to 
some extent, also involved in the terror of the period. 
During war communism, the Bolsheviks established a complete 
and consistent, though unprecedented system of a totalitarian 
state in Russia. This system was characterized by:
12  The quoted excerpt is from Goikhbarg’s text, also found in Goldman 
(1983, p. 185).
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1. The  practical  application  of  Lenin’s  pre-revolutionary 
comprehension of law where law was an instrument of reprisal 
against enemies of the authorities unable to restrict the 
lawmaker (a combination of Marxism and legal nihilism).
2. The rejection de iure of all legal guarantees protecting the rights 
of the citizens; the rejection of the entire pre-revolutionary 
legislation and replacing it with never defined, random 
regulations of the unwritten law.
3. The introduction of legal dualism: the common courts and the 
extraordinary courts which judged political cases; establishing 
a wide range of reprisal institutions (four types of revolutionary 
tribunals) in this administrative repression (the Cheka).
4. The liquidation of property law (real estate) in towns and in the 
country, on the whole territory of the state.
5. The concentration of all power in the hands of executive 
organs; replacing the institution of parliamentary act (with 
the parliament itself preserved in place) by a normative act of 
the executive authorities (extremely broad conception of the 
decree); the official negation of the institution of separation of 
powers.
To sum up, it may be said that during the three and a half years 
of war communism Russia experienced vast transformations. At 
the same time, a totally new, unprecedented legal and political 
system was established. Most probably none (maybe except for 
the transformations in Cambodia under Pol Pot) of the other 
totalitarian systems of the 20th century brought about such deep 
changes into a pre-revolutionary state. Thus, it is no coincidence 
that many of the concepts related to the Bolshevik state were 
adopted during the Stalin era. Some of the institutions, in a limited 
form, also infiltrated into the Nazi legal system (the nihilism of 
R. Freisler, the dualism of the administration of justice, maybe 
even the institution of the family code and related upbringing 
concepts). But many more of the Bolshevik ideas of law and 
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politics originating in the war communism period entered the legal 
systems of the USSR and the communist bloc countries. Some of 
the institutions which were developed under the Bolshevik state 
continue to exist even in the Polish legal system in the present day. 
This applies, among other regulations, to the well-known general 
clauses in the Polish Civil Code such as the principle of social life 
and the socio-economic role of the law.
Key words: The Russian revolution, totalitarianism, war communism, genocide, 
political repressions, bolshevism, Lenin, law under totalitarian regime, political 
system of totalitarianism, civil law in totalitarianism, utopianism. 
Kształtowanie się pierwszego państwa totalitarnego:  
system polityczny i prawny Rewolucji Rosyjskiej  
(październik 1917-1921) i jego konsekwencje
Artykuł analizuje kształtowanie się bolszewickiego systemu politycznego 
i prawnego, powstałego w latach komunizmu wojennego 1917-1921 i wcześniej: 
w programie partii i jej założyciela. Poglądy Lenina, który na temat prawa pisał 
bardzo niewiele, a w Rosji carskiej traktowany był jako postać marginalna, sta-
nowiły niewątpliwy asumpt do wytworzenia systemu totalitarnego. Natomiast 
program partii, jeszcze w początku 1917 roku deklarujący literalnie wolności 
obywatelskie, czy przywiązanie do demokracji bezpośredniej, został po rewo-
lucji całkowicie złamany. Lata komunizmu wojennego to bowiem stworzenie 
bardzo rozbudowanego systemu ludobójstwa oraz bardzo szerokich kompeten-
cyjnie organów represyjnych, ograniczenia praw obywatelskich i najbardziej 
podstawowych swobód (z prawem własności włącznie), przy deklarowaniu 
bardzo szerokich wolności, nieobecnych w żadnym innym systemie politycz-
nym. Nietrudno dostrzec, że negatywne dziedzictwo takiego systemu, odbiło 
się systemach polityczno-prawnych wielu państw, w tym Polski. Bolszewicka 
rewolucja 1917 roku jest w tym przypadku najgorszym chyba wydarzeniem 
XX stulecia. 
Формирование первого тоталитарного государства: 
политическая и правовая система Русской революции 
(октябрь 1917-1921 гг.) и ее последствия
В статье рассматривается формирование большевистской политической 
38 Adam Bosiacki
и правовой системы, созданной в годы военного коммунизма 1917-1921 
гг., и ранее: в программе партии и ее основателя. Ленин, взгляды кото-
рого были решающими в формировании тоталитарной системы, в цар-
ской России по вопросам права писал мало и был скорее фигурой мар-
гинальной. Программа партии, еще вначале 1917 года декларирующая 
гражданские свободы и ценность прямой демократии, после революции 
была полностью изменена. Годы военного коммунизма – это создание 
системы геноцида и репрессивных органов с широкими полномочиями, 
ограничение гражданских прав и основных свобод (включая право собс-
твенности) при декларировании очень широких свобод, отсутствующих 
в любой другой политической системе. Несложно увидеть, что негатив-
ное наследие такой системы повлияло на политико-правовые системы 
многих стран, включая Польшу. Большевистская революция 1917 года, 
с этой точки зрения, является худшим событием 20-го века.
Lyudmila Ilyicheva
Chapter 2
State, Business and Society in Russia:  
The Genesis and Models of Interaction 
1917–2017
After  more  than  a  century  since  the  Russian  Revolution 
a relatively sufficient amount of time has passed to pay attention 
to the lessons of the revolution and now really clarify what in fact 
what has happened in the intervening years.
Before 1914 the class of entrepreneurs already looked quite 
formed, and the period from 1908 to 1914 can rightfully be 
called the golden age of capitalism in Russia. The capital of newly 
established joint-stock companies during that period comprised 
41% of the total capital of all business societies organized after 
1861. Between 1908 and 1914 more than 70% of new investments 
were created by domestic funds.
This wealth, distributed in a very uneven manner, was 
evidenced by the twofold increase of deposits in banks savings 
and current bank accounts as well as the fact that Russian citizens 
began to actively buy back securities that had long been in the 
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hands of foreigners. Hence there were positive tendencies in the 
relationships between the state and entrepreneurs in accordance 
with the course taken by Witte and continued by Stolypin. The 
period from 1905 to 1914 may be deemed the time of emergence 
of a class of real entrepreneurs and a market for private demand 
able to replace state encouragement in all economic sectors both 
in the city and in the countryside.
By the beginning of World War I, an extensive network of 
representative bodies of capital had achieved great influence 
within society. Any potential attempts to extend influence over 
the state authorities in the first post-reform years were replaced by 
a powerful organizational pressure on the government resulting 
in the entwinement of public and private interests. The significant 
economic success achieved by capitalist Russia was definitely 
a result of the unwritten contract between the state and the capital 
although the latter’s aspirations did not always coincide with the 
political and economic interests of the state.
In 1915–1916, during the military and economic crisis, various 
social structures were established in the country. Their purpose 
was to help the state to find a way out in the situation of economic 
collapse. Upon the initiative of the business leader A. Guchkov, 
the head of the Octobrist Party, a Central Military Industrial 
Committee was set up. This committee distributed military 
contracts among business leaders having sufficient authority in 
politics and acted practically as a parallel government.
In 1917 “The Society for the Economic Revival of Russia” 
was one of the most affluent political groups. It was founded 
thanks to the initiative of A. Putilin. It included bankers and 
industrialists from Petrograd (Saint Petersburg). The organization 
had 269 branches. In Moscow, during this period, the opulent 
organized the “All-Russian Union of Trade and Industry” which 
included about 500 different business associations. One of the 
tasks of the Union was the preparation for leading its placemen 
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to the Fifth State Duma and after the February Revolution – to 
the Constituent Convention. These facts illustrate the formation 
of diversified ties between the economy and politics, their 
interdependence and interconnection.
The alliance of industrialists and authorities, broken by the 
revolutionary events, was partially restored during the period of 
New Economic Policy (hereinafter referred to as “NEP”). A new 
stage in the interaction between political structures and new 
entrepreneurs began. This temporary deviation from the extremely 
rigid Soviet statist policy and control once again demonstrated 
the great importance of such ties. At the same time researchers 
note contradictions, such as obvious inconsistency on part of the 
authorities in the implementation of this approach.
At the end of 1921 the Leninist formula of “state capitalism” 
is enriched with the concept of “transfer of state enterprises to 
so-called economic accounting”, i.e. “largely on commercial, 
capitalist grounds”. This provision is critical not only for the NEP 
period but also for the comprehension of the entrepreneurship 
phenomenon with regard to state-owned enterprises. The transfer 
of such enterprises, especially trusts, to full economic accounting, 
i.е. to full economic responsibility for the manufacture, 
nomenclature and sales of products, allows for a discussion on 
state entrepreneurship.
It is important to emphasize that during the formation of state 
self-supporting trusts there were many examples of merging the 
interests of trusts’ management and business speculators who 
made great profit from trade and intermediary services with these 
trusts rather than organizing production and trade themselves in 
their civilized capitalist forms. By 1924 private capital controlled 
over two-thirds of the wholesale and retail goods turnover in the 
country aggravating strong mismanagement of the new bodies, 
whose leadership came from the liquidated central administrations 
and centers, taught how to deal with the distribution of goods 
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but lacking genuine knowledge about the organization of trade 
and market. It can be said without exaggeration that elements of 
parasitic, speculative-bureaucratic capitalism were born. They 
did not have anything to do with the patterns of capitalism that 
existed in developed European capitalist countries.
In the Soviet Union, since it was a totalitarian system, 
“corporatism” was characterized by a relatively close integrated 
connection of various corporate interests with the “nationwide 
interest”.
There were corporate interests, sometimes realized contrary 
to the interests of other corporate groups, in the economic 
monopoly system regulated by the state. For example, investments 
in agriculture were carried out through the development of food 
and consumer goods industries which ultimately affected the 
development of agriculture. This predominantly refers to the 
development of the military-industrial complex.
The time of “Perestroyka” resulted in different phenomena: 
existing interest groups actually undermined the party bodies 
and, remaining uncontrolled, began to manage resources entering 
the power struggle with each other. The abolishment of central 
planning (the CPSU) freed the groups of interests from the support 
of party bodies. The particular groups became the main power 
brokers in the post-Soviet area, and still do not have either serious 
political opposition or serious economic competitors. At the same 
time, however, these groups were being transformed. The interest 
in the “participation in redistribution of resources” implies the 
unification or delimitation of the subjects of this redistribution on 
contractual terms. This initiated the formation of “elite groups” 
which strengthened the power structures.
At the end of the 1990s the actually authoritarian and oligarchic 
power mechanisms came into conflict with the society’s need 
for broad social reforms. A balanced system of constructively 
functioning political parties and other socio-political organizations 
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was not created in society. The low level of trust of the population 
towards power was fixed. This determined the nature and specific 
features of lobbyism within public authorities, strengthening their 
diversification, mobility and adaptability. Naturally, they desired 
to overcome the negative attitude of the overwhelming and silent 
majority toward the political decision-makers.
New  interests  called  for  new  mechanisms  for  their 
implementation. They focused not only on economic but also on 
political processes. There was a fusion of interests of the upper 
class of the financial and economic elite and interests of the 
upper bureaucracy as well as crystallization and confrontation of 
various oligarchic financial and industrial groups in interaction 
with various groups of state bureaucracy. Corporations tried 
to lobby their interests through such political forms as social 
associations. Such channels of influence as latent and sometimes 
open investment of capital in politics, especially in the electoral 
process, were legalized.
In practice the criminalization of Russian society was 
intensified. Hidden lobbyism and corruption in the top echelons 
of power are among the top ten most important Russian 
problems. This required the adoption and implementation of 
the program of struggle against organized crime and corruption. 
The task of regulatory measures towards the state apparatus of 
colleges, ministries and social councils under the government and 
parliament came into force.
When Vladimir Putin took the office of the President of the 
Russian Federation the country entered the process of cardinal 
reconstruction. First of all, the relationships between power and 
society, political institutions, social groups and nations, between 
the state and social associations and political parties, between the 
center and regions, the relationships within the federal subjects, 
between business and society, business and political parties etc. 
radically changed. Political relations began to be formed in a more 
democratic manner.
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Paradoxically, nowadays there is a greater diversity of regional 
interests and social forms of life. Regional authorities assume the 
functions of developers and conductors of economic and social 
policy thereby developing and strengthening the specificity of 
their regions.
With the advent of the world economic crisis in 2008, Russia 
set upon the path of modernization with the goal of reaching 
a national consensus in relation to the long-term goals of 
economic development. Such long-term strategic goals become 
a mobilizing program of actions when methods and mechanisms 
of their achievement are developed, resources necessary for their 
achievement are identified, including support of the goals by the 
crucial social groups and, ideally, by the whole of society. This task 
was accepted for implementation (comp. Mau, 2015).
Map of modernization project in the Russian Federation
Modernization
Improving 
competitiveness in the 
country, overcoming 
of dependence on raw 
materials
Cooperation with the 
countries of Europe, 
Asia, America
Reliance 
on humanitarian  
values
Support for  
solo effort
Creation of «smart», 
efficient economy, 
improvement of the 
quality of life
Attraction of foreign 
technologies, 
investments to the 
Russian Federation
Support for 
democracy, supremacy 
of law
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Contrary to the destructive doctrines of the past, the current 
leadership of the country has set the task of maintaining relations 
with other countries as equal partners in order to mutually enrich 
their cultures and economies, to solve security problems etc.
In his decrees from May 2012, Vladimir Putin instructed 
the government to take measures aimed at the improvement of 
Russia’s position in the World Bank’s rating for business climate 
from the 120th position, calculated in 2011, to the 50th in 2015 
and to the 20th in 2018.
If one refers to the annual “Conduct of Business” report by 
the World Bank, it will be brought to light that this report has 
already been compiled for the 14th time and covers 190 countries. 
The report focuses on the regulatory standards that facilitate or 
hinder business development throughout the entire business cycle 
including the establishment of enterprises, conduct of business, 
carrying out foreign trade activity, payment of taxes as well as 
maintaining a high level of protection of the rights of investors.
The WB analysts in the latest reports looked at three main 
scenarios for the development of the Russian economy. In the 
baseline scenario, the World Bank expects that the average oil price 
will stay at $53.2 per barrel in 2015 and $56.9 per barrel in 2017. 
As noted in the report, if the impact of sanctions and the decline 
in oil prices continues, it will provoke a prolonged recession in 
Russia. “Based on the continuing geopolitical tensions, the present 
forecast assumes preservation of the sanctions during 2015 and 
2017.” The cost of attracting foreign borrowing remains high, and 
access to international capital markets – limited, which will hold 
the investment demand (World Bank, 2015, comp. also World 
Bank, 2017).
The  problems  mentioned  above  are  not  fulfilling  the 
modernization agenda in the current crisis. Other important areas 
of institutional and structural reforms should be highlighted, such 
as industries of human capital (education, healthcare and the 
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pension system), which are now closely intertwining social, fiscal 
and investment factors. New approaches to social policy, foreign 
economic activity and spatial development are required.
In conclusion, the urgent tasks that require creative institutional 
solutions for the further transformation of the economic system of 
Russia (as a post-communist state), can be described in a number 
of points:
•  updating the most important components of market infra-
structure (banking systems, stock market, infrastructure, 
support for small and medium-sized businesses, and 
others);
•  taking decisive steps against  the sprawling corruption and 
other forms of negative shadow relations in the economy;
•  taking  effective  measures  to  implement  major  structural 
changes in the economy, associated with the departure 
from the raw material model and the conversion to the 
innovation-oriented model of economic development;
•  creating an effective national innovation system;
•  re-creating  a  long-term  forecasting  system,  strategic 
and indicative planning and programming of social and 
economic development at the federal level;
•  discovering  effective  forms  of  the  project-based  approach 
to solving repetitively emerging large-scale scientific, 
technological and socio-economic problems across the 
whole country;
•  the  creation of  a more  effective mechanism of  interaction 
between enterprise structures and the state in the 
implementation of relevant national issues;
•  significant  improvement  of  the  system  of  regional 
management of the economy, which should contribute to the 
expansion of centralized influence towards more balanced 
territorial development and stimulation of initiative efforts 
of the regions in addressing socio-economic problems at the 
regional and local level (comp. Орлова, Соколова, 2017).
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Current objectives determine the perspectives of development 
of the Russian economy and the priorities of the state with regard 
to the economic policy. The success of their implementation is 
directly connected with the characteristics of the institutional 
structure of the country and its civilizational peculiarities, the 
values and interests of the major economic actors that are forming 
a real mechanism of public policy.
It also seems possible to name a set of useful principles 
underlying the relationship between the state, business and society 
in Russia:
•  determined  refusal  to  merge  the  functions  of  private 
entrepreneurship and public administration,
•  transparency  of  relations  between  large  capital  and  state 
power, based on law and the institutions available for control 
by civil society;
•  effective  participation  in  the  system  of  social  partnership 
on the basis of collective agreements, the exclusion of force 
methods in solving disputable problems (comp. Dudin, 
2014).
To sum up, the solution for overcoming the dark legacy of the 
Revolution, which lies not only in ineffectiveness but also in the 
split between the three constructing pillars of the nation, is to work 
out a new model of harmonious interaction between the state, 
business and society in Russia. The oversimplified (and in this way 
deconstructed) idea of cooperation between the three elements 
needs to undergo gradual and consistent rebirth in the seemingly 
trivial process of implementing public-private partnerships.
Państwo, biznes i społeczeństwo w Rosji.  
Powstanie i modele interakcji 1917-2017
Rozdział przedstawia genezę interakcji pomiędzy biznesem, państwem i spo-
łeczeństwem po rewolucji 1917 roku. Zaznaczono rolę przedsiębiorczości na 
wszystkich etapach rozwoju socjalistycznego oraz postsocjalistycznego. Obec-
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ne stadium charakteryzuje się poszukiwaniem równowagi interesów pomię-
dzy państwem, biznesem a społeczeństwem oraz próbą jej utrzymania. Sferę 
innowacji można określić jako proces implementacji partnerstwa publiczno-
prywatnego.
Государство, бизнес и общество в России:  
генезис и модели взаимодействия 1917-2017 гг.
Глава представляет генезис взаимодействия бизнеса, государства и обще-
ства после революции 1917 года. Отмечена роль предпринимательства на 
всех этапах социалистического и постсоциалистического развития. Ны-
нешний этап характеризуется поиском и попыткой сохранения баланса 
интересов между государством, бизнесом и обществом. Сфера иннова-
ций может быть определена как процесс имплементации государствен-
но-частного партнерства.
Ivan Fomin
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad
Chapter 3
Contested Post-Soviet Secessions  
in the Russian Political Discourse:  
The Grammar of Recognition1
This paper is focused on the cases of recognition of contested 
secessionist entities in the official Russian political discourse. Of all 
the post-Soviet contested states there are only three that have been 
officially recognized by Russia. They are Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Crimea. In other cases, even though Russia did sometimes 
back the secessionist entities, it has never formally recognized 
their independence. For example, Novorossiya (the Donetsk 
Peoples’ Republic and the Lugansk Peoples’ Republic) in Ukraine 
and Transnistria in Moldova did receive Russia’s support and 
petitioned to be recognized by Moscow (and even to be integrated 
as regions of Russia), but are still deprived of recognition.
1  This work was supported by the National Science Centre in Poland (grant 
No. 2015/19/B/HS5/02516).
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The goal of my research is to understand how Russia’s official 
political discourses about the entities that did receive Moscow’s 
recognition (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea) differ from 
each other in terms of discursive strategies used to legitimize 
their statuses. This analysis is a way to better understand how the 
painful legacies of the Soviet era and the revolutionary momentum 
of the de-composition of the Soviet empire in 1991 echo in the 
contemporary political language of Russia. The study also outlines 
a spectrum of how the political discourse of Russia reacts to the 
still ongoing processes of disintegration in the post-Soviet space. 
Comparing the cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea 
can be productive, since, on the one hand, they share a number 
of common features with both Georgia and Ukraine being post- 
-Soviet polities, both dealing with the conflictogenic legacy of the 
Soviet territorial policies, both going through color revolutions 
in mid-2000s and both facing Russia’s interventions. However, 
when it comes to the secessionist entities themselves, they are 
quite different in terms of the history of these territories and their 
ethnolinguistic demography. 
Russia’s policies towards these entities are also not identical. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been recognized as separate 
states, but have not been fully integrated into Russia (even though 
South Ossetia has petitioned several times for this to happen), 
while Crimea was made a part of Russia almost immediately after 
the de-facto separation from Ukraine.
Materials and Methods
The research is based on the comparative analysis of two 
texts: 
1) the statement by Dmitry Medvedev on the recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (August 26, 2008),
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2) the address by Vladimir Putin on the reunification of Crimea 
with Russian Federation (“the Crimean Speech”) (March 18, 
2014). 
The main analytical category that I use in this research is 
that of topos. Topoi can be described as argumentation strategies 
that belong to either explicit or inferable premises. “They are the 
content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ that connect the 
argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, 
they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the 
conclusion” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 74-75). The abductive 
approach to topoi analysis that is often used in the Discourse-
Historic Approach to critical discourse analysis has a number of 
limitations when it comes to its universal use, however it can be 
quite effective in describing and comparing the argumentation 
strategies that are typical for certain discourses and genres. 
The list of topoi that I analyzed from the studied declarations 
is presented in Table 1 (based on Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 74- 
-80). In order to compare the two documents, I used quantitative 
analysis counting the number of paragraphs in which each of the 
topoi was used. 
Table 1.
List of Topoi
Topoi Conclusion rule
Topos of danger If there are specific dangers and threats, one should do 
something about them.
Topos of 
democracy
If a decision does (not) conform to democratic procedures, one 
should (not) accept it.
Topos of diversity If a political action or decision does (not) respect the diversity 
of society, one should (not) perform or make it.
Topos of ethnicity If a political action or decision does (not) respect the interests of 
an ethnic group, one should (not) perform or make it.
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Topos of history One should perform (omit) a specific action, because of 
historical analogies, negative and positive examples or other 
similarities (“history teaches that…”). 
Topos of 
humanitarianism 
If a political action or decision does (not) conform to human 
rights or humanitarian convictions and values, one should (not) 
perform or make it.
Topos of intuition If a claim conforms to one’s intuition (feeling), the claim is true.
Topos of language If a political action or decision does (not) respect the interests of 
a language community, one should (not) perform or make it.
Topos of law If a law or an otherwise codified norm prescribes (forbids) 
a specific action, the action has to be performed (omitted).
Topos of numbers If the numbers prove a specific claim, this claim is true.
Topos of peace If a political action or decision does (not) conform to the value 
of peace, one should (not) perform or make it.
Topos of public
(Argumentum ad 
populum)
A proposition is true, good or right because many people 
believe it to be so.
Topos of reality Since reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be 
performed/made.
Topos of reason If a political action or decision does (not) conform to common 
sense, one should (not) perform or make it.
Topos of rightness If a situation does (not) conform to one’s concept of justice 
(fairness, rightness, responsibility), the situation should not 
(should) be changed.
Results
The results of the comparative quantitative topoi analysis of 
the two texts are presented in Table 2 and Diagram 1.
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Table 2.
Comparative Analysis of Topoi Use in the Crimean Speech 
(2014) and in the Statement on the Recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (2008) (N of paragraphs)
Topoi Statement on 
the recognition 
of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia 
Crimean Speech 
Topos of danger 7 19
Topos of democracy 3 10
Topos of diversity 0 2
Topos of ethnicity 3 17
Topos of history 1 21
Topos of humanitarianism 3 6
Topos of intuition 0 2
Topos of language 0 7
Topos of law 2 14
Topos of numbers 1 7
Topos of peace 3 5
Argumentum ad populum 3 9
Topos of reality 1 1
Topos of reason 1 0
Topos of rightness 0 6
Total number of paragraphs 11 64
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Diagram 1.
Comparative Analysis of Topoi Use in the Crimean Speech 
(2014) and in the Statement on the Recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (2008) (% of paragraphs)
From this analysis we can see that, in general, the sets of topoi 
used in the two texts are quite similar. However, there are four 
topoi that are unique for the discourse of the Crimean Speech and 
one topos that is specific for the statement about South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia.
Diversity and Ethnicity
The first topos that is unique for the discourse about Crimea 
is the topos of diversity. It is used in the part of the text that is 
devoted to the ethnolinguistic demography of Crimea and to the 
claim that Crimea should be trilingual:
Da
ng
er
De
mo
cra
cy
Di
ve
rsi
ty
Eth
nic
ity
Hi
sto
ry
Hu
ma
nit
ari
sm
Int
uit
ion
La
ng
ua
ge La
w
Nu
mb
ers
Pe
ac
e
Ad
 po
pu
lum
Re
ali
ty
Re
as
on
Rig
ht
ne
ss
Ad
 po
pu
lum
55Contested Post-Soviet Secessions in the Russian Political Discourse…
(1) Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and 
traditions. This makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where 
not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries. 
Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other 
ethnic groups have lived side by side in Crimea, retaining their 
own identity, traditions, languages and faith.
(2) We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living 
in Crimea. This is their common home, their motherland, 
and it would be right – I know the local population supports 
this – for Crimea to have three equal national languages: 
Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.
The absence of the topos of diversity in the text about South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia is quite illustrative since the Georgian 
population of the secessionist republics is radically excluded 
from Medvedev’s discourse. Even though the topos of ethnicity 
is shared by both analyzed texts, neither Georgian refugees (IDP) 
nor those Georgians who still live in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
were mentioned in Medvedev’s speech. The only ethnic groups 
mentioned in the text are Abkhazians and Ossetians2. In contrast, 
in the Crimean Speech, Putin refers not only to Russians, but to 
Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians as well. 
This can be explained by the context of the recognition of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia since during the war of 2008 in 
South Ossetia Georgian villages were destroyed and the Georgian 
population was forced to leave. The president of South Ossetia 
Eduard Kokoity then declared: “We do not intend to let anybody 
in here anymore” (Габуев, 2008).
2  See examples in (13). (22), (23), (24).
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Language
In the Crimean Speech, the topos of diversity is closely 
connected with another unique argumentation strategy that is the 
topos of language. In the declaration of 2014, Putin emphasized 
that the annexation of Crimea was connected with the threat to 
Russian-speaking population and was triggered by the disrespect 
of its language rights:
(3) Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians 
of their historical memory, even of their language and to 
subject them to forced assimilation.
(4) The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law 
to revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement 
on the rights of ethnic minorities.
(5) Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened 
with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, 
the Russian-speaking Crimea.
Rightness and Intuition
Another topos that is present in the Crimean Speech but is 
not used in the statement on the recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia is the topos of intuition. When speaking about 
the annexation of Crimea, Putin twice refers to the idea that “in 
people’s heart” Crimea “has always been a part of Russia”.
The topos of intuition is closely connected with the topos 
of rightness that is also used only in Putin’s text. It is crucial to 
emphasize that the concept of rightness used by Putin does not 
necessarily imply equity or legal justice. It rather refers to the 
intuitive feeling of spravedlivost’ (rightness).
Here are some fragments from the speech in which Putin 
refers to intuition and rightness:
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(6) In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been 
an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based 
on truth and justice and was passed from generation 
to generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite 
all the dramatic changes our country went through during 
the entire 20th century.
(7) However, the people could not reconcile themselves to this 
outrageous historical injustice. All these years, citizens 
and many public figures came back to this issue, saying that 
Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian 
city. Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds, but we 
had to proceed from the existing reality and build our good-
neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine on a new 
basis. 
Another aspect of the topos of rightness is based on the concept 
of moral responsibility. It is used both to justify Russia’s actions 
and to condemn the actions of the “western partners”:
(8) Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could 
not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would 
have been betrayal on our part.
(9) And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed 
the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and 
unprofessionally.
Interestingly, the intuitive topoi of the Crimean Speech contrast 
with the topos of reason that can be found only in the Medvedev’s 
declaration about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This topos is used 
in the speech as a way to disprove Georgia’s aggression against 
South Ossetia:
(10) The Georgian leadership, in violation of the UN Charter 
and their obligations under international agreements and 
contrary to the voice of reason, unleashed an armed conflict 
victimizing innocent civilians.
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Danger 
As to the topoi that were not unique for one of the analyzed 
discourses but were dominant in one of them, in the case of 
Medvedev’s speech that was the topos of danger. In more than 60% 
of the paragraphs of the statement, Medvedev refers to Tbilisi 
threatening the very existence of the Ossetian and Abkhazian 
peoples. And it is this danger that was used as the main warrant to 
justify the recognition of the secessionist states. 
For example:
(11) The Georgian leadership, in violation of the UN Charter 
and their obligations under international agreements 
and contrary to the voice of reason, unleashed an armed 
conflict victimizing innocent civilians. The same fate lay 
in store for Abkhazia. Obviously, they in Tbilisi hoped 
for a blitz-krieg that would have confronted the world 
community with an accomplished fact. The most inhuman 
way was chosen to achieve the objective – annexing South 
Ossetia through the annihilation of a whole people.
In some cases the topos of danger was combined with the topoi 
of peace and humanitarianism:
(12) It stands quite clear now: a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
was not part of Tbilisi’s plan. The Georgian leadership 
was methodically preparing for war, while the political 
and material support provided by their foreign guardians only 
served to reinforce the perception of their own impunity.
(13) Tbilisi made its choice during the night of August 8, 2008. 
Saakashvili opted for genocide to accomplish his political 
objectives. By doing so he himself dashed all the hopes 
for the peaceful coexistence of Ossetians, Abkhazians and 
Georgians in a single state. 
(14) Russia calls on other states to follow its example. This is not 
an easy choice to make, but it represents the only possibility 
to save human lives.
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In the Crimean Speech, the topos of danger was also one of the 
dominant ones. For example, Putin used the threat of NATO as 
one of the warrants to justify the integration of Crimea.
(15) Let me note too that we have already heard declarations 
from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What would 
this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It 
would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there 
in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create 
not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole 
of southern Russia. These are things that could have become 
reality were it not for the choice the Crimean people made, 
and I want to say thank you to them for this.
Putin also used the topos of danger arguing that there was 
a threat to the Russian-speaking population of Crimea after 
“Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites” executed 
the coup in Ukraine:
(16) Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened 
with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, 
the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents 
of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in 
defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events 
that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, 
Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.
Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could 
not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would 
have been betrayal on our part.
History
Even though the topos of danger was crucial for the discourse 
of the Crimean Speech, it was not the main topos used in it. The 
dominant topos of the speech was the topos of history. In more 
than 30% of the paragraphs, Putin appealed to it claiming that 
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Crimea should be a part of Russia because of the deep historical 
connection between them and because Crimea had been separated 
from Russia as a result of an “outrageous historical injustice”:
(17) More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. 
Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favour of reuniting 
with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.
To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough 
to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea 
have always meant for each other.
(18) However, the people could not reconcile themselves to this 
outrageous historical injustice. All these years, citizens 
and many public figures came back to this issue, saying 
that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is 
a Russian city. Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds, 
but we had to proceed from the existing reality and build 
our good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine 
on a new basis. 
(19) For all the internal processes within the organisation, 
NATO remains a military alliance, and we are against having 
a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard 
or in our historic territory. 
Putin also used a series of historical parallels and comparisons 
in order to justify the annexation:
(20) Let me remind you that in the course of political 
consultations on the unification of East and West Germany, 
at the expert, though very high level, some nations that were 
then and are now Germany’s allies did not support the idea of 
unification. Our nation, however, unequivocally supported 
the sincere, unstoppable desire of the Germans for national 
unity. I am confident that you have not forgotten this, and 
I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the 
aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore 
unity.
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(21) Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-
known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our western 
colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar 
situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation 
of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, 
was legitimate and did not require any permission from 
the country’s central authorities. 
In the discourse of the statement on the recognition of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia the topos of history was used only once, in the 
context of the comparison between the events of 2008 and 1991: 
(22) That was not the first attempt to do this. In 1991, President 
Gamsahourdia of Georgia, having proclaimed the motto 
“Georgia for Georgians“ – just think about it! – ordered 
attacks on the cities of Sukhum and Tskhinval. The result 
then was thousands of killed people, dozens of thousands of 
refugees and devastated villages. And it was Russia who at 
that time put an end to the eradication of the Abkhaz and 
Ossetian peoples. 
Democracy
The topos of democracy and the argumentum ad populum were 
used in both analyzed texts and the manner of using them was 
quite similar in both cases. Both Putin and Medvedev referred 
to the results of referendums in order to justify their decisions. 
However, the percentage of paragraphs devoted to these topoi was 
larger in the case of Medvedev’s speech. 
Here are some examples from the statement of 2008:
(23) The peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have several 
times spoken out at referendums in favor of independence 
for their republics.
(24) The Presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, based on the 
results of the referendums conducted and on the decisions 
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taken by the Parliaments of the two republics, appealed to 
Russia to recognize the state sovereignty of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. The Federation Council and the State Duma 
voted in support of those appeals.
A decision needs to be taken based on the situation on the 
ground. Considering the freely expressed will of the Ossetian 
and Abkhaz peoples and being guided by the provisions of 
the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of 
International Law Governing Friendly Relations Between 
States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other 
fundamental international instruments, I signed Decrees on 
the recognition by the Russian Federation of South Ossetia’s 
and Abkhazia’s independence.
The examples of the same topoi can be found in the Crimean 
Speech:
(25) A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full 
compliance with democratic procedures and international 
norms.
More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. 
Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favour of reuniting 
with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.
(26) The most recent public opinion surveys conducted here in 
Russia show that 95 percent of people think that Russia should 
protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic 
groups living in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens. 
(27) A total of 86 percent of our people see Crimea as still being 
Russian territory and part of our country’s lands. And one 
particularly important figure, which corresponds exactly 
with the result in Crimea’s referendum: almost 92 percent of 
our people support Crimea’s reunification with Russia. 
(28) Thus we see that the overwhelming majority of people in 
Crimea and the absolute majority of the Russian Federation’s 
people support the reunification of the Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol with Russia.
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As one can see, in the Crimean case the president referred not 
only to the results of the referendum, but also to the survey data 
in order to justify the claim that Russian citizens want to accept 
Crimea as a part of Russia.
Conclusions
The comparative analysis of the sets of topoi used in the 
statement on recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in 
the Crimean Speech leads to the following conclusions:
1. The statement on the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
is largely based on the topos of danger.
2. The Crimean Speech is dominated by both the topos of history 
and the topos of danger. 
3. The topoi of rightness and intuition as well as those of language 
and diversity are used only in the Crimean Speech.
4. The topos of reason is unique to the discourse of recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
5. The topoi of ethnicity and law are actively used in both texts.
6. For the discourse about South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the topoi 
of peace, humanitarianism and democracy are also important. 
These results can be interpreted from two perspectives. First, 
they can be seen as evidence of the fact that Russia’s policies towards 
Crimea and towards the secessionist republics in Georgia are not 
identical. It is not only the formally recognized statuses of these 
entities that are different, but also the discourse of legitimization 
of those statuses. The analysis shows that the separation of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are mostly represented as compelled 
secessions, legitimized by a threat, while in the Crimean case one 
of the main additional discursive motives is that of a voluntary 
secession of an entity that is historically meant to be with Russia. 
Second, the comparison of the two texts is also illustrative of 
Russia’s regime drift from 2008 to 2014. From this point of view, 
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the difference between the two texts can be seen as a symptom of 
a larger discursive shift from the more pragmatic political discourse 
of 2000s to a more irrational and mythologized discourse of 
2010s, i.e. from the formal respect to democratic procedures, law, 
reason and humanitarian values to the rise of sacralized historical 
narratives and emotionally charged intuitions.
This trend shows that today Russia is still haunted by the 
Soviet past and is still influenced by the trauma of the collapse of 
the USSR and the following period of social disorder. It turns out 
that the two decades after the collapse of the Soviet empire were 
not enough to deal with this experience without spiraling back to 
the heavily ideological discourses. 
Sporne secesje ery postsowieckiej  
w rosyjskim dyskursie politycznym
Praca ma na celu pokazanie jak secesja Osetii Południowej, Abchazji i Krymu 
w czasach post-sowieckich jest ujmowana w oficjalnym rosyjskim dyskursie 
politycznym. Wszystkie trzy powyższe regiony zostały uznane przez Rosję, ale 
mają one inny status. Abchazja i Osetia Południowa zostały uznane za odrębne 
państwa, ale nie zostały w pełni włączone do Rosji, (chociaż Osetia Południo-
wa kilkakrotnie wystąpiła z taką prośbą), podczas gdy Krym stał się częścią 
Rosji niemal natychmiast po oddzieleniu się od Ukrainy. Artykuł pokazuje, 
że nie tylko formalny status tych podmiotów jest inny, lecz dyskurs związany 
z uznaniem Osetii Południowej i Abchazji za osobne państwa różni się również 
od tego dotyczącego Krymu. Badania zostały oparte na analizie porównawczej 
dwóch tekstów: 1) Oświadczenia Dmitrija Miedwiediewa w sprawie uznania 
Abchazji i Osetii Południowej (26 sierpnia 2008 r.), 2) Przemówienia Władi-
mira Putina dotyczącego Krymu (18 marca 2014 r.). Analiza pokazuje, że casus 
Osetii Południowej i Abchazji jest najczęściej reprezentowany jako secesja wy-
muszona, podczas gdy w przypadku Krymu jednym z głównych motywów dys-
kursywnych jest dobrowolna secesja półwyspu, który historycznie jest częscią 
Rosji. Porównanie to ilustruje również sposób, w jaki rosyjskie władze w latach 
2008–2014 zmieniały nastawienie do problematycznego dziedzictwa sowiec-
kiej polityki terytorialnej.
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Оспариваемые постсоветские сецессии  
в российском политическом дискурсе3
Цель работы показать, как в постсоветское время в официальном рос-
сийском политическом дискурсе представляется захват Южной Осетии, 
Абхазии и Крыма. Все три вышеуказанных региона признаны Россией, 
но имеют разный статус. Абхазия и Южная Осетия считаются скорее от-
дельными государствами и не были присоединены к России, хотя Южная 
Осетия (неоднократно обращалась с такими просьбами), в это время кaк 
Крым почти сразу после его отделения от Украины стал частью России. 
В статье показывается, что не только отличается формальный статус этих 
субъектов, но и дискурс, связанный с признанием Южной Осетии и Аб-
хазии как отдельных государств, отличается от дискурса признания Кры-
ма. Исследование было основано на сравнительном анализе двух текстов: 
1) заявления Дмитрия Медведева о признании Абхазии и Южной Осетии 
(26 августа 2008 года), 2) выступления Владимира Путина посвященного 
Крыму (18 марта 2014 года). Анализ показывает, что казус Южной Осе-
тии и Абхазии чаще всего представляется как вынужденное отделение, 
а в случае Крыма одним из главных мотивов дискурса является добро-
вольное отделение полуострова от Украины, который исторически всегда 
был частью России. Это сравнение также иллюстрирует то, как россий-
ские власти в 2008-2014 годах изменили свое отношение к проблемному 
наследию советской территориальной политики.
3  Проект осуществлен при финансовой поддержке Национального на-
учного центра Польши (проект No. 2015/19/B/HS5/02516).
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Chapter 4
A Revolution That Has Not Happened:  
The Potential  
of the Russian Nationalist Revival
Introductory remarks
World history abounds with revolutionary political changes. 
What does not seem important about that topic is the theoretical 
framework, which allows many scholars to discuss whether 
a political series of events can be put into the conceptual, systemic 
framework of “revolution” or not. What is widely accepted among 
theoreticians is the conviction that a revolution is a radical and 
anti-systemic political change. The theoretical understanding of 
revolution is related to the legitimacy of authority. The Weberian 
tradition includes 3 types of authority: traditional, legal-rational, and 
charismatic (comp. the critical remarks of Blau, 1963). According 
to it, a revolution can either violently break the people’s readiness to 
obey commands of a culturally rooted power or overthrow the old 
regime by acting according to a new system of laws, which replaces 
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the previous one without a sense of remorse. The new leaders and 
their style can often be defined as charismatic but theoretically we 
can easily think of a new, even more charismatic avant-garde, which 
steals the show: in revolutions a more radical kind of modernity 
usually replaces the previous style, which is perceived to be not 
revolutionary enough. In other words, revolutions undermine the 
base of all the three types of authority.
However, what really matters is the fact that after a revolution 
one’s smaller or bigger world will never be the same. Revolutions are 
incongruent with Tancredi’s (a character of Lampedusa’s Leopard) 
conviction that “For everything to stay the same, everything must 
change”. After a revolution not too many things stay the same: the 
main imperatives are either denied or even reversed – what was 
a vice in the old times becomes a virtue nowadays.
From the empirical or historical perspective, one can observe 
several types of revolutions. A classical study on the topic, Tanter 
& Midlarsky (1967, p. 265), lists four types: a mass revolution, 
a revolutionary coup, a reform coup and a palace revolution. 
This point of view, however, focuses on the technical aspect of 
change, whereas in the present study it is much more important 
to emphasize the object of contestation on the one hand, and the 
general objective, the imaginary future on the other. From the 
perspective of the first aspect, a lot of types can be distinguished 
but most of them boil down to three categories. 
1. Some revolutions are generally directed against a monarchy or 
another kind of autocratic power. Most European revolutions, 
including the Puritan Revolution in England, the French 
Revolution and the February Revolution in Russia led to 
toppling the contested monarchy. The imperatives that lead the 
revolutionaries to the barricades consist mainly in such things 
as the elevation of the people or administrative liberalization.
2. When the “people’s regime” turns out to be more invasive than 
the old system, especially if the leftist rules are imposed from 
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outside, an anti-socialist or an anti-communist revolution may 
demolish the radically egalitarian authorities. This is the case 
of the Thermidorian Reaction or the Autumn of Nations in 
Eastern Europe.
3. Another type of revolution is directed against the state that 
does not allow a people to develop its nationalistic desires: the 
will to unite, the desire for the fulfillment of pride, the libido 
dominandi among other nations or, finally, the desire to keep 
one’s own uniqueness, which is expressed in Russian with the 
term of samobytnost’ (самобытность). Historically, national 
revolutions and uprisings have taken various shapes such as 
the activities of the Spanish Falanga, which successfully fought 
the internationalist Republic, the Nazi upheaval in the 1930s or 
the Kurdish revival in Iraq in the 2010s. The theoretical aspect 
of the topic may not have been studied sufficiently; however, 
some publications concerning the issue are recommended 
(Unwalla, 2015; Kumar, 2015).
Russia can be described as a post-revolutionary country in 
at least two aspects. It underwent a deep deconstruction of its 
original civilizational structure after 1917 and, after more than 
70 years of the communist experiment, it had to face the collapse 
of the “red empire” and try to build a democratic civil society and 
free market. As in the case of gnostic utopia and in international 
relations both at home and abroad, we have to deal with two 
acts of deconstruction, where old values and dichotomies were 
replaced by new ones. Old Russia was predominantly an Orthodox 
and East-Slavic, ethnically Russian (russkaya) domain. The most 
typical oppositions in the political discourse oscillated around 
two topics:
1. “Russian” versus “Western”, where for the Westerners Russia 
should approach the European standards or, according to the 
Slavophil thinkers, it should protect its uniqueness and avoid 
the poison of the Western spirit.
70 Joachim Diec
2. “Orthodox” versus “atheist or heretic”. For traditionalists and 
the vast majority of the Russian population participation in the 
Eastern Church was a sine qua non condition of being a “real 
Russian”.
What seems surprising, in spite of the fact that the social 
question – the situation of the people – was widely discussed by 
the intelligentsia and a kind of “state populism” was also present, 
it would not be relevant to say that the intellectual elite tried to 
set one of the social classes against the other. Contrary to the 
Marxist belief in class struggle, the Russian intelligentsia tried to 
be sympathetic toward the peasants and took many actions which 
varied from charity to political terror against the state officials 
(comp. Nahirny, 1983).
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 changed a lot in the narrative. 
In fact it became entirely deconstructed. The opposition between 
the West and traditional Russia disappeared to be replaced by 
another juxtaposition: nationalism (or Great Russian chauvinism 
even) versus socialist internationalism. Only political tactics made 
Vladimir I. Lenin support the national independence ambitions. 
According to the Bolshevik leader, severe steps against nationalisms 
would provoke the nations to abandon the only sensible objective 
which is the liberalization of the world proletariat. The nations, 
focusing on the national conflicts, could thus be successfully tempted 
by the exploiters to forget about the main task (Lenin, 1972; see 
also the study on the controversy about the issue in Löwy, 1976).
The clue to the problem lies in the fact that before 1917 
the  value  of  national  patriotism  among  the  opposition  was 
a positive option, and Western cosmopolitism was perceived as 
a problematic attitude (in most of the Russian press and in the 
educational narrative; for the leftist intelligentsia the destruction 
of the old regime and the old cultural paradigm was the main 
objective), whereas now resorting to Russian national sentiments 
was proclaimed reactionary and became the negative pole of the 
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new opposition. As mentioned above, Russian traditionalists 
glorified the Russian people, especially the peasantry, no less than 
the leftists did. The goal was different, of course, because the leftists 
aimed at the liberalization of the “dark mass” and the monarchists, 
Slavophiles or Pan-Slavists preached about the people as the solid 
foundation of tsarism and Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the people 
and the elite (both reactionary and revolutionary) could agree on 
a certain kind of solidarity.
The revolution brought about a significant change, which, on 
a side note, was predicted by the Populist (Narodnik) and Bolshevik 
narratives, where the category of “the enemy of the people” played 
an important part. Previously, everybody praised the people, 
now the population was categorized into two different groups: 
the proletariat, the avant-garde of the proletariat (the Bolshevik 
Party), and, finally, the group of the enemies of the people. The 
term became very broad due to the fact that the Bolsheviks (or 
radical revolutionaries in general) did not enjoy general support. 
In the election to the Constituent Assembly in late fall of 1917 
the socialist agrarian democrats – the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party with Victor Chernov at the helm won most of the votes in 
the house, whereas the Bolsheviks with the Left SRs did not even 
exceed a quarter of the general vote (comp. Radkey, 1950). 
The other reason for the expansion of the category was the 
intention to wipe out not only the reactionary camp but also 
the left side of the political stage in all cases of real or imaginary 
disobedience.  The  Bolsheviks  accused  the  other  Russian 
revolutionaries, the Mensheviks or the Left SRs, of not being 
revolutionary enough and leading the people astray. The Bolshevik 
radicalism in the struggle for the ultimate dictatorship of the 
proletariat turned all the other leftists into the category of the enemy 
of the people. Moreover, under the Stalin regime many devoted 
Bolshevik activists were executed as a result of the same kind of 
accusations (see Stalin’s pamphlet: Mastering Bolshevism).
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After more than seven decades, the great change of the 1990s 
brought about another kind of deconstruction. In fact it fits quite 
well in Tanter & Midlarsky’s category of a “reform coup”. After 
December 1991, the Russian people woke up in a different reality: 
not only had the peaceful revolution destroyed their big state but 
it also undermined the paradigm of social and moral values. The 
new times created new oppositions such as
– “democracy” versus “communist authoritarianism”, 
– “liberalism” versus “Soviet totalitarianism”,
– “the self-made person” versus a collectivist “Homo 
Sovieticus” (sovok).
The axiological values of the poles were reversed: communism 
was now associated with the lack of personal freedom, the Soviet 
state was accused of crimes and, consequently, being a Homo 
Sovieticus became an insult (see the study on the sovok syndrome 
in Gogin, 2012). The older generation, which was deeply permeated 
with the idea of economic equality and social security could not 
understand foreign ideas and imperatives, which forced them to 
accept aggressive business games, spectacular careers of cunning 
swindlers,  and  painful  pauperization  of  the  majority  of  the 
citizens. 
Seeking elements that were commonly present or absent in the 
axiological oppositions of the three periods mentioned above, one 
can realize that Post-Communist Russia was unexpectedly quite 
liberal in the economic sense. Individual freedom and private 
initiative turned out to be capable of subordinating the other 
needs and values. The common good, especially in the sense of 
the social security of the average citizen, was entirely forgotten. In 
the same way one of the most important triggers for ideologists 
was lost: the “just cause” or sacrifice in the name of the people. The 
tsarist doctrine, created in the 1830s by the Minister of National 
Education, count Sergei Uvarov, promoted the ideas of Orthodoxy 
(pravoslavie),  Autocracy  (samoderzhavie),  and,  surprisingly 
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enough – narodnost’, which can be translated as Nationhood or 
Peoplehood (Uvarov, 1832). On the other hand, the revolutionary 
and moderate intelligentsia was ready for jail or hard work in 
Siberia if their struggle for the happiness of the people demanded 
such dramatic decisions.
Nothing like that characterizes the latest period of Russian 
history. Even though the new elite that came to power with 
Vladimir Putin after the beginning of the new millennium became 
much more assertive and rejected the previous subordination 
to Western interests and naive liberalism, it only replaced the 
previous oligarchy and still avoided any commitments concerning 
the common good of the citizens. In this way the axiological 
base of Post-Soviet Russia owes a lot to radical revolutionary 
deconstruction: it moved away from obligations concerning the 
people. The new times appeared to be painfully real, they brought 
about a completely new reality, an odd kind of business-like social 
contract (Gallopin, 2009). 
A historical study concerning any country or civilization 
ought to be based on facts and keep clear of “the alternative past”. 
In other words, historians describe facts and search for reasons. 
Political science, however, is not obliged to keep these standards 
since it is supposed to deal with current events and be confined 
to prognostic tasks. That is why it has to take into consideration 
probability and potentials in the same way as facts. Historians 
(despite being aware of their tasks) may not realize that their 
vision of the course of events is slightly deterministic whereas 
in fact none of the recorded and described historical events was 
entirely predictable a priori.
Sudden revolutions as well as longitudinal periods of duration 
are embedded in a complex structure of conditions, possibilities 
and decisions. Decisions made either by the leaders or by the people 
can be studied a posteriori but cannot be predicted with absolute 
certainty. However, the probability of events may be considered 
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while studying the well-known elements of the decision-making 
process and even ought to be taken into account in a prognostic 
study (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975). Theoretically, our 
point of interest lies in possible revolutions or other series of 
events which could have happened, may happen or should happen 
because of some reasons.
The range of perceived probability can vary from “absolute 
impossibility” to the strong feeling that “something is in the air” and 
that we are supposed to experience political turbulence tomorrow. 
What has to be remembered is the fact that we are still dealing 
with perceived probability since probability in the mathematical or 
physical sense (in quantum mechanics) cannot be applied directly 
in political science analyses even if they are based on quantitative 
(e.g. statistical) research. This does not mean that hard data that 
are helpful in the explanation of some events such as the number 
of guns or aircrafts should not be valued. The problem probably 
lies in the infinite number of conditioning factors.
The present chapter is devoted to an “imaginary revolution”, 
a vital problem in the Russian political reality, which has manifested 
itself several times but never resulted in a mass uprising or in 
a reform coup. The topic is somewhat inspired by the considerations 
of Tat’yana and Valeri Solovei, whose brilliant and pessimistic 
study Несостоявшаяся революция (The Unfulfilled Revolution) 
published in 2011 paints a picture of the tragedy of the Russian 
nation within its own state and the story of a necessary change 
that could never be realized because of internal contradictions 
within the nationalistic camp.
 The question of a nationalist revolution in Russia has been 
widely discussed not only by intellectuals but also among Russian 
politicians and in the media. In 2005 Andrei Savelyev, a prominent 
politician and member of the Rodina faction, openly declared in 
his lecture presented at the St. Petersburg Patriotic Forum that his 
party was not preparing a revolution but was getting ready for it 
(Савельев, 2005). 
75A Revolution That Has Not Happened: The Potential…
The hypothetical revolutionary option is treated by some circles 
as necessary because of the impossibility to realize the Russian 
national idea in a legal way. One of the very few nationalistic 
parties in Russia which work legally and enjoy their participation 
in the establishment is the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR) with Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky (Eidelstein) at 
the helm. However, his program and everyday narrative can be 
explained as a certain kind of “franchised nationalism” since 
Zhirinovsky managed to register his party in the Communist 
era as the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union; before 
that he co-headed the cultural organization Shalom, which was 
created to channel Jewish sentiments in the situation of increasing 
anti-Communist attitudes among that minority, which in turn led 
to mass migration, predominantly to Israel.
Another case of a legal nationalist-conservative political 
being is the Rodina (Homeland) Party, created in 2003 by Dmitry 
Rogozin. The party disappeared in 2006 because of a merge 
with Just Russia but was re-established in 2011 as an outcome of 
a conference of another nationalist organization: the Congress 
of Russian Communities. It was initially founded (in 1990) to 
promote the interests of ethnic Russians who were left beyond 
the Russian border as a result of the collapse of the USSR. The 
organization was officially registered in 2011. 
The other nationalistic groups, however, were much less 
successful. The list below illustrates only some representative 
cases.
1. A relatively early creation – the National-Republican Party of 
Russia, founded in 1991 by Nikolai Lysenko, was not persecuted 
as a whole but its leader was charged with the organization of 
a terrorist attack in the State Duma. Although the accusation 
was finally rejected, Lysenko was found guilty of stealing a state 
computer. In 1996, after the arrest of Lysenko, the party split 
into two factions. The faction which was led by Yuri Belyaev was 
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later transformed into The Party of Liberty (Партия свободы). 
Since the National-Republican Party of Russia could not be re-
registered until the end of 1998, it practically ceased to exist.
2. The Russian National Unity (Русское Национальное 
Единство) movement, a relatively big radical and militaristic 
group, established in 1990 by Alexandr Barkashov, was banned 
after supporting the Parliament in 1993 and has since been 
functioning in this manner. The organization tried to take 
part in the elections of 1999 within the Spas bloc but the 
Moscow court did not recognize its registration. From that 
point onwards it has been functioning in a semi-legal capacity. 
In some interpretations the RNU, the Slavic Union and other 
organizations of that kind should be described as post-fascist 
(or post-Nazi even) rather than nationalistic in the classical 
western tradition of the term (comp. Hearst, 1999).
3. The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers (Союз православных 
хоругвеносцев), which, in fact, is not a political party but an 
organization founded in 1992 with the goal of re-establishing 
absolute Christian monarchy, was not banned but had to face 
several court cases. Its slogan, “Orthodoxy or Death”, was 
removed from a church building near St. Petersburg as a result 
of the prosecutor’s inquiry.
4. The People’s National Party (Народная национальная 
партия), registered originally in 1994 as the Movement of the 
People’s Nationalists (Движение народных националистов), 
proposed a racist program in which the bloodline conditions 
the predominance of the Russian nation in the state. The 
political line of the leader, Alexandr Ivanov-Sukharevsky, as 
well as that of some other activists, led to the decision about 
the refusal to re-register the party in 1998. 
5. An anti-immigrant nationalistic group – the Movement Against 
Illegal Immigration, which appeared in 2002 after an ethnic 
fight between Russians and Armenians in Krasnoarmeysk, 
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was officially banned by the court in 2011. The movement 
was originally led by Vladimir Basmanov, then by his brother, 
Alexandr Belov (Potkin), and, since 2011, by Vladimir 
Yermolaev. In October 2016 the movement’s most influential 
leader – Alexandr Belov was sentenced to 7.5-year imprisonment 
in a collective labor colony.
6. The Slavic Union (Славянский союз), organized by Dmitry 
Demushkin in 2000 concentrated on the idea of an ethnically 
Russian nation-state. Clear links to some Nazi symbols (the 
acronym of the organization’s name – SS or a kind of swastika) 
and Holocaust denial made the ban on the organization 
inevitable: the decision was made by the court in April 2010. 
After that Demushkin (accompanied by some other activists 
e.g. Belov-Potkin) decided to take part in the creation of a new 
organization – The Russians (Русские). However, this one was 
banned as well in October 2015. Demushkin was put under the 
travel ban whereas Vladimir Basmanov was forced to go abroad 
where he created a new nationalistic group: the Committee 
“Nation and Liberty” (Комитет «Нация и Свобода»).
7. The national-traditionalist Great Russia Party (Великая 
Россия), founded by Dmitry Rogozin and Andrei Savelyev in 
2007 was refused registration twice, which led to a temporary 
break in its functioning. However, in 2010 another attempt to 
re-establish the party was made.
8. The National-Democratic Party (Национально-Демократи-
ческая Партия), which was created by Konstantin Krylov 
in 2012 on the base of two organizations: the Russian Social 
Movement (Русское Общественное Движение) and the 
Russian Civic Union (Русский Гражданский Союз), was 
officially registered in 2014 but later the registration information 
was refuted. Krylov himself was put on trial under Article 282 of 
the infamous bill of 2002 in connection with his public speech 
at the rally – “Stop feeding the Caucasus”, held on October 22, 
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2011 at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, and sentenced to 120 
hours of correctional labor, which made him legally unable to 
become the official leader of any party (Tipaldou 2015, p. 70).
This short overview suffices to reveal the range of Russo-
centric nationalist sentiments in the Russian Federation. The 
main question, however, is about the reasons for the appearance 
of Russian nationalism nowadays in the country where the most 
important positions belong to ethnic Russians and where the 
widely promoted Russian language and culture are supposed to 
shape the behavioral patterns of the population. Two options seem 
the most obvious at first sight: the historical grounds – the soil for 
a possible nationalist change, or the current situation, which may 
have led the Russian nation to take such steps.
The traditions of Russian nationalism
From a theoretical point of view, we must be aware that there 
are various kinds of nationalism, and that Russia is by no means 
an exception: the term of nationalism can be applied there to 
phenomena which are conceptually far from each other. We may 
consider various typologies. For example, Hechter (2000) suggests 
such kinds of nationalism as:
– state-building nationalism, whose essence lies in creating 
a more homogenous society,
– peripheral nationalism, found in communities which try 
to avoid acculturation,
– irredentist nationalism, with a tendency to enlarge the 
state’s territory,
– unification nationalism, which “involves the merger of 
a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory 
into one state” (Hechter, 2000, pp. 15–17).
In fact we could also distinguish some other forms, such as the 
ethnic, cultural, political, nativistic or vitalistic kind of nationalism 
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(Bäcker, 2008, pp. 11ff). The general question probably lies in 
the definition of la nation, which generally boils down to three 
essentially different bases: the ethnic (or racial) root, culture and 
statehood. However, it seems that it is the empirical material that 
delivers some more convincing hints for structuring the tradition 
of nationalism in Russia. 
At any rate, in order to attempt to clarify the structure of 
conditioning circumstances one has to look back to the traditions 
of Russian nationalism according to the shape they have taken in 
Russian historiography and in the classical works describing the 
history of Russian political thought. Nationalism in Russia is by 
no means an invention of the end of the 20th century. It generated 
several earlier incarnations. Here are the most representative 
ones:
1. Slavophilism (slavyanofil’stvo, славянофильство), which was 
originally constructed by a very small group of columnists such 
as Ivan Kireevsky, Konstantin Aksakov, Alexei Khomyakov or 
Yuri Samarin. The movement’s thinkers preached about the 
superiority of Orthodoxy – the only true religion, the historical 
tradition of Old Rus’ and the Eastern conciliarism over the 
Western legacy: the intellectualism of Western Christianity, 
the tradition of competition, social contract and papalism. 
The Slavophiles, who strongly criticized the Petrine reforms, 
were not the beloved child of the court, which made itself out 
to be a reliable and modern European monarchy rather than 
a museum of medieval folk culture (comp. Walicki, 1975).
2. Pochvennichestvo (почвенничество), which was a philosophy 
of  the  return  to  the  roots,  a  trend  that  appeared  among 
traditionalist  publishers,  critics  and  writers  such  as  Apollon 
Grigoryev,  Nikolai  Strakhov  or  Fyodor  Dostoevsky.  The 
pochvenniks  did  not  reject  modernization  but  emphasized 
the necessity to cultivate Russian convictions, especially the 
ones that referred to Orthodox practices and national axiology 
(comp. Walicki, 1975).
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3. Russian Pan-Slavism – the idea of uniting all Slavs. The trend 
began  in  the  Austrian  Empire  but  was soon  taken  over 
by  Russian  ideologists  such  as  Mikhail  Pogodin,  Nikolai  Y. 
Danilevsky,  Ivan  Aksakov,  Vladimir  Cherkassky,  Rostislav 
Fadeev. The main ideological base for the doctrine was 
formulated by Danilevsky in his famous book Russia and 
Europe (Eng. trans. 2013), where he introduced the idea of 
a Slavic Union with the capital in Constantinople, which was 
supposed to be regained from the Turks (comp. MacMaster, 
1967; Snyder, 1984, pp. 17–36).
4. The Black Hundred (Чёрная сотня) ideologies, which were 
represented by several organizations such as the Union of the 
Russian People (Союз русского народа), Russian Monarchist 
Party (Русская монархическая партия), White Two-Headed 
Eagle (Белый двуглавый орёл) or St. Michael’s Union (Русский 
Народныи Союз имени Святого Михаила Архангела), 
established by the famous and controversial activist Vladimir 
Purishkevich. Their programs, which were in fact a reaction 
to socialist and liberal movements, included such elements as 
devotion to the throne and Orthodox religion, anti-socialism, 
anti-Westernism, various forms of anti-Semitism including 
anti-assimilationism, and the conviction that building a nation 
state is a necessity (comp. Laqueur, 1993).
What may be surprising nowadays is the fact that modern 
Russian nationalism, although it is equally suppressed and 
marginalized as it was under the tsarist regime, does not descend 
from the old doctrines apart from the most basic idea that 
constitutes any nationalism – the elevation of the nation. The only 
visible convergence can be observed between modern Russian 
nationalism and the Black Hundreds. How can that be explained? 
Paradoxically, this historical reflection takes us to another line of 
explanation: to facts and numbers.
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The ethnic and social reality after the Russian  
Revolution
What made the situation after 1905 in Russia under the old 
regime different from the last decades of the former century was 
the fact that the traditionalistic and nationalist circles realized 
that at that time not only a narrow elite but also a significant 
part of the working class, including the peasantry, which made 
up no less than 85% of the whole population, felt disappointed 
with the regime and was ready to promote significant reforms. 
The contestation of the emperor’s court as well as of the church, 
which provided strong ideological support to the throne, made 
the Russian rightists aware that the spirit began to shift to the left. 
But was it simply a turn in the Russian soul?
The Russian Empire had never been a national state. As already 
mentioned, it was only ideologically integrated by the values of 
Orthodoxy, Authority and Peoplehood. The monarchs had no 
Russian blood in their veins, and many high-ranking officials 
were either foreigners or people of non-Russian descent. However, 
the 19th century brought about extraordinary interest in foreign 
social and political ideas. Moreover, some important political 
movements were created with significant presence of Jewish, 
Polish and other activists who represented various nations, which 
were by no means interested in the stability of the empire. 
The importance of that issue can be illustrated by pure facts. 
The non-Marxist revolutionary Populist (Narodnik) organizations, 
which caused the original political unrest, owed a lot to people 
of foreign descent. Among the very few founders of the Black 
Repartition (Чeрный передел) there are such figures as Paul 
Axelrod and Leo Deutsch, who were born into Jewish families. In 
the more radical and terrorist faction Narodnaya Volya (People’s 
Will) one should not forget the names of Yakov Yudelevsky, 
a Belarusian Jew and a significant French philosopher, as well as 
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the figure of the Polish nobleman Ignacy Hryniewiecki, the killer 
of tsar Alexander II. One of the most prominent theoreticians 
of Russian socialism was Vasily (Vilgelm) Bervi-Flerovsky, son 
of William Bervy, an official of the Ministry of Justice of purely 
English descent. The theoreticians of legal Marxism: Nikolai 
Sieber and Petr Struve had well-known German ancestors; Struve 
was a grandson of a famous astronomer, Friedrich Georg Wilhelm 
von Struve. The Menshevik leaders were predominantly Jewish 
with Yulius Martov (Tsederbaum) at the helm. Vladimir I. Lenin, 
the leader of the Bolshevik faction, had Russian but also many 
other roots. His father was of Russian, Chuvash and Mordvin 
(or Kalmyk) descent whereas his mother had Swedish, German, 
Russian as well as Jewish ancestors. A brief look at the other 
prominent leaders of the party explains a lot: Leo Trotsky (Leiba 
Bronstein), Lev Kamenev (Rosenfeld), Grigory Zinoviev (Hirsch 
Apfelbaum) and Lazar Kaganovich were unquestionably Jewish, 
Joseph Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Lavrentiy 
Beria were Georgian, Anastas Mikoyan – Armenian; the founder 
of Cheka – Feliks Dzerzhinsky (Feliks Dzierżyński) – a Polish 
nobleman, whereas the most radical activist of that institution and 
the head of the Red Army Cheka, Martin Lacis (Jānis Sudrabs) – 
a Latvian farmworker.
The feeling that citizens of foreign descent (rus. inorodcy, 
инородцы) were predominantly responsible for the destruction 
of the empire was strengthened by the ethnic structure of Russia, 
which evolved throughout the passing decades. Before the 
partitions of Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795) the Russian territory 
was settled mainly by Eastern Slavs. The tiny minorities, such as 
the Finno-Ugric peoples or Tartars did not play a big part in the 
country’s policies. However, after the annexation of a significant 
part of Poland and the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Empire 
began to grow again and absorbed numerous and “problematic” 
nations. The much better educated and technologically advanced 
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Poles gradually became more and more hostile toward the regime 
and to Russia in general. At the end of the 19th century the Jewish 
population, which became a “blessing” after the incorporation 
of Poland’s eastern territories, began to take active part in the 
revolutionary movement since its position in the empire was 
quite far from modern standards of civic equality. What seemed 
especially annoying to some Jews was the Pale of Settlement 
(cherta osedlosti, черта оседлости) proclaimed in a decree issued 
by Catherine the Great in 1791. According to the decree, which 
was later annexed by the bill of 1804, Jews could only settle in 
the Western territories of the empire in sixteen governorates. The 
other problem was the lack of political rights until the last days 
of the tsarist state. It was apparent that Russian Jews hoped for 
suffrage in the new form of the country; in a way their hopes came 
true after 1917. 
In the second half of the 19th century the country experienced 
another inflow of ethnically non-Russian citizens (or, to be 
precise, subjects to the emperor) – the Muslim peoples of Central 
Asia, which at that time was usually named Turkestan. Russia’s 
expansion to the South was unwillingly directed to the Islamic and 
Turkic world. Initially, the people of Turkestan – Kazakhs, Uzbeks, 
the Kyrgyz people, Iranian Tajiks – did not seem a real challenge. 
Their demographic dynamics were not too impressive since the 
Orthodox and Slavic part of the population developed faster.
According to the first imperial census, which was held in 1897, 
Russia was inhabited by 126.5 million people. Orthodox and Old-
Believer Christians amounted to more or less 109.1 million, which 
comprised 86.2% of the population, Roman Catholics – 11.5 million 
(9%), Jews – 5.2 million (4%), Muslims – 13.9 million (10.9%) 
(Демоскоп, № 741–742). Although the numbers draw a picture 
of a multi-cultural empire, the burden of the Southern, Western 
and Eastern frontiers did not seem too heavy for the vigorous and 
well-developing “state-forming nation” – ethnic Russians.
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The territory of the Soviet Union after World War II was almost 
of the same size. Moscow only gave up the east-central Polish 
provinces. After the 1989 census it was possible to make some 
conclusions about the demographic tendencies in the last decade. 
It turned out that the dynamics were generally positive. However, 
some nations grew much more than others if one compares the 
results to those of the previous census, which was held in 1979. 
The main nation was still on its way up: in 10 years it managed 
to reach a 6% growth whereas Poles or Jews recorded a decline 
(98% and 76% respectively). However, there was a tendency that 
had continued for more than two decades: the fast growth of 
the Muslim nations such as the Uzbeks (34%), Chechens (27%), 
Turkmen people (35%), Kazakhs (24%), Azeri people (24%), Tajik 
people (45%), Ingush people (28%) and Avars (24%) (Лабутова, 
1990).
These data might have caused some reflection but in fact they 
were ignored at that time since the main topic of intellectual 
disputes was strictly political and concerned the reforms that 
were supposed to revitalize the USSR as a whole. In 1991 the 
“red empire” collapsed, which correctly seemed to be the main 
issue. Moscow lost direct control over nearly a quarter (23.77%) 
of the territory of the USSR. Theoretically the Russian republic, 
now liberated from the non-Russian rest, should have created the 
best conditions for the development of the Russian nation. The 
coming decades brought about a colossal demographic disaster 
and a visible change of proportions of the particular ethnic groups 
(comp. Вишневский, 2016).
According to official data the Russian ethnic group within 
the territory of the Russian Federation comprised 81.53% of the 
whole population in 1989. It is in fact a weaker result than the 
percentage of Orthodox Christians in the Russian empire at the 
end of the 19th century. In 2010 the index only reached 80.9%. 
The second ethnic group – the Tartars – enjoyed a growth from 
3.76 to 3.87%, whereas the Chechens – a dynamic jump from 0.61 
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to 1.04, the Ingush people from 0.15 to 0.32 and the Azeri group 
from 0.23 to 0.44 (in the case of the last two groups the index 
doubled) (Федеральная служба государственной статистики, 
2012, p. 72). According to the data from 2010 the decrease in the 
ethnic Russian element (if compared to 2002) constituted 4.2 per 
cent, whereas in the case of the whole population it amounted 
to only 1.59%. At the same time the increase in the number of 
Chechens reached 5.23%, of Uzbeks – 135% (166 946 people) 
and of Kyrgyz people – 225.14%. The inflow of groups which 
did not determine their nationality was estimated at 285.38% 
(4 168 678 people) (Statdata, 2017). More recent data are going to 
be available after the next census.
The official data, although convincing enough, may not reflect 
the reality. In informal conversations Russian officials express their 
doubts about the methodology of the last census and are afraid that 
in reality the demographic situation of the Russian nation might 
be much gloomier. According to many commentators (whose 
opinions by no means come from the opposition) the real number 
of Russians is probably significantly lower, especially if one takes 
into account the extinction of the provincial areas (вымирание 
глубинки). In 2017 the analysts of “Realnoye Vremya”, apposing 
the demographic indices of the first halves of 2016 and 2017, 
discovered that the demographic dynamics in the whole territory 
of the Russian Federation once again began a catastrophic 
downfall, especially in Moscow (34.4%). The situation is also not 
good in Tatarstan. However, there are no indicators whether this 
concerns the Russian part of the population or rather the Tartars 
(Реальное Время, 2017).
Although before 2017 the demographic data became slightly 
more optimistic the nationalistic circles still complained that Russia 
managed to overcome the most dramatic decline only because the 
native Russian population had been for years gradually replaced by 
Muslim incomers from Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus 
(comp. Царский Путь. Русский Оперативный Журнал, 2017). 
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The problem is that the real range of this phenomenon is relatively 
difficult to estimate. According to Marlene Laruelle (2016) the 
number of Muslims in Russia is about 15 million with one in ten 
located in Moscow. As she says, “Given forthcoming demographic 
changes, by around 2050 Muslims will represent between one 
third (according to the most conservative estimates) and one 
half (according to the most alarmist assessments) of the Russian 
population”. Laruelle correctly points out the main trends of 
Moscow’s policy toward the growing number of Russian Muslims. 
Firstly, it emphasizes Russia’s openness and friendliness as 
a peaceful country, based on respect towards traditional religions. 
Secondly, it rejects radical Islam labeling all non-conformist 
groups as linked to Wahhabism. Thirdly, it also tries to present 
itself as a part of the Islamic world, a traditionalistic global power 
opposed to the “rotten West” (Laruelle, 2016).
This puts the Russian nationalistic circles in an awkward 
position. Trying to defend “traditional values” they unwillingly 
place themselves on the side of the Kremlin, which in fact introduces 
a kind of “creeping revolution”, deconstructing the exploited term of 
“traditional values”. There is no doubt that Christianity (including 
Orthodoxy) does not promote homosexuality and patchwork 
communities, trying to help traditional families instead. However, 
the most basic values of Christianity such as charity toward all 
people or devotion to the truth about the union of God and man in 
the person of Jesus Christ are incongruent with the Muslim ones. 
A Christian traditionalist cannot agree with a Muslim traditionalist 
in the dispute on the number of wives a man may have. The 
“traditionalists of all countries unite” imperative is a caricature of 
the Marxist slogan rather than a Christian objective.
The reflection on the two main types of reasons for a possible 
national revolution in Russia can only lead to a conclusion that 
the evolving ethnic situation in the contemporary state seems to 
be a much more important motivator than the traditional models 
87A Revolution That Has Not Happened: The Potential…
of Russian nationalism, which appeared before the political 
disaster of 1917. In other words, today’s Russian nationalists are 
not Slavophiles, pochvenniks or Pan-Slavists; they are people who 
face the challenge of a dying “state nation”, even if their obsession 
is based on a kind of individual fear rather than an analysis of 
statistical data.
* * *
Keeping in mind the historical and social grounds for a national 
revolution in Russia we still do not solve the main problem which 
is the question about the hypothetical possibility of such a change. 
To open a perspective for some attempts it is necessary to point to 
such issues as:
– a modern theoretical base that could be convincing for 
contemporary Russians, 
– the organizational potential,
– the political conditions, 
– the readiness of the Russian people to understand the 
ethnic question and appreciate the attempts of the potential 
revolutionary nationalists, the feeling that something has to 
be changed.
The theoretical base
Russian nationalism of the recent decades is represented 
not only by emotional pamphlets; there is also an abundance of 
important and valuable patterns and theoretical models, which 
have to be taken into deep consideration. However, not all 
proposals are widely known and kept in memory, which makes 
some relatively unproductive. The Russian political and social 
base of narratives after the Stalin era provides an interesting 
range of topics. They can be classified in various ways, according 
to chronological or typological criteria. However, it is obvious 
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that non-communist thought began with the “dissidents”, non-
conformists of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era. Some of them, 
such as Marxist revisionists (representatives of “economism”) 
appeared as a result of intellectual resistance which remained 
within the Soviet “internationalist” paradigm. 
Generally speaking, Russian dissidents of the 1960s and 
1970s represented various options. Originally the differences 
were interpreted in a simplified way: the dissidents were divided 
into “the lefts” – those who accepted Marxism (or socialism in 
general) but rejected Stalinism and the rights – those who rejected 
Marxism completely and were “genuine Russian patriots”. They 
were associated with a critical attitude both to Soviet policies and 
to the Russian authoritarian past. In fact, “the lefts” such as Andrei 
Sakharov, Andrei Siniavsky, Grigory Pomerants or Alexandr 
Yanov did not necessarily stick to Marxism. They simply tried to 
act in specific conditions. On the other hand, it is definitely true 
that many of them, such as Yanov, Pomerants or Siniavsky were of 
Jewish descent, which could make their ideas less popular among 
ethnic Russians.
The other group was associated with “Slavophilism” since it 
emphasized the values of the Orthodox tradition as well as the 
legacy of Old Russia and Russian culture. This group, which 
ought to be much more in focus in the present study, is associated 
with such figures as Alexandr Isaevivh Solzhenitsyn, the famous 
writer and Noble Prize winner, Igor Rostislavovich Shafarevich, 
a distinguished mathematician, or Vadim Mikhailovich Borisov, 
whose name is nearly forgotten nowadays. However, it was 
Borisov who drafted the postulate of Russia’s obligation to find its 
own national face in his text placed in the famous collection From 
Under the Rubble (Из-под глыб, 1974, p. 200). 
The greatest popularity was originally enjoyed by Solzhenitsyn 
who created an important pattern of modern and sublime 
nationalism whose essence boils down to a couple of points:
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1. Communism is not a Russian invention. Its idea was imported 
from the West and implemented by an uprooted elite; it is 
followed by the new intelligentsia, which in fact lost its contact 
with the nation (Из-под глыб, 1974, pp. 217–260).
2. Russia should not seek inspiration in the West since the latter 
passively accepts communism and because of its consumerism 
is unable to struggle for higher values (Солженицын, 1978).
3. Russia should limit its expansionary ambitions and get rid of 
the Soviet ideology, especially the idea of materialistic progress 
(Солженицын, 1990).
4. The Russian nation should develop according to the spiritual 
model of Russian peasantry (Солженицын, 1998).
Solzhenitsyn’s ideas, which became popular in the 1980s and 
1990s, were quite congruent with the ones proposed by Igor 
Shafarevich, whose model contained similar postulates:
1. Socialism is an ancient and destructive tendency in the 
development of humanity. The doctrine was imposed on 
the Russian people because of a non-native harmful germ 
(Шафаревич, 1977). 
2. Although socialist destruction appeared within the circles of 
Russian intelligentsia it would have never succeeded if it had 
not been for the presence of the Jewish element (Шафаревич, 
2005, pp. 432–441).
3. The Western intellectual world as well as alienated intellectuals 
of foreign descent in Russia are permeated with russophobia, 
which rejects the Russian tradition and ambitions as well as the 
country’s rural heritage (Шафаревич, 1988).
Shafarevich’s concept of the Jews and alienated intellectuals as 
a destructive minority within the big nation (an idea borrowed 
from Augustin Cochin) still seems to be rather a reflection of 
Russian nationalism before World War I even though it was 
exploited within the circles of contemporary nationalists. What 
became especially productive is the notion of russophobia, a term 
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that became popular not only among the right camp activists but 
also in the narratives applied by Russian officials and governmental 
spin doctors.
Trying to determine the probability of a national revolution in 
Russia, one has to consider the model of nationalism which resorts 
to the Orthodox tradition such as the Union of Orthodox Banner- 
-Bearers. However, it must be remembered that its adherents face 
an unsolvable problem. Since they treat Orthodoxy as the only true 
faith (единая православная вера) they are obliged to admit its 
universality. In other words, they cannot “privatize” or “nationalize” 
their religion, which is a common temptation in many cultural 
circles: to be a “real” Russian tone ought to be an Orthodox, in the 
same way a “real” Japanese citizen should be a Shintoist, a “real” 
Jew – a Judaist, a “real” Englishman – an Anglican, a “real” Pole 
– a Catholic. This issue becomes problematic while discussing 
the Ukrainian question since the Ukrainians are predominantly 
Orthodox but have a strong conviction of being a separate nation.
A relatively odd model of nationalism was presented by the 
National Bolshevist movement, which took the shape of The 
National-Bolshevik Front, the National-Bolshevik Party, and 
(since 2010) of The Other Russia (Другая Россия), a party 
that was denied registration. Their spiritus movens was the 
scandalous writer Eduard Limonov. The ideology of “nazbols” was 
a combination of totalitarian communism and fascist nationalism. 
This trend of Russian nationalist thought was probably a reaction 
to the liberalization and democratization of Russia that took place 
in the 1990s. Limonov strongly resisted any kind of liberalism, 
democracy and capitalism promoting the idea of a strong state 
led by an authoritarian leader who would defend the interests 
of the people. In the area of foreign policy the nazbols intended 
to re-integrate the post-Soviet area and severely suppress the 
minorities. They identified the main enemy with the US (The 
National-Bolshevik Party website, 2007).
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Another semi-nationalist product of post-Stalinist Russia was 
neo-Eurasianism, a trend that originated in the interwar time (and 
was at that point represented by such thinkers as duke Nikolai 
Trubetzkoy, Petr Savitsky, Petr Suvchinsky, Georgi Florovsky, Lev 
Karsavin, Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky and Nikolai Alekseev). In 
the Soviet era it was continued by a highly popular ethnologist – 
Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov, the son of famous poets: Anna 
Akhmatova and Nikolai Gumilyov. Gumilyov suggested that the 
Russian ethnos is a product of the modern era, not of Old Rus’ and 
that it cultivates the legacy of Genghis-Khan. Consequently, the 
Russian people represent Eurasian virtues rather than European or 
Slavic ones. The Eurasian nation is the ethnic substrate of Eurasia, 
which is generally identical to the territory of the Soviet Union 
(Гумилев, 2002; Пальцев, 2011). 
After the collapse of the USSR the neo-Eurasian idea was 
popularized by other ideologists with their unquestionable leader 
– Alexandr Gelevich Dugin. At the beginning of his intellectual 
journey he proclaimed a “conservative revolution” (a term 
borrowed from Armin Mohler) after the decades of communism. 
However, in what is probably his most popular book, Dugin 
discusses the grounds of geopolitics and develops a strikingly 
anti-Western theory. He exploits Mackinder’s old scheme of the 
competition between the sea powers and the continental ones. 
According to Dugin, Russia is the medium of tellurocracy (the 
continental power), which stands for conservatism/tradition, 
autocracy and collective responsibility for the economy whereas 
the Atlantic powers (especially the US and the United Kingdom) 
represent talassocracy, the power of the sea, which dissolves 
collective obligations. The Western world proposes progress 
instead of tradition, democracy and capitalism, the free market, 
which is responsible for nothing and nobody (Dugin, 1998).
In Dugin’s works the Russian nation is not an ethnic being but 
a Eurasian bedrock of tradition. If we treat neo-Eurasianism as 
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a kind of nationalism, we have to deal with a specific understanding 
of it. There is no doubt that Dugin delivered an influential model 
of Great Russia, an “immortal homeland”. In this concept the 
Russian people together with the other ethnic groups (which 
form the great nation of the Eurasian niche) are responsible for 
the communitarian and traditionalist ethos. Dugin is devoted to 
Orthodoxy in a specific sense. In his books and interviews the 
Russian faith is presented as a “tradition” rather than a “religion”, 
which is normally conditioned by specific rules and beliefs. This 
way Dugin ignores the differences between Orthodoxy and tribal 
Islam, and rejects Western Christianity as an intellectual doctrine. 
Thus, the neo-Eurasianist concept cannot be categorized only 
in terms of nationalism. This refers both to the interwar, primary 
tradition of the movement and to its later forms. Bäcker (2000) 
describes the development of early Eurasianism as a transition 
from a kind of reaction against acculturation to totalitarianism; 
this well-grounded approach seems to be even better justified 
by today’s forms of the movement. According to some recent 
publications (e.g. Mostafa, 2013) Eurasianism is interpreted 
as a unifying political program where ethnic nationalisms are 
replaced by another kind of peaceful solidarity. 
Another theoretical model was delivered by the “tribalists” (or 
racists even), where the nation bears a strictly ethnic meaning, and 
the underlying principle of nationalism lies in the idea of the purity 
of blood (usually known in its Iberian variations – the Portuguese 
limpeza de sangue or the Spanish limpieza de sangre), in the ties of 
kinship. This radical point of view was proposed in the founding 
texts of The People’s National Party, in the ideology of the Slavic 
Union and in the marginal national-socialist groups. One of the 
most interesting and, at the same time, most consistent visions 
of the Russian nation’s fate was presented by Alexei Shiropayev 
in his 2001 book The Prison of the Nation (Тюрьма народа), 
where Russia is illustrated as a place of great sufferings of the 
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Russian tribe. Shiropaev understands it as an Aryan community 
which originated in the North-Eastern territories of Europe and 
descends from Nordic Varangians and Vendens (Slavs). In the 
course of time the Russian tribe had to face dramatic challenges. 
The foreign influence – Eastern, Greek Christianity, which in fact 
originated in the Jewish den, and invasions from the East (the 
inflow of such peoples as Turkic Pechenegs and Polovtsy, Mongols, 
Tartars, etc.) subordinated the nation to Eastern rulers, who soon 
became princes and emperors. Under Soviet rule the Russian tribe 
was exterminated by Jewish commissars or Asian activists. The 
Soviet Union led most of the Russian people to death, with the 
Great Famine in Ukraine and ruthless tactics during World War 
II (Широпаев, 2001).
Finally, we also have to account for a model which is visibly 
related to contemporary incarnations of European “defensive” 
nationalism. Some Russian nationalists make conclusions which 
are analogous to the ones of the Party for Freedom in Holland, the 
Alternative for Germany, Pegida or the National Front in France. 
The model includes mainly the hostility to immigration caused 
by the fear of a barbarian, predominantly Islamic flood. The most 
incisive narrative of that sort was presented in the program of the 
Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI).
 However, there is also a much more sophisticated and 
moderate version of “defensive” or “cultural” nationalism in 
contemporary Russia, a program which is also widely accepted 
among many intellectuals. It is connected mainly with the 
National-Democratic Party and its academic tribune in the form 
of “Voprosy nacionalizma”, an interesting and influential journal 
in which the questions of the possibility to build or re-create the 
Russian nation as well as nationalism in general are discussed on 
a relatively high level. Apart from Krylov, who is the head of the 
journal, Natalya Kholmogorova – the co-founder of the initiative, 
Nedezhda Shalimova – the Secretary of the Russian Social 
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Movement, as well as Sergei Sergeev (Сергеев, 2017a; Сергеев, 
2017b), a respected and moderate historian, should also be taken 
into consideration as the ideological leaders of the trend.
To sum up, we can say that Russia has received a rich and 
diversified set of models that could be followed by a mass 
nationalistic movement. However, one should also realize that 
the exploitation of the theoretical concepts given above sketches 
a dichotomous explanatory model of Russian nationalism. Its 
internal divergence was also formulated by Tat’yana and Valerii 
Solovei, who make a distinction between the supporters of a purely 
national state and the imperialists (Соловей and Соловей, 2011, 
p. 402). Most of Russian nationalists are somewhere in between 
but the contradiction remains clear: imperialism is an efficient 
impediment to the perspective of an ethnically pure country. In 
other words, Russia for Russians would be inevitably smaller than 
a monstrous Great Russia (Великая Россия).
The organizational potential
Russian nationalism is represented by many groups and 
theoreticians. Most of these circles are (or were) relatively small and 
often had no real access to peripheral areas. Giving a full picture 
of nationalist organizations in Russia is hardly possible. Some of 
them are listed by Dubas (2008, pp. 47ff), some are described in 
other studies such as Laruelle et al. (2009). The list given below is 
by no means complete. However, for further studies it is advisable 
to remember such groups, organizations and parties as:
1. “National traditionalist” organizations:
Formerly:
– The Memory (Память, Pamyat), the oldest post-Stalinist 
nationalist organization, which goes back to the beginning 
of the 1970s and ceased to exist in 2003 after the death of its 
leader, Dmitry Vasilyev,
Currently:
– Great Russia (since 2007).
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2. The xenophobic and anti-immigrant ones:
– Rus – Party for the Defence of the Russian Constitution 
(Партия  Защиты  Российской  Конституции  “Русь”, 
ПЗРК),
– Russiаn National Unity (Русское Национальное 
Единство),
– The Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Движение 
Против Нелегальной Иммиграции).
3. Ethnic and racist nationalist groups:
– The Russian Social Movement (Русское Общественное 
Движение),
– The Slavic Union (Славянский Союз),
– The National Union (Народный Союз),
– National Socialist Society (Национал-социалистическое 
общество),
4. The National-Bolshevik organizations:
Formerly:
– National Bolshevik Front (1993),
– National Bolshevik Party (1994–2007).
Currently:
– The Other Russia (since 2010).
5. The Orthodox-nationalistic organizations:
– The Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers (Союз право-
славных хоругвеносцев),
– The Union of Orthodox Citizens (Союз православных 
граждан),
– Radonezh (Радонеж).
6. Eurasianist formations:
– Eurasia Party (Партия “Евразия”),
– the Eurasian Youth Union (Евразийский союз моло дежи).
7. State nationalist (imperialist) parties and organizations:
– Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia,
– “Rodina” Party – The National Front (Партия “РО-
ДИНА”),
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– The Congress of Russian Communities (Конгресс русских 
общин).
The number of the members of the particular groups is 
difficult to estimate. Even the officially registered establishment 
organizations and parties do not publish such statistics. 
However, in 2008 the “Kommersant” magazine, pointing to the 
information available then in the Federal Registration Bureau 
(Федеральная регистрационная служба), provided the number 
of LDPR members which was supposed to be 155.86 thousand 
(“Коммерсант”, 2008). The radical groups are rather small and 
usually do not exceed 100 activists in each of the centers. The 
cores of the organizations, however, are surrounded by a changing 
number of supporters. 
What seems to be a valuable source of information (from the 
organizational perspective) is the demonstration which is annually 
held on November 4 (the Day of National Unity) – the Russian 
March. The organizers declare that 
the Russians are dissatisfied with the fact that they do not have their 
own national state, that their interests are not considered in Russia, 
because of the adoption of “substituting migration”, and because 
their existence and their right to determine their own future are 
now being questioned. 
The organization of the demonstration is in the hands of the 
Center for the Russian Committee of the Russian March, which 
nominally consisted of 9 people in September 2017: 
– Vladimir Basmanov – the founder of the anti-immigrant 
DPNI and of the Russian Association in exile, as well as 
the head of the “Nation and Freedom” Committee, one of 
the main organizers of the first Russian March and many 
subsequent ones,
– Alexandr Belov – his brother, a political prisoner since 2016, 
one of the leaders of the DPNI and the Russian Association, 
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another key organizer of the first Russian March and many 
subsequent ones,
– Maxim Vakhromov – one of the leaders of the National 
Union of Russia (Национальный Союз России), the leader 
of the nationalists in Yekaterinburg where he organizes the 
Russian marches,
– Vitaly Goryunov – one of the leaders of the National Union 
of Russia, the head of the nationalists of Tula and the 
organizer of the Russian Marches in Tula,
– Sergey Guzhev – the organizer of the Russian Marches in 
Vologda,
– Aleksey Kolegov – a political prisoner, one of the leaders 
of the Russian Association and the organization Frontier of 
the North (Рубеж Севера), formerly the main organizer of 
the Russian Marches in Syktyvkar (Komi Republic),
– Georgi Pavlov – the organizer of the Russian Marches in 
Pskov,
– Igor Stenin – one of the leaders of the Russian Association, 
the main organizer of the Russian Marches in Astrakhan,
– Alexei Bakhtin – a political prisoner, formerly the main 
organizer of the Russian Marches in Novosibirsk.
The Central Organizing Committee embraces interregional 
advisory groups which include all the organizers of the Russian 
March who would like to take part in the collegial discussion about 
preparations for the Russian March. There are also a number of 
functional commissions within the Committee, formed by various 
participants who devote their time to organizational issues (see 
Русский марш, 2017).
According to the Agency of Russian Information the number 
of participants of the march in 2006 exceeded 7000 (Агентство 
Русской Информации, 2006). The exact data referring to the 
march in 2016 and 2017 are not available. However, as one of 
the oldest organizers, Alexei Mikhailov, declared in an interview, 
after the march he was taken to the local police department 
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(Управление внутренних дел) and fined because the declared 
number of participants was exceeded: no fewer than 8 thousand 
people turned up (Михайлов, 2016). Such numbers (if one takes 
into account the size of Moscow) do not make a great impression. 
However, we have to remember that Russian national extremists 
are under constant control and a gathering such as the Russian 
March during a national holiday provides evidence for the 
determination of the nationalistic circles.
Political conditions
There is no doubt that the Russian authorities, both in the 
1990s and later, found imperialist and statist nationalism much 
more suitable for the realization of their objectives than the racist 
or anti-immigrant versions (comp. Panov, 2010). People like 
Dmitry Rogozin (who has held the post of Deputy Prime Minister 
of the Russian Federation since 2011), the leader of Rodina and 
the Congress of Russian Communities, or Alexandr Dugin, 
the founder of the neo-Eurasianist movement (who received 
substantial financial support for his publications and even became 
the chair of the Sociology of International Relations at Moscow 
State University), were by no means treated as unwanted people 
within the Russian political establishment.
Since the imperial nationalists, unlike the liberals, supported 
the hard line toward the West, especially to the US, the Kremlin, 
especially after 2000, treated them as natural allies: they at least 
aimed at the extension of Moscow’s influence to former Soviet 
republics, where a good part of the new states’ population was 
ethnically Russian. The liberals of the 1990s did not see any chance 
of success in such assertive behavior and highlighted the possible 
negative consequences, especially in the sphere of international 
trade.
Putin’s regime did a lot to not only get rid of the liberal 
opposition but also to hamper the budding development of 
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another potential enemy: the radical nationalist non-conformist 
groups. There were several reasons behind this course of action. 
First of all, they were difficult to control and resorted to direct 
public support with no intermediation of the Kremlin. Another 
problem lay and still lies in their exclusive style: appealing to ethnic 
Russian sentiments they exclude a large and still growing milieu 
of nations which were tempted by Putin’s regime to unite under 
the control of Moscow. The Kremlin, as it previously was in the 
case of the Mongol Empire, Victorian Britain or imperial Russia, 
appeared to be unable to give up the idea of expansion. In other 
words, geopolitical imperatives (according to state documents, 
presidential addresses to the National Assembly and political 
practice in nearly all spheres) overshadowed the economic, or, 
more generally, the civilizational ones. Finally, at least some of the 
nationalistic groups such as the DPNI or People’s National Party 
served programs which matched very well the European practice of 
extreme nationalism. This way they seemed to be much more pro-
European than pro-Eurasian: they discovered that the Russians 
are white Christians or white Aryans, and that they constitute 
a part of the European civilization.
The main device used as a weapon in the struggle against the 
nationalist threat is the refusal to register a party under the pretext 
of extremism. Since 2002 a significant number of political parties 
and organizations have been denied registration because of real 
or imaginary extremism on the grounds of the Federal Law on 
Combating Extremist Activity (Федеральный закон от 25 июля 
2002 г. N 114–ФЗ). Chapter 1 of the bill states that extremist activity 
also includes such things as “incitement to social, racial, ethnic 
or religious hatred; propaganda of exclusiveness, superiority or 
inferiority of an individual based on his/her social, racial, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic identity, or his/her attitude to religion”. This 
way Putin’s KGB team obtained a perfect device to eliminate ethnic 
nationalists from the main game of thrones. Since 2002 a great 
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number of nationalistic organizations and parties were refused 
registration; some were banned and persecuted.
The Russian state of mind
Russian nationalistic sentiments are not easy to study because 
the matter is somewhat elusive. However, we can take into 
consideration the results of the public opinion research conducted 
by Levada Center in which the respondents were asked about their 
attitude to the nationalist imperative: “Russia only for Russians”. 
The initial set of studies was done in the years 1998–2009. The 
results were unclear and did not reveal any unquestionable 
tendency. Strong support varied from 14% in 2007 to 19% in 
2005. Relative support (“it would be advisable to realize this 
idea in a reasonable framework”) ranged from 31% in 1998 to 
42% in 2008. Strong objection gained the least popularity (18%) 
in 2000 and was accepted most widely in 1998 (32%) (Левада- 
-Центр, 2009). 
In 2016 we received another portion of information which 
was discussed in the media. Levada Center revealed that the 
popularity of the nationalist slogan did not change significantly. 
Answering the question about the attitude to this imperative, 
14% of respondents declared full support, 38% were more accurate 
and said that such a thesis would be a good idea to implement 
in reasonable limits. 21% of the respondents reacted sharply to 
the idea saying that this was real fascism. The same percentage 
of the respondents answered that they were not interested in the 
topic. Sociologists asked people whether they should restrict the 
residence in the territory of Russia to representatives of certain 
nationalities. 20% of the respondents said that no restrictions 
should be introduced, 34% advocated limiting residence in Russia 
to people from the Caucasus, 29% were against the incomers from 
the former Central Asian republics of the USSR, 24% were negative 
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towards the Chinese, 21% – to the Roma Gypsies, 19% did not 
want to see the Vietnamese in the Russian Federation, 13% – the 
Ukrainians, 6% – Jews (ZNAK, 2016; another study on the topic: 
Dubas, 2008, pp. 29–30).
Discussing the results presented above one has to remember 
that 52 per cent of the entire or relative support seems good for 
the nationalists for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is more than 
likely that in the territories which are traditionally settled by 
other nationalities, such as Chechnya, Buryatia or Tuva, Russian 
nationalistic slogans cannot be widely accepted. In other words, in 
the Russian ethnic territories such imperatives gain even stronger 
support. Secondly, the decreasing percentage of ethnic Russians 
in Russia leads to the tide of xenophobia. On the other hand, 
a strong feeling of an emerging demographic disaster in the sense 
of the ethnic composition of the population may lead to other acts 
of social unrest.
The readiness for radical action was proven in a series of 
violent events, especially the ones in Kondopoga, Karelia in 2006 
and on Manezh square in Moscow in 2010. In Kondopoga, after 
a Chechen group killed two local Russians, crowds of people tried 
to take revenge and in fact forced many Chechens to leave the 
town. In Moscow the violent reaction was a result of the death of 
a Spartak soccer fan who was killed by five Dagestanis. During 
the riots 32 people were injured and, what makes the case more 
interesting, three members of the Other Russia: Igor Berezyuk, 
Ruslan Khubaev and Kirill Unchuk, were arrested, tried and 
sentenced to imprisonment (8, 4.5, and 3 years respectively) 
(Правозащитный центр “Мемориал”, 2014). The probability of 
such phenomena to occur in the future cannot be easily estimated. 
However, this potential cannot be entirely neglected because the 
trials after the Manezh events did not stop the tension (e.g. in 
October 2013 in Biryulovo, a district of Moscow, a huge crowd 
of local people attacked the properties of immigrants after the 
murder of a young Russian, Yegor Shcherbakov). 
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Concluding remarks
A critical review of the four constituting aspects leads to 
ambiguous conclusions about the perspectives of a national 
revolution in Russia. 
First of all, it must be said that the first pillar of a possible 
revolution, the theoretical grounds, are relatively well-developed 
and logically structured. Russian nationalists have a lot of historical 
and new models of a nationalist political change at their disposal. 
The older models, however, seem less effective in the context of the 
situation in which the Russian nation is nowadays. The religious 
and ideological conflict with the West or another external enemy 
is far behind the other challenges such as the growing presence 
of Caucasian and Central Asian incomers, who may become 
the successors of ethnic Russians in the great state if the present 
demographic tendencies are to continue.
The analysis supports the opinion that the contemporary 
nationalism is conceptually divergent. One of its poles consists 
in Russian imperialism, political inclusivism and expansionism 
(deeply rooted in the previous periods of Russian history), and is 
generally supported by the Kremlin. The other trend – the ethnic 
and “exclusive” nationalism, is contested by the present elite, which 
perceives it as a threat to the state’s integrity.
The organizational potential of Russian nationalists cannot 
be neglected but is generally a disputable issue. The imperialist 
nationalists are represented in solid structures such as the 
Congress of Russian Communities or the Liberal-Democratic 
Party of Russia. However, they are strongly subordinated to the 
Kremlin camp and would not gain sufficient support without the 
help of the government. On the other hand, the ethnically and 
culturally-oriented nationalists are dispersed in customarily small 
and suppressed organizations with no coordinative center.
The political and legal conditions for a nationalist revolution 
are not favorable. The non-conformists have to take into account 
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significant problems with registration, official bans and difficulties 
with gaining access to the media. According to the 2002 Federal Law 
On Combating Extremist Activity several radical groups or relatively 
moderate organizations were erased from the official political life 
in Russia and no liberalization in this area can be expected.
The question about the readiness of the Russian people to 
support a nationalist political change in the future remains open. 
However, series of events such as the ones in Kondopoga in 2006 
or in the very center of Moscow in 2010 provide evidence that 
awareness of the problem is hidden somewhere in the Russian souls 
and that the sleeping bear can wake up if the situation gets out of 
control. On the one hand, the feeling that the inner immigrants are 
getting a competitive advantage seems to be growing because of 
the objective demographic processes. On the other – the growing 
share of non-Russian inhabitants of the Federation may weaken 
the revolutionary potential.
* * *
In the 2010s, after the marginalization of oligarchs and liberal 
parties such as the Union of Right Forces (Cоюз правых сил) or the 
Yabloko Party (Партия “Яблоко”), Alexei Navalny, the founder of 
Anti-Corruption Foundation and the leader of the Progress Party, 
became the most recognizable symbol of Russian opposition. His 
political image was associated with his actions against corruption 
on the one hand and with the emphasis put on the interests of the 
Russian nation, especially in the context of the Caucasian threat, 
on the other. His views are perceived as “national democratic”. 
That is why Navalny ought to be described as a representative 
of “vitalistic” nationalism; he generally promotes a vision of an 
uncorrupted state to build a healthy market economy, which 
brings him closer to the liberals. However, he was also strikingly 
critical about the Caucasian elites: both the ones connected with 
the Kremlin and the Islamic traditionalists or fundamentalists. 
Laruelle (2014) correctly points to the fact that in the activities of 
Navalny nationalism and liberalism are in a way reconciled.
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There is a widespread opinion that Navalny is not a really 
strong personality but rather an artificial creation: his blog and 
other texts on the internet were supposed to have been produced 
by a team with the leader being only a supposititious figure. This 
might be, however, a secondary problem. What is much more 
important is the fact that Navalny’s popularity (which became clear 
during the election to Moscow’s City Hall), no matter what kind 
of personality the politician really presented, revealed a genuine 
need for a seemingly odd combination: Russia’s rapprochement to 
the Euro-Atlantic civilizational standards in order to build a state 
which the Russian nation could ultimately treat as its own. The 
“restless” perception of the difficult political reality in Russia, in 
which Navalny is only a personification of contestation seems 
to be more and more congruent with Andrei Savelyev’s opinion 
that for those who think about the salvation of the Russian nation 
the evolutionary option is theoretically possible but in fact not 
accessible because of the lack of time (Savelyev, 2005).
Rewolucja, której nie było:  
potencjał odrodzenia rosyjskiego nacjonalizmu
W rozdziale omówiono perspektywy rewolucji nacjonalistycznej w Rosji. Bada-
niu poddano teoretyczną bazę, obiektywne okoliczności, mogące się przyczynić 
do ewentualnej zmiany, potencjał organizacyjny organizacji nacjonalistycznych, 
warunki polityczne i nastroje rosyjskiej części obywateli Federacji Rosyjskiej. 
Pierwszy filar ewentualnej rewolucji, to jej fundamenty teoretyczne, stosun-
kowo dobrze rozwinięte i logicznie zorganizowane. Rosyjscy nacjonaliści mają 
do dyspozycji wiele historycznych i współczesnych modeli nacjonalistycz-
nych przemian politycznych. Jednak starsze modele wydają się mniej skutecz-
ne w kontekście obecnej sytuacji narodu rosyjskiego. Religijne i ideologiczne 
konflikty z Zachodem czy innym wrogiem zewnętrznym, schodzą na dalszy 
plan wobec takich problemów jak rosnąca obecność kaukaskich i środkowo-
azjatyckich emigrantów, którzy mogą stać się następcami etnicznych Rosjan 
w państwie. 
Analiza potwierdza pogląd, że współczesny nacjonalizm jest konceptual-
nie rozbieżny. Jednym z jego biegunów jest rosyjski imperializm, inkluzywność 
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i ekspansja polityczna (głęboko zakorzenione w poprzednim okresie historii 
Rosji), generalnie wspierane przez Kreml. Druga tendencja – etniczny i „uni-
kalny” nacjonalizm, poddawany krytyce przez obecną elitę, która postrzega go 
jako zagrożenie dla integralności państwa. 
Nie należy nie doceniać organizacyjnego potencjału rosyjskich nacjona-
listów, charakterystyczne są tu jednak rozproszenie i brak woli zjednoczenia. 
Imperialistyczni nacjonaliści reprezentowani są w tak potężnych strukturach 
jak Kongres Wspólnot Rosyjskich czy Polityczna Partia LDPR (wcześniej Libe-
ralno-Demokratyczna Partia Rosji). Są silnie podporządkowani Kremlowi i nie 
mogą odnieść sukcesu bez pomocy rządu. Natomiast etnicznie i kulturowo zo-
rientowanej nacjonaliści są rozproszeni w różnych organizacjach, pozbawieni 
koordynującego centrum i są prześladowani. 
Polityczne i prawne warunki dla przeprowadzenia nacjonalistycznej rewo-
lucji nie są korzystne. Należy wziąać pod uwagę duże problemy z rejestracją, 
oficjalnymi zakazami, trudnościami z dostępem do mediów. Na mocy federal-
nej ustawy z dnia 25 lipca 2002 r. N 114-ФЗ „O przeciwdziałaniu działalności 
ekstremistycznej” kilka radykalnych grup bądź relatywnie umiarkowancych 
organizacji zostało usuniętych z oficjalnego życia politycznego w Rosji i nie 
przewiduje się liberalizacji w tej dziedzinie.
Kwestia gotowości Rosjan do wspierania nacjonalistycznych zmian poli-
tycznych w przyszłości pozostaje otwarta. Niemniej jednak wiele wydarzeń, 
takich jak zamieszki w Kondopodze w 2006 r. czy na placu Manieżnym w grud-
niu 2010 r., pokazuje, że świadomość problemu kryje się gdzieś w rosyjskich 
duszach i, że śpiący niedźwiedź może się obudzić, jeśli sytuacja wymknie się 
spod kontroli. Z jednej strony, poczucie, że wewnętrzni imigranci są bardziej 
konkurencyjni, wydaje się wzrastać z powodu obiektywnych procesów demo-
graficznych. Z drugiej – udział nierosyjskich mieszkańców Federacji może 
osłabić potencjał rewolucyjny.
Революция, которая не произошла:  
потенциал возрождения русского национализма
Глава рассматривает перспективы национальной революции в России. 
Предметом изучения является: теоретическая база, объективные обсто-
ятельства, способствующие возможной перемене, организационный по-
тенциал националистских организаций, политические условия и настро-
ения русской части населения Российской Федерации. 
Первое условие возможной революции, теоретические ее основания, 
относительно хорошо развиты и логически структурированы. У русских 
националистов в распоряжении есть много «исторических» и новых мо-
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делей националистических политических перемен. Однако, более старые 
модели кажутся менее эффективными в контексте актуальной ситуации 
российской нации. Религиозно-идеологический конфликт с Западом или 
другим внешним врагом отходит на второй план перед такой проблемой 
как растущее присутствие кавказских и среднеазиатских инородцев, кото-
рые могут стать преемниками этнических русских в большом государстве.
Анализ подтверждает мнение о том, что современный национализм 
концептуально расходится. Одним из его полюсов является российский 
империализм, политическая инклюзивность и экспансионизм (глубоко 
укорененный в предыдущих периодах русской истории) и в целом под-
держивается Кремлем. Другая тенденция – этнический и «исключитель-
ный» национализм оспаривается нынешней элитой, которая восприни-
мает его как угрозу целостности государства.
Организационным потенциалом русских националистов нельзя 
пренебрегать, однако, он подвергается дисперсии и характеризуется от-
сутствием воли объединения. Империалистические националисты пред-
ставлены в таких мощных структурах, как Конгресс русских общин или 
Либерально-демократическая партия России. Они сильно подчинены 
кремлевскому лагерю и не в состоянии добиться успеха без помощи пра-
вительства. С другой стороны, этнически и культурно ориентированные 
националисты разбросаны в разных организациях, лишены единого ко-
ординационного центра, и подвергаются гонениям.
Политические и правовые условия для националистической револю-
ции не благоприятны. Нонконформисты должны считаться со значитель-
ными проблемами: с регистрацией, официальными запретами, трудностя-
ми с доступом к средствам массовой информации. Согласно Федеральному 
Закону от 25 июля 2002 г. N 114-ФЗ «О противодействии экстремистской 
деятельности» несколько радикальных групп или относительно умерен-
ных организаций были устранены из официальной политической жизни 
в России и никакой либерализации в этой области не ожидается.
Вопрос о готовности русского народа поддержать националисти-
ческие политические изменения в будущем остается открытым. Тем не 
менее, ряд событий, таких как беспорядки в Кондопоге в 2006 году или 
на Манежной в декабре 2010 г., свидетельствует о том, что осознание 
проблемы скрывается где-то в российских душах и что спящий медведь 
может проснуться, если ситуация выйдет из-под контроля. С одной сто-
роны, ощущение, что внутренние иммигранты получают конкурентное 
преимущество, похоже, растет из-за объективных демографических про-
цессов. С другой – растущая доля нерусских жителей Федерации может 
ослабить революционный потенциал.
Joanna Rak
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
Chapter 5
Justifying the Use of Violence:  
A Gnostic Deconstruction  
of a Political Universe1
Introduction and State of the Art
The current analyses of the Russian Revolution of 1917 show 
that it was a by-product of successful modernization (Mironov, 
2015, p. 79; Bassin, et al., 2017, p. 2). Theoretical frameworks 
employed to study the contentious politics draw upon the theories 
of anomie, disorganization, and tension. In introducing a variety 
of social and political factors that influenced the revolution, they 
concentrate on the change of living conditions, rules of behavior, 
social norms, anomie, attenuation of the mechanisms of social 
control over the individual by social organizations, disorganization 
1  This paper is a result of the research project “Contemporary Russia: Between 
Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism” funded by National Science Centre, 
Poland. The research grant number: 2015/19/B/HS5/02516. 
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of society, tensions between people’s needs and actual possibilities 
of satisfying those needs, relative deprivations, social, economic, 
and political grievances (Sargeant, 1997; Badcock, 2008; Mironov, 
2015, p. 89). The works claim that disorientation, dysregulation, 
disorganization, and the intensification of tensions increased the 
level of deviant and protest behavior (Mironov, 2015, p. 89; Rendle 
and Retish, 2017). Although the existing body of work plausibly 
identifies the structural factors that contributed to the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, it understudies how political subjects triggered 
off their revolutionary potential (Kumar, 2015). In other words, 
the substantive literature avoids scrutinizing Russian political 
consciousness shaped by the structural factors, perpetuated, 
distributed and redistributed over time (Rendle, 2005; Cracraft, 
2010; Michael-Matsas 2016; Rendle and Lively, 2017). Political 
consciousness is relatively persistent and remains after the 
disappearance of beings, phenomena, and processes which molded 
it (Wood, 2003; O’Kane, 2015). As such, it is of exploratory and 
explanatory power for identifying the sources and consciousness 
heritage of the revolution (Hickey, 2011; Beyrau, 2015).
Researchers point out that a gnosis is a form of historically- 
-effected political consciousness characteristic of the processes 
of modernization, and it arises from a lust for power (Voegelin, 
1997, p. 71; Hotam, 2007; Smith, 2014; Chase, 2015). The article 
argues that a theoretical category of political gnosis may offer 
a powerful conceptual framework for analyzing the sources 
of the Russian Revolution of 1917 identifiable on the level of 
political communication. It may be applied to study how political 
consciousness evolved over the history of Russia determined by 
contentious politics, what consciousness factors justify the use of 
political violence, and how Russian revolutionary deconstructions 
were reflected in political consciousness after 1917.
According to Voegelin, in political gnosis, the will to redeem 
ancient gnosis is combined with the “metastatic expectation 
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of apocalypse” and “faith in the possibility of bringing about 
the metastasis” through human action to form the complex of 
revolutionary consciousness. Revolutionary consciousness is “the 
faith in the gnostic recipes for redemption according to which 
humankind is to be displaced out of the structure of temporal 
history and into the structure of eternal history by revolutionary 
action” (2000, p. 205).
A classic meaning of ancient gnosis, its secularization through 
politicization, and criticism of modernism inform Voegelin’s 
understanding of political gnosis. Gnosis was first defined as 
“knowledge” – a pure translation of the Greek gnôsis. However, 
in late antiquity, that knowledge achieved a saving role as arcane 
knowledge. Thereby, gnosis became a religious movement. In 
a narrower sense, gnosis or gnosticism is a syncretistic religious 
movement distributed particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean 
sphere of late antiquity. This movement made the elitarian 
“knowledge of divine secrets” the center of its theory and regarded 
the spiritual core of the human being as partaking in the divine 
substance. After having fallen into a fateful entanglement with 
the matter, this spiritual core can gain salvation solely through 
the recognition of its true, transmundane nature (Riegel, 2007, 
p. 214). Importantly, gnosis draws on a strict ontological dualism 
between the immanent, evil world of darkness and the good 
world of light in the beyond. As salvator salvandus (the savior to 
be saved), the saving knowledge also has a dynamic of its own: 
leading its immanent part to knowledge and salvation, it becomes 
a salvator salvatus (saved savior). Thus, the saving knowledge 
has a liberating and healing effect (Riegel, 2007, p. 214). Those 
features reflect Voegelin’s meaning of ancient gnosis and introduce 
a conceptual framework of gnosis. 
Since the meaning of gnosis has been changed many times 
to perform diverse exploratory and explanatory tasks in various 
scientific fields (Varshizky, 2002, p. 315), its semantic field is 
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vague to some extent. In political sociology and philosophy, the 
term of gnosis occurs with a predicate of political, and the notion 
of political gnosis applies to describe the phenomena considered 
to be the sources of radical evil and the embodiment of the use of 
excessive political violence, such as revolution, terrorism (Pellicani, 
2003), anarchism (Bamyeh, 2013, p. 192), Maoism (Grelet and 
Smith, 2014), Marxism, Leninism, Bolshevism (Besançon, 1981), 
totalitarianism (Gray, 2014), pathological sickness of political 
mindset, and lethal neoplasm of Western Civilization (Voegelin, 
1952, p. 317; 1987, p. 112; Jonas, 1952). Those approaches are 
criticized for being value-laden (Miley, 2011, p. 34; Gerschewski, 
2016). Furthermore, the works do not introduce the differences 
between gnostic and non-gnostic political consciousness. They 
also omit to provide us with operationalisable definitions and 
conceptual frameworks.
The literature review raises two research problems. First, how 
to categorize the differences between gnostic and non-gnostic 
political consciousness? Second, how to measure political gnosis? 
Hence, the paper aims to create a tool for both identifying the 
distinction between political gnosis and diagnosis and measuring 
the intensity of political gnosis. It consists of eight scales formulated 
according to the values of the essential features of political gnosis. 
A value is a qualitative quantity assigned to a variable (feature). 
Political gnosis is the set of beliefs determining the interpretation of 
social reality. It often serves as a justification for the use of political 
violence (Mulholland, 2017). The very nature of an apparatus 
specified by the predicate of epistemic indicates that beliefs are 
considered to be knowledge or knowing (Dalferth, 2004, p. 194). 
The features are sufficient and necessary for an epistemic 
apparatus to fall into the category of political gnosis. Although 
single features or their values may be characteristic of other 
epistemic apparatuses, their configuration implies political gnosis. 
They are: splitting the universe of material things into the good 
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internal world and the evil external world, dividing people into 
“we-insiders” and “they-outsiders”, fallacious immanentization of 
the eschaton, self-construction of the expansionary savior to be 
saved, political obscurantism as a mode of dealing with dangerous 
knowledge, creation of the total enemy, manifestations of presumed 
anomie among a populace, and strategies of survival on the 
historic battlefield. Each feature takes on values that contribute to 
the extent of the intensity of political gnosis. In turn, an epistemic 
apparatus is non-gnostic when it does not meet the criteria for 
political gnosis and satisfies those for political diagnosis.
Feature № 1: The Good Internal World and the Evil 
External World
The first essential feature of political gnosis is a distinction 
between the good internal world and the evil external world, 
including their political values (e.g. Russia and the rest of the 
world). It concentrates solely on inanimate elements of the existing 
political reality. The distinction is a result of the semantic creation 
of either intrinsically good or evil worlds. It may take a form of 
five basic strategies that are based on the mythical structures of 
the images of things (Rak, 2017). On the level of the distinction 
between the worlds, two homogeneous criteria for the positive 
valorization of the internal world and the negative valorization 
of the external world allow us to distinguish the levels of the 
intensity of political gnosis. The scale ranges from (5) to (1). When 
a verbal expression concerning the internal and external worlds is 
free from attributing either positive or negative value to political 
reality, a feature takes on [0].
The description of the features marks the range of political 
gnosis determined by the level of its intensity with round brackets. 
Numbers in the brackets imply places on the continua. For the 
112 Joanna Rak
sake of clarity, a political diagnosis is marked with square brackets. 
Sufficient and necessary defining features of political gnosis and 
diagnosis mark out a boundary between the categories.
The distinction between the good internal and evil external 
worlds (f1) takes on the following values:
(5) sacralization of the good internal world and devilization of 
the evil external world,
(4) hierophanization of the good internal world and demonization 
of the evil external world,
(3) nympholeptic melioration of the good internal world and 
nympholeptic pejorativization of the evil external world,
(2) counter-iconoclastic purification of the good internal world 
and counter-idolatric purification of the evil external world,
(1) defensive relativization of the good internal world and 
offensive relativization of the evil external world,
[0] political diagnosis of political reality.
The maximum extent of political gnosis (5) is when the gnostic 
sanctifies the internal world so much that it becomes the sacred, 
the greatest thing in the universe. An antinomic semantic creation 
focuses on the external world. The gnostic damns it so much that 
it is an extremely infernal evil. Adjectives in the superlative degree 
used to create words in that way indicate a maximum intensity of 
gnosis. The very high level of intensity (4) is when the internal 
world achieves a status of hierophany. It is a manifestation of 
the sacred but not the sacred itself. Although the gnostic avoids 
sanctifying the internal world, he or she sees it as a revelation of 
something greater. In contrast to hierophany, in demonization, 
the gnostic presents the external world as possessed. According 
to the narration, a demon evinces itself in the external world. 
The world is not the devil’s spawn, but evil manifests itself in its 
form. Adjectives in the comparative degree serve as a means of 
verbal construction. The high intensity (3) is when the gnostic 
settles for nympholeptic creations of the worlds. Adjectives are 
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in a positive form. They show affectionate and frenetic allegiance 
to the worlds under valorizing, either positive or negative. The 
gnostic designs the worlds by exalted manifestations of worship 
or aversion respectively. In the moderate intensity (2), counter- 
-iconoclastic purification of the internal world is founded on 
the reduction of the diagnosed negative features of the world. 
The gnostic avoids making an avowal of his or her observation 
because he or she opposes the devaluation of the world and the 
decline of its positive image. The image is purified from even 
potentially negative qualities. Then, counter-idolatric purification 
of the external world is based on the reduction of the diagnosed 
positive features of the world. The gnostic does not disclose the 
discovery of its positive features. Instead, he or she rejects them 
actively to purify the world’s image from the properties which are 
not bad. On the low level (1), defensive relativization depicts the 
elements of the good internal world as being not as evil as others. 
It makes use of comparisons to convince people that they are the 
best against the background of others. Offensive relativization of 
the evil external world takes advantage of the same mechanism. 
The gnostic presents positive components of the external world 
as being not as positive as others. The comparison of features 
serves the depreciation of that world. When a verbal expression 
does not take the shape of a value-laden discoursive creation and 
is relatively close to a political diagnosis of the worlds [0], political 
gnosis does not emerge.
Feature № 2: “We-Insiders” and “They-Outsiders”
The second feature of political gnosis is the distinction between 
“we-insiders” and “they-outsiders” (e.g. Russians and non-
Russians). Just like the previous feature, it consists of splitting, also 
called black-and-white or all-or-nothing thinking. However, in 
contrast to the above feature, the second one focuses on animated 
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elements of political reality. Whereas the former concerns things 
and political values that constitute the gnostic’s universe, the 
latter relates to people that are in the universe, including Paraclete 
who is shown and shows himself/herself as the main creator of 
political gnosis (e.g. he/she may be a leader of a revolution). The 
ontic status is a criterion for their analytical distinction, but they 
co-occur in the real world. The distinction is a result of a semantic 
creation of political subjects. It may take the form of five basic 
strategies that draw upon the mythical structures of the images of 
people (Rak, 2017). On the level of the distinction between people, 
two homogeneous criteria for the positive valorization of “we- 
-insiders” and the negative valorization of “they-outsiders” enable 
us to distinguish four levels of the intensity of political gnosis. The 
scale ranges from (4) to (1). When a verbal expression concerning 
“we-insiders” and “they-outsiders” is free from attributing either 
positive or negative value to political subjects, a feature takes 
on [0].
The distinction between “we-insiders” and “they-outsiders” 
(f2) takes on the following values:
(4) anthropolatrization of “we-insiders” and devilization of “they- 
-insiders,”
(3) theophanization of “we-insiders” and demonization of “they- 
-insiders,”
(2) making “we-insiders” a divine mesistes and “they-insiders” – 
an infernal mesistes,
(1) making “we-insiders” a katechon and “they-insiders” – an 
antichrist,
[0] political diagnosis of political subjects.
The maximum extent of political gnosis (4) is when the 
gnostic acknowledges the in-group as the divinity. The out-group 
is the devil incarnate. The high extent (3) is when the gnostic 
claims that the divinity revealed itself in the in-group. In contrast 
to anthropolatrization, “we-insiders” are not the god but its 
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revelation. In demonization, a demon manifests itself in the out-
group. Unlike devilization, “they-outsiders” are not a hellhound 
but a devil’s tool. The moderate extent (2) refers to a category of 
a mesistes (also known as a mesidios). A mesistes is a particular 
type of mediator that can establish and perpetuate relations 
between the real and supernatural worlds thanks to his or her 
own unique features. A divine mesistes intercedes between a deity 
and people. In contrast to theophany, a mesistes is not a physical 
manifestation of a god, but he or she contacts a god. An infernal 
mesistes mediates between a devil and people not because he or 
she is possessed but thanks to his or her extraordinary features. The 
low extent (1) is when the gnostic makes “we-insiders” a katechon 
and “they-insiders” – an antichrist. Whereas a katechon is the 
one who prevents evil from destroying the world and safeguards 
human lives, an antichrist devastates the world and strives for its 
perdition. In each case, a political subject is an imagined being 
and may be either individual or collective. They do not have to be 
presented as aware of fulfilling their roles in a gnostic universe. 
When a verbal expression does not assume the form of a value-
laden discoursive creation of an imagined subjectivity and is 
relatively close to a political diagnosis of political subjects [0], 
political gnosis does not occur.
Feature № 3: Fallacious Immanentization  
of the Eschaton
The analysis does not enter into a discussion on to what extent 
the subject matter of a discoursive creation is real and imagined, 
but it assumes the verbal expressions of elements of political 
reality as the results of a semantic creation (Shahzad, 2014). They 
mirror how the gnostic alters the ontological status of the existing 
reality by destroying and building a new one on its smoldering 
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ruins (Pellicani, 2003, p. 11). Thus, let us emphasize that political 
gnosis hypostases imagined beings with words (e.g. a vision of 
Russia as a great power). The first two features of political gnosis 
concentrate on the semantic creation of the existing reality, the next 
one focuses on the design and performance of its future shape. The 
third feature of political gnosis is the fallacious immanentization 
of the eschaton which mirrors how eschatology affects politics 
(Voegelin, 1987, p. 117). The gnostic fallaciously immanentizes 
the eschaton by projecting eschatological visions for the world and 
implements a policy to actualize them (Voegelin, 1987, p. 166). 
Immanentization is fallacious because the projects of eternal 
salvation are of political rather than religious nature (Voegelin, 
1987, p. 120). Political gnosis is gradable under a criterion of 
a variant of immanentization of the eschaton which provides the 
gnostic’s life with sense. The distinction is a result of a semantic 
creation of what political reality should dawn and how to achieve 
that dreamful state. It may take the form of four basic strategies 
that emanate from Voegelin’s variants of immanentization 
(Voegelin, 1987). On the level of the fallacious immanentization, 
a homogeneous criterion of the feasibility of the eschaton enables 
us to distinguish four levels of the intensity of political gnosis. The 
scale ranges from (4) to (1). When a verbal expression concerning 
the future of political reality is free from overtly dreamlike visions, 
a feature takes on [0].
The fallacious immanentization of the eschaton (f3) takes on 
the following values:
(4) active mysticism,
(3) utopianism,
(2) eutopianism,
(1) progressivism,
[0] political diagnosis of current efforts to develop the state.
The scale is based on Voegelin’s three variants of fallacious 
immanentization: active mysticism, utopianism, and progressivism, 
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but it modifies the framework to enhance its methodological 
and expected empirical effectiveness. According to Voegelin, 
in active mysticism (4), a state of perfection is to be obtained 
through a revolutionary transfiguration of the nature of a man. 
Let us go a step further and add that active mysticism consists 
of the performance of a fully unrealistic vision of the eschaton. 
The gnostic declares the use of available and inaccessible means to 
perform the eschaton. As Voegelin argues, utopianism concentrates 
on the state of perfection, without clarity about the means that are 
required for its performance. It may assume two forms. First, it 
may be an axiological dream world when the gnostic is aware that 
the eschaton is unrealizable. Second, it may take the form of social 
idealism. The distinction between the forms remains unclear. 
Whereas the first locates just in an awareness sphere, the second is 
verbally expressible. Here, within the scale, utopianism (3) is when 
the gnostic creates a wholly unrealistic vision of the eschaton and 
declares the deployment of available means to actualize it. Unlike 
utopia, eutopia embodies a possible concept. Eutopianism (2) draws 
upon a realistic vision of the eschaton and making declarations 
of the actualization of the eschaton. The gnostic presumes the 
employment of available means to immanentize his or her vision. 
It is utopistics in Wallerstein’s (1998, p. 1) understanding. As 
Voegelin indicates, progressivist immanentization (1) focuses 
on a movement towards a goal, a beatific vision that is a state 
of perfection. The progressivist gnostic does not provide clarity 
about the final perfection, but it need not be clarified because 
he or she takes a selection of desirable factors as the standard 
and interprets progress as a qualitative and quantitative rise 
of the present good – the “bigger and better.” Unless he or she 
adjusts the original standard to the changing political situation, it 
becomes reactionary (Voegelin, 1987, pp. 120–121). It means that 
progressivist immanentization concentrates on the rather realistic 
but not well-defined eschaton. The gnostic introduces ways 
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towards its achievement. Whereas the gnostic verbally creates 
a heaven on earth, the diagnostic avoids introducing his or her 
unrealistic expectations. When a verbal expression does not take 
the form of a value-laden discoursive creation and is relatively 
close to a political diagnosis of prospective political reality [0], 
political gnosis does not occur.
Feature № 4: Presumed Anomie
The fourth feature of political gnosis is presumed anomie. The 
gnostic that creates and distributes political gnosis assumes that 
its recipients feel anomie and thus he or she refers to anomie’s 
suppositious features (e.g. a vision of relative deprivation in social 
security). Anomie is instability resulting from a breakdown of 
the regulatory order that secures norms (Braithwaite, et al., 2010, 
p. 17). Even though it is an opportune awareness undertow for 
political gnosis (Bäcker, 2011, p. 195), it also informs a semantic 
resource of political gnosis as a reaction to the existing populace 
and world condition. The gnostic seeks to distribute political 
gnosis effectively to win political believers over and encourage 
them to redistribute political gnosis. He or she makes provision 
for the properties of actual anomie to make his or her expressed 
vision of anomie the reflection of reality. His or her presuming, 
however, is not contingent on the actual anomie. It is just a goal- 
-driven semantic creation which may take on a variety of values. 
The scale to measure an extent of the intensity of the feature 
of political gnosis benefits from Heydari, Davoudi and Teymoori’s 
set of indicators of anomie (2011). The set comprehensively, 
critically, and skillfully summarizes and develops current scales 
of anomie. The authors define three major groups of indicators: 
meaninglessness and distrust, powerlessness, and fetishism of 
money. Meaninglessness and distrust find expression in eight 
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statements: (i) I can trust the statements of high-ranking officials 
(authority), (ii) There is little use in writing to public officials 
because they often aren’t really interested in the problems of the 
average man, (iii) In spite of what some people say, the lot of 
the average man is getting worse, not better, (iv) I believe most 
of the congress bills are towards the welfare of people, (v) Most 
public officials (people in public office) are not really interested 
in the problems of the average man, (vi) I often wonder what 
the meaning of life really is, (vii) It’s hardly fair to bring children 
into the world with the way things look for the future, (viii) 
Everything is relative, and there just aren’t any definite rules to live 
by. Powerlessness expresses itself in seven statements: (i) I lead 
a trapped or frustrated life, (ii) Nobody knows what is expected of 
him or her in life, (iii) I have no control over my destiny, (iv) The 
socioeconomic status of people determines their dignity and it is 
inevitable, (v) The world is changing so fast that it is hard for me 
to understand what is going on, (vi) My whole world feels like 
it is falling apart, (vii) No matter how hard people try in life, it 
doesn’t make any difference. Fetishism of money is expressed in 
five statements: (i) To make money, there are no right and wrong 
ways anymore, only easy ways and hard ways, (ii) A person is 
justified in doing almost anything if the reward is high enough, 
(iii) I am getting a college education so I can get a good job, (iv) 
I follow whatever rules I want to follow, (v) Money is the most 
important thing in life (Heydari, Davoudi and Teymoori, 2011, 
p. 1089). Verbal expressions which fall into the statement category 
are the elements of political gnosis called presumed anomie.
On the level of presumed anomie, two homogeneous criteria 
for the anomie indicators and statements enable us to distinguish 
three levels of the intensity of political gnosis. The scale ranges 
from (3) to (1). When a verbal expression concerning presumed 
anomie is free from the references to the statements, a feature 
takes on [0].
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The presumed anomie (f4) takes on the following values:
(3) three types of the anomie indicators and at least 50% of the 
statements of each one,
(2) two types of the anomie indicators and at least 50% of the 
statements of each one,
(1) one type of the anomie indicators and at least 50% of its 
statements,
[0] political diagnosis of relative deprivation.
The maximum extent of political gnosis (3) is when the gnostic 
presumes anomie that finds expression in meaninglessness and 
distrust, powerlessness, and fetishism of money. At least 50% of 
the statements of each indicator are in use. Political gnosis achieves 
the moderate extent (2) when the gnostic takes advantage of two 
out of the three indicators and at least 50% of the statements of 
each one. The low extent (1) occurs when the gnostic refers to one 
from among the three indicators and at least 50% of its defining 
statements. When a verbal expression does not take the shape of 
a value-laden discoursive creation of a response to the presumed 
anomie and is relatively close to a political diagnosis of relative 
deprivation [0], political gnosis does not emerge.
Feature № 5: Total Enemy
The research avoids employing the category of the objective 
enemy because it is strongly associated with totalitarianism 
(Arendt, 1973, pp. 422–423). Instead, it defines political gnosis by 
the feature of the semantic creation of the total enemy (e.g. enemy 
of the people). Thorup defines the total enemy as the one whose 
identity and deeds are substituted for analogies and being; whose 
the only one goal in life is to destroy and deploy violence; who is 
present even if not apparent; whose enmity comes from a being 
rather than an action; and with whom coexistence is impossible 
due to the fact that the total enemy will never let go and allow 
121Justifying the Use of Violence: A Gnostic Deconstruction…
peace and prosperity to become the order of the day (2015, p. X). 
The total enemy is to be found, punished, and annihilated because 
it impedes any immanentization of the eschaton and threatens the 
existence of the in-group. It is a source of great and everlasting 
insecurity. 
On the level of the total enemy that jeopardizes gnostic 
enterprises, two homogeneous criteria of the expectedness of 
the total enemy’s shape and the extent of the establishment of 
in-group political values under the total enemy threat enable us 
to distinguish four levels of the intensity of political gnosis. The 
scale ranges from (4) to (1). When a verbal expression concerning 
obstacles to development is free from the category of the total 
enemy, a feature takes on [0].
The creation of the total enemy in relation to in-group political 
values (f5) takes on the following values:
(4) moral-nihilistic creation of the total enemy in relation to 
a floating set of political values,
(3) moral-nihilistic creation of the total enemy in relation to 
a fixed set of political values,
(2) fundamentalist creation of the total enemy in relation to 
a floating set of political values,
(1) fundamentalist creation of the total enemy in relation to 
a fixed set of political values,
[0] intersubjective political diagnosis of obstacles to the 
community’s development.
The maximum extent of political gnosis (4) is when the gnostic 
employs moral nihilism to produce the total enemy. Members of 
a populace can never be quite sure that they will not fall into some 
future category of the total enemy because it may be changed and 
supplemented over time (Court, 2008, p. 107). The gnostic claims 
that the total enemy stops the immanentization of the eschaton and 
puts many things significant to a populace in jeopardy. It is erratic 
what political values, apart from the core ones, contribute to the 
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creation of relations between the total enemy and other semantic 
creations. The high extent (3) is when people cannot predict who 
or what will become the total enemy because it is continually under 
construction. The total enemy undermines immanentization of 
the eschaton and threatens the gnostic’s resources. The gnostic 
has, however, a rigid set of political values that are to be protected 
from the total enemy. Unpredictability-driven fear is a result of the 
most intensive types of political gnosis which make use of moral-
nihilism. In turn, a firm agenda mirroring a hierarchy of political 
values contributes to less intense fundamentalist political gnosis 
by arming it with relative predictability. The moderate extent 
(2) occurs when the gnostic distributes a consistent vision of the 
total enemy. People know how to recognize it, and the criteria for 
recognition are invariable. Nevertheless, that well-determined 
total enemy puts a variety of volatile political values at risk. 
The low extent (1) typifies a fundamentalist project of the total 
enemy. The fundamentalist gnostic creates a consistent image of 
the total enemy. Members of a populace know the criteria for its 
distinction and are sure what and who meets the essential criteria 
to be the total enemy. That figure impedes the immanentization 
of the eschaton as well as the firmly established and hierarchized 
political values. When a verbal expression does not take the 
shape of a value-laden discoursive creation of the total enemy 
that endangers gnostic enterprises and is relatively close to an 
intersubjective political diagnosis of obstacles to the community’s 
development [0], political gnosis does not take place.
Feature № 6: Expansionary Savior to be Saved
According to a politico-soteriological gnostic view, the gnostic 
is a savior to be saved. It means that the gnostic has knowledge of 
how to be saved through the immanentization of the eschaton, 
performs eschatological goals, and saves others from extinction by 
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sharing knowledge and immanentizing the eschaton together. At 
a declarative level, he or she saves himself/herself, others, and will 
be saved. The expansionary nature of the savior to be saved finds 
expression in the search for savable non-gnostics (e.g. Russian 
compatriots (Grigas, 2016, p. 2)). Apart from unambiguous 
divisions between the in-group, the out-group, the good internal 
world and the evil external world, the gnostic detects some group 
of people who may become a material resource of the internal 
world. They are neither part of the in-group nor belonging to the 
evil external world. They do not belong under the total enemy. As 
such, they may be saved rather than doomed to extinction like the 
out-group.
On the level of the expansionary savior to be saved, 
a homogeneous criterion of the source of non-gnostics’ 
predisposition to become gnostics allows us to distinguish four 
levels of the intensity of political gnosis. The scale ranges from 
(4) to (1). When a verbal expression concerning external political 
subjects is free from overtly soteriological attempts to change their 
status to a political structure, a feature takes on [0].
The expansion of the savior to be saved (f6) takes on the 
following values:
(4) voluntarist rescue operation,
(3) subjective rescue operation,
(2) objective rescue operation,
(1) fatalistic rescue operation,
[0] political diagnosis of external political subjects in relation to 
domestic and exterior political structures.
The maximum extent of political gnosis (4) occurs when the 
gnostic refers to the knowledge-driven will to semantically inform 
a rescue operation aiming at transforming non-gnostics into in-
group gnostics and building them into the good internal world. 
The gnostic avoids introducing the perspective of the would-be 
material resource. The other three semantic strategies relativize 
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the sources of the predisposition. The high extent (3) is when 
the gnostic refers to the passionate desire of a subject formed by 
non-gnostics to join in-group gnostics and become the part of the 
good internal world. The gnostic shows the subject as enticed into 
immanentizing the eschaton together and thus thirsting the future, 
secular and political salvation. The moderate extent (2) is if the 
gnostic objectifies the rescue mission by giving it objective values 
to introduce it as generally beneficial. The source of the operation 
is general knowledge rather than gnostics’ or non-gnostics’ will. 
The low extent (1) typifies a fatalistic semantic creation of the 
rescue operation. As the gnostic claims, there is nothing left but 
to save non-gnostics, and this is not a matter of anybody’s choice. 
When a verbal expression does not take the form of a value-laden 
discoursive creation of the rescue operation aiming at expanding 
the savior to be saved and is relatively close to an intersubjective 
political diagnosis of external political subjects in relation to 
domestic and exterior political structures [0], political gnosis does 
not make an appearance.
Despite non-gnostics’ predisposition to be saved, they must 
not immanentize their eschaton. Let us bring back Buckley’s 
(2007, p. 24) famous phrase “Don’t let THEM immanentize the 
eschaton! [original spelling – J. R.]” to delve into the very nature 
of the conditions of the savior’s to be saved expansion. Non- 
-gnostics must attach themselves or be taken into the in-group 
soteriology. Otherwise, they fall into the out-group or the total 
enemy category.
Feature № 7: Political Obscurantism
Obscurantism consists of purposeful withholding knowledge 
from members of a populace. The gnostic imposes restrictions of 
disseminating knowledge to prevent facts from becoming known 
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(e.g. current economic rates in the world). Thus, he or she strives 
to maintain the shape of a gnostic universe under construction. 
On the level of political obscurantism, one homogeneous 
criterion of a strategy of coping with non-gnostic knowledge lets 
us define three levels of the intensity of political gnosis. Non- 
-gnostic knowledge is of a dangerous nature because it potentially 
or genuinely precludes the immanentization of the eschaton, 
supports the out-group, the evil external world, the total enemy, 
and threatens the in-group and the good internal world. The scale 
ranges from (3) to (1). When a verbal expression concerning 
knowledge is free from attempts to stop its spread and politicize 
its nature, a feature takes on [0].
Political obscurantism (f7) takes on the following values:
(3) exterminating dangerous knowledge,
(2) faking dangerous knowledge,
(1) tabooing dangerous knowledge,
[0] discussion over the diagnosed knowledge of political 
meaning,
The maximum extent of political gnosis (3) occurs when the 
gnostic displays overt hostility to dangerous knowledge which 
is to be destroyed due to its very nature. The moderate extent 
(2) is when the gnostic presents non-gnostic knowledge as fake 
knowledge that misleads. The low extent (1) makes an appearance 
when the gnostic taboos non-gnostic knowledge. Since tabooing 
draws upon making things unmentionable, dangerous knowledge 
does not enter the gnostic’s statements. When a verbal expression 
does not take the shape of a value-laden discoursive creation of 
the eradication of dangerous knowledge, and it is relatively close 
to contributing to the discussion over diagnosed knowledge of 
political meaning [0], political gnosis does not appear.
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Feature № 8: Survival on the Historic Battlefield
Political gnosis gives temporal solutions which stem from 
a desire of self-perpetuation. The gnostic introduces strategies of 
how to survive on the historic battlefield of the clash of good and 
evil powers (e.g. a revolutionary situation). Unlike the features 
of political gnosis that depict how the in-group/out-group and 
the good/evil worlds look like, and in contrast to the future- 
-oriented immanentization of the eschaton, the following feature 
concentrates on the strategies of coping with being here and now. 
On the level of the strategies of the survival on the battlefield, 
two homogeneous criteria for responding to non-gnostic cultural 
resources and treating gnostic cultural resources enable us to 
determine three levels of the intensity of political gnosis (Rak, 
2015a; 2015b; 2016). The scale ranges from (3) to (1). When 
a verbal expression concerning the use of cultural resources in 
daily life is free from the references to the statements, a feature 
takes on [0].
The strategies of survival on a historic battlefield (f8) take on 
the following values:
(3) annihilating contra-acculturation and celebrating nativism,
(2) isolating contra-acculturation and preserving nativism,
(1) escapist contra-acculturation and reviving nativism,
[0] political diagnosis of how to use or avoid using cultural 
resources.
The maximum extent of political gnosis (3) is when the gnostic 
claims that non-gnostic cultural resources are to be annihilated. 
Simultaneously, the gnostic celebrates gnostic resources by 
making use of its valuable potential to survive. The moderate 
extent (2) makes an appearance when the gnostic comes out 
in favor of isolation from non-gnostic cultural resources. The 
gnostic perpetuates his or her own cultural facilities. The low 
extent (1) occurs when the gnostic escapes from being in any 
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relationship with non-gnostic cultural resources. He or she makes 
attempts to revive the weakened cultural base. When a verbal 
expression does not take the form of contra-acculturative and 
nativist approach towards cultural resources and is relatively close 
to an intersubjective political diagnosis of their use [0], political 
gnosis does not show up.
Conclusions
The article makes a methodological contribution to the 
growing body of literature concerning political gnosis. It creates 
the research tool for differentiating between political diagnosis and 
gnosis and measuring the intensity of the latter on the basis of the 
qualitative indicators. Each out of the eight defining features takes 
on values that contribute to the level of the intensity of political 
gnosis. Every time before their application to empirical research, 
they should be operationalized according to the character of the 
sources to be analyzed.
In political reality, the pure ideal types of neither political 
gnosis nor diagnosis occur. Instead, their features co-occur in 
various configurations. It means that in a political text, a researcher 
may find both gnosis and diagnosis even on the level of the same 
feature. The former may take on a variety of values which indicate 
its intensity. When verbal expressions of a feature are diversified 
in terms of intensity, a researcher has to estimate which value is 
dominant and what characterizes the configuration of values. 
The article initiates an academic debate over the measurement 
of political gnosis and as such avoids proposing a final conceptual 
framework. Instead, it brings researchers in to analyze its 
methodological and theoretical assumptions critically and make 
research attempts to contribute to the field. Researchers may 
develop the tool by both discussing the quality and properties of 
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its structure and testing its empirical effectiveness. Revolutionary, 
non-revolutionary, pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
thinking offer a challenging research field. It may be helpful to 
evaluate how well the tool performs its methodological function 
within an analysis. One may also wish to rethink and modify the 
necessary and sufficient criteria for an epistemic apparatus to fall 
into the categories of political gnosis and diagnosis. The already 
proposed scales may be extended to improve their sensitivity to 
the details. The more precise the scale is, the more detailed the 
research results are.
Usprawiedliwienie zastosowania przemocy:  
gnostyczna dekonstrukcja wszechświata politycznego
Celem artykułu jest stworzenie narzędzia badawczego służącego do rozróż-
niania gnostycznej i niegnostycznej świadomości politycznej oraz mierzenia 
natężenia pierwszej z wymienionych. Gnoza polityczna to aparat epistemiczny, 
który przybiera formę konfiguracji przekonań określających interpretację rze-
czywistości społecznej. Wystarczające i konieczne cechy definiujące gnozę po-
lityczną są następujące: podział uniwersum rzeczy materialnych na dobry świat 
wewnętrzny i zły świat zewnętrzny, rozróżnienie ludzi na „nas-swoich” i „ich-
obcych”, fałszywa immanentyzacja eschatonu, manifestacje domniemanej ano-
mii wśród populacji, stworzenia wroga totalnego, autokreacja ekspansywnego 
zbawiciela, który ma zostać zbawionym, polityczny obskurantyzm jako sposób 
radzenia sobie z niebezpieczną wiedzą i strategie przetrwania na historycznym 
polu bitwy. Każda cecha przybiera wartości, które wskazują poziom natężenia 
gnozy politycznej. Wkładem opracowania do metodologii socjologii polityki 
jest zestaw wskaźników i skali pozwalający badaczowi identyfikować i porów-
nywać werbalne wyrazy gnozy politycznej. Co więcej, rozwija ono metodologię 
badania gnozy politycznej za sprawą kryteriów rozróżnienia politycznej dia-
gnozy od gnozy.
Оправдание насилия:  
гностическая деконструкция политической вселенной
Цель этой статьи – создать исследовательский инструмент для измерения 
интенсивности и определения различий между гностическим и негнос-
тическим политическим сознанием. Политический гнозис – это эписте-
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мический аппарат, который принимает форму конфигурации убеждений, 
определяющих интерпретацию социальной реальности. Достаточные 
и необходимые черты, определяющие политический гнозис следующее: 
разделение вселенной материальных вещей на хороший внутренний мир 
и плохой внешний мир, разделение людей на «нас-своих» и «их-чужих», 
ложная имманентизация эсхатона, проявления предполагаемой аномии 
среди населения, создание тотального врага, создание экспансивного 
спасителя, который должен быть спасен, политический обскурантизм, 
как способ справиться с опасными знаниями, а также стратегии выжива-
ния на поле битвы истории. Каждая черта принимает ценности, указыва-
ющие интенсивность политического гнозиса. Вклад настоящего исследо-
вания в методологию социологии политики это предоставление набора 
показателей и шкал, позволяющих исследователю определять и сравни-
вать словесные выражения политического гнозиса. Более того, оно раз-
рабатывает методологию изучения политического гнозиса по критериям 
различения политического диагноза и гнозиса.
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Conclusions
The Deconstructive Power of the Russian Revolution
The time that has passed since the beginning of the Russian 
Revolution is long enough to work out some interpretative 
formulas of its consequences. In the 19th century, in his treaties 
about the Western world and Russia, the Russian poet and political 
thinker Fyodor Tyutchev (1803–1873) described the latter as the 
embodiment of an eternal providential empire whose mission 
is continually distorted by a diabolic power – the Revolution 
(Тютчев, 2013). As it turned out after a couple of decades, it was 
just Russia that became both the victim and the den of evil: the 
Revolution of 1917 took a specifically Russian shape even though 
it originally refuted the national idea.
In the course of time, the state that had grown on the 
revolutionary soil changed its image several times. According 
to Chaadaev’s generalizations, which were mentioned in 
the introduction, Russia is abnormally vulnerable to radical 
transformations. This does not necessarily refer only to the great 
shifts of paradigms such as the Petrine reforms or the collapse of 
the old empire and the establishment of a communist state. Even 
within the Soviet period, everyday life and institutions looked 
significantly different in 1924, 1938, 1957 or in the 1970s. Dmitry 
Trenin realizes that in the very beginning the Russian Revolution 
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was permeated by universalistic messianism. However, in the 
mid-1920s the paradigm of the Soviet state turned into a fortress 
mentality: the USSR was the only genuinely socialist country in 
the world (as it was in the case of the only Orthodox state – the 
Third Rome – in the 16th century) surrounded by capitalist powers. 
After WW2, we dealt with “the socialist camp”, and after 1960 – 
with “the socialist community” which fought against the “world 
imperialism” with the United States at the helm. This competition 
led to longitudinal tension and to the collapse of the USSR in the 
end (Trenin, 2012, pp. 274–275).
Trying to answer the questions which were declared as the 
leitmotif of our study, we can initially point to the conclusion that 
the ideas, actions and consequences of the revolution result from 
a certain kind of unnaturalness. Its base is formed by the belief in 
the necessity of legal supremacy of ideas, such as the happiness of 
the people or the glory of a state or nation, over everyday needs 
and individual ambitions. The revolution originally fulfilled the 
dreams of several generations of Russian Marxists and Populists 
(Narodniki), who preached about the oppression which was 
experienced by the Russian people, especially peasants and 
workers. However, the new system managed to rob them of any 
individual property and individual rights. The life and dreams of 
the individual turned out to be trivial in the clash with the “just 
cause”: a peasant who, just before WW1, was ultimately liberated 
from control and became the owner of his plot of land had to first 
face the duty of compulsory deliveries after 1917 and then, after 
1928, the tragedy of collectivization.
Another source of unnaturalness lies in the conviction that 
the state (or any other collective organization) has a universal or 
divine mission. The pattern of such thinking comes from great 
religions, e.g. Shinto, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity or 
Islam. These missions, however, are generally oriented toward 
transcendental reality even if they concern human behavior and 
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preoccupations. In the case of the Russian Revolution, contrary 
to most of the previous ones, it is a deterministic, post-Hegelian 
scheme that underlay the revolutionary actions and lawmaking. 
The assumption that the state might play an important part 
in the divine plan is close to the idea of the Byzantine diarchy 
or the Islamic caliphate, so one can seek some earlier patterns. 
Nevertheless, all of them treat the supernatural world as the main 
point of reference. In the case of the Marxist Revolution, the 
ultimate cause lies in the earthly state itself.
Such an attitude is linked to the idea that the essence of the 
mission can be expressed and successfully realized in laws and 
political actions. Law in the revolutionary perspective was 
treated neither as a set of practical regulations that can make 
the functioning of the state and society safer and more effective 
nor as a realization of a higher order. There was a lot of criticism 
of law in Russia under the old regime: it was usually accused of 
overregulation and allegiance to conservative values. However, 
the legal framework of the empire made it ineffective only in some 
way, whereas the Soviet law created a totally dysfunctional state, 
which finally collapsed after 70 years of totalitarian management. 
After the revolution, several legal solutions, as we can read in the 
first chapter, still influence today’s Russian legislation, especially 
in the area of business and the relation of citizens with foreign 
legal and natural persons.
The essential place of law in the structure of Russia’s 
dysfunctionality cannot be neglected. As a number of researchers 
have noted, law in Russia is perceived not as a core social value 
but as an instrument for the leaders. In the long history of the 
country, law was often criticized as a barrier to efficient policies. 
It is the central authority that is equipped with common trust and 
a providential mission. The same can be said about the advantage 
of politics over the economy. It is the central power that has always 
decided about the shape of economic relations. The situation is 
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not very different in today’s capitalist Russia, where all basic flows 
are controlled by the administration (Bieleń, 2014, pp. 211–212).
The unnaturalness of the main convictions in revolutionary 
thinking also stems from the belief that human needs are permanent 
and that there is an intelligible way in which we could meet them. 
The Russian Empire was authoritarian, not totalitarian, requiring 
obedience but not necessarily spiritual devotion (contrary to 
Pre-Petrine Moscovia). Some of the populist and revolutionary 
socialists, especially Petr Tkachov, postulated the standardization 
of needs and the physical liquidation of the older generation, which 
was supposed to be incapable of building a brave new and totally 
structuralized society. This kind of thinking was taken over by the 
Bolsheviks who created a political, economic and social system 
which lacked mental diversity. The system was uniform under the 
vertical leadership of the party, the economy was a leading example 
of inefficient central planning. In the area of culture and education, 
for a long time only the correct ideological (Marxist) and artistic 
(socialist realistic) lines were accepted. However, what seems 
paradoxical, it is the non-conformist activity that contributed 
to relative success in the USSR: the space breakthroughs, sport 
achievements or famous pieces in the movie industry or literature 
with Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn.
The second essential problem of the following study lies in 
the issue of equality: the problem of the people and of the elite. 
Whereas natural order (at least in the Hoppean explication) 
assumes a spontaneous emergence of nobilitas naturalis, the 
Bolshevik doctrine imposes different solutions. First of all, it 
aims at the creation of an entirely egalitarian society. This vision 
is by all means utopian but many studies on totalitarian utopias 
describe and cleverly generalize such phenomena. The Bolshevik 
dream neglects natural differences probably not only because it is 
a utopian idea. The attempt, which was doomed to fail from the 
very beginning, was in fact a powerful step toward the eradication 
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of these disproportions. It was a dramatic struggle of those who 
were highly dissatisfied with the shape of the real world in which 
they were born: in the wrong country or ethnic group, in the 
wrong place or social class.
Measures were undertaken to even the social and economic 
status of Russian citizens: people of the lowest classes became 
officers and state officials, representatives of the nobility and 
bourgeoisie were expelled and even food was rationed at the very 
beginning of the Bolshevik era (according to the regulations of 
war communism). However, after a decade it turned out that there 
were some citizens who were more equal than others. Since the 
1930s, the Stalinist regime consisted not only in the totalitarian 
dictatorship of one person but also in the power of the secret police, 
which had enormous prerogatives. Then, in the 1960s and 1970s 
the nomenklatura, a certain new class of well-established party 
officials, began to dominate in spite of the egalitarian ideology 
(Đilas, 1957). Even in the circumstances of such an ideological 
atmosphere, the system appeared incapable of any successful 
struggle against natural processes of the circulation of elites. 
After the collapse of the red empire, in the 1990s, the Family 
(the people closest to President Boris Yeltsyn) and the oligarchs 
became the new elite of the “robbed country”. Since 2000, the Putin 
team of secret service and military officials have established their 
supremacy in the name of the struggle against the old and bad 
oligarchy within the country and against the Western domination 
in international relations. In none of the cases has the Russian 
political system helped to work out a nobilitas naturalis that would 
be allowed to develop the country in an unrestricted way. The old 
oligarchs gained their property because of their connections with 
those who controlled the financial flows and decided about the 
economic shape of the country. However, they generally took 
advantage of their own smartness and initiative. The new elite 
predominantly used violence and restrictions subordinating the 
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Russian economy to the expectations of statists but the level of 
inequality within the country became even more appalling. 
This, in the end, makes us inquire about the relation between 
the revolution and the natural order. The notion of natural order 
includes several disputable aspects. First of all, it does not refer 
directly to the state of nature. Contrary to that, it combines two 
tendencies. On the one hand, it is based on realism concerning 
the laws of nature, i.e. human corporeality. On the other – it 
tries to meet something actually absent in nature: the need for 
harmonious development in the material and mental spheres. For 
some it might be the never ending search for the undefinable dào 
(道); for others – a quest for a life formed according to the biblical 
commandments and reflections: “fill the earth and subdue it” 
(Genesis, 1, 28), “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither 
are your ways my ways (Isaiah, 55, 8–9)” and St. Augustine’s famous 
conviction that “You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our 
heart is restless until it rests in you” (Augustine, Confessions, Lib. 
1,1–2,2.5,5; CSEL 33, 1–5).
Such a concept is by no means abstract. Contrary to many 
“realistic” theories, it leads the analyst to the study of real processes 
in which one focuses on the technological, economic and social 
development of nations. There is no such thing as unlimited 
development in the state of nature but it can be considered if one 
refers to natural order. It is possible to describe the demographic 
dynamics, which seems to be relatively positive from the perspective 
of the whole of mankind but not necessarily in the case of Russia 
and the West. It is not difficult to estimate life expectancy, infant 
mortality, the length of time a citizen must be employed to afford 
one square foot of real estate or the participation in NCO. Even 
the level of happiness becomes an object of sociological research 
(Левада-Центр, 2014). In other words, it is relatively possible 
to estimate to what extent a state or a certain system meets the 
expectations of regular and, what is no less important, unrestricted 
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development of the citizens, so that they continually get healthier 
and happier but also increasingly motivated to reach the next 
stages of health, satisfaction, wealth and happiness.
There is no doubt that such categories (as mentioned above) 
can be expressed only by means of indirect statistical indicators. 
However, if compared to the revolutionary imperatives such 
as equality, brotherhood or social justice, they still seem quite 
scientific.
If one looks critically at the categories of natural order and 
those of the revolution, it is possible to discern a specific relation 
between them since the revolutionary thinking is by no means 
autonomous; it is a dark shadow of the natural search for goodness. 
Let us have a look at the basic oppositions which are relevant to 
the natural order paradigm and the new proposal promoted by 
Bolshevism. For a reasonable simplification, we will use the term 
“traditional” for the categories of the natural order paradigm and 
the adjective “revolutionary” to express the ones that underlie the 
revolutionary thinking.
1. The traditional opposition of prosperity versus poverty was 
replaced by the revolutionary one of social justice versus social 
injustice.
2. The traditional opposition of God-given individual freedom 
versus slavery (created by imperfect man) was replaced by the 
revolutionary one of freedom as consciousness of necessity 
versus class unconsciousness.
3. The traditional opposition of political liberty – totalitarianism 
was replaced by the revolutionary one of liberation of the 
proletariat versus social oppression.
4. The traditional opposition of human dignity – degradation 
(animalization) was replaced by the revolutionary one of 
communist relations of production versus historically 
backward relations of production. The individual dignity for 
the Bolsheviks was only a product of the superstructure (comp. 
Bochenski, 1963, pp. 119–120).
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5. The traditional opposition of legal equality versus legal 
inequality was replaced by the revolutionary one of equality in 
the access to goods versus inequality in the access to goods.
6. The traditional opposition of respect for property versus theft 
was replaced by the revolutionary one of liberation from 
private property versus kulak mentality.
7. The traditional opposition of respect for individual life and 
health versus murder/disrespect for health was replaced by the 
revolutionary one of respect for the “collective man” (individual 
lives were obviously unimportant) versus disrespect for the 
interests of the proletariat (Fülöp-Miller, 1965, pp. 7–8).
8. The traditional opposition of solidarity versus discord was 
replaced by the revolutionary one of class consciousness 
(comp. Goldman, 1971, pp. 69–70) versus class treason.
9. The traditional opposition of competition for perfection versus 
destructive uniformity was replaced by the revolutionary one 
of collective work (Stakhanov ethic) versus sabotage.
10. The traditional opposition of equal opportunities versus 
unequal opportunities was replaced by the revolutionary 
one of the satisfaction of needs vs failure to satisfy needs 
(according to the belief that “all stomachs are created equal”).
11. The traditional opposition of highest harmony versus chaos 
was replaced by the revolutionary one of classless society 
versus class struggle.
12. Last but not least, the traditional opposition of nobilitas 
naturalis versus populus naturalis was replaced by the 
revolutionary one of the avant-garde of the proletariat (the 
Party) versus the Proletariat itself (the not entirely self-
conscious subject of historical development). 
As observed in Toynbee’s Study of History, after some time 
the creative minority inevitably turns into the dominant minority 
(Toynbee, 1939, pp. 35ff, 445ff, 459ff) However, the natural elite 
is not a closed and established class. It is rather a constantly 
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changing group where some people are continually replaced by 
others as a result of the functioning market. The avant-garde of 
the proletariat is a different story: the party members become 
state officials and are able to establish laws that protect them from 
natural competition (Đilas, 1957).
This short overview opens the door to generalization: one may 
realize that the new revolutionary oppositions can be described 
as deconstructed forms of the traditional ones. We decided to 
categorize the revolutionary paradigm in such a way because the 
Russian Revolution turned against many more values than the 
ones represented by the old regime. The Bolsheviks and other 
radical revolutionaries tried to demolish any inequality without 
reflection about the natural character of the emergence of elites and 
avoided considerations about the temporariness and randomness 
of injustice in their own lives and in the whole Russian Empire.
Finally, there is an obvious need for a glimpse into the relation 
between the Russian Revolution and natural order in the pragmatic 
perspective. An objective and just evaluation of the revolution and 
the following Soviet period in Russian history is hardly possible. 
As stated in the second chapter of our book, Russia still looks at 
itself through the prism of its Soviet past and is by all means under 
the impression of the trauma that arose after the collapse of the 
red empire.
In many bitter ways, the Russia of the 21st century is still a shadow 
of its previous greatness both in the material and moral dimensions. 
According to Maxim Kalashnikov, who resorts to Victor I. Petrik’s 
sociological research, the Post-Soviet anthropological type is 
much more passive than its Soviet predecessor. Today’s Russia 
has become a state where the leading role both in ideology and 
economy belongs to “ruminants” (жвачные) – people who do 
not believe that a technological breakthrough is possible in their 
country: everything important has already been invented and 
even if there is a chance of some new ideas, they will appear in the 
West rather than in Russia (Калашников, 2014, p. 188).
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This nostalgic tone, however, seems to be justified only if 
one compares the Soviet times with the period of the Russian 
Federation. A comparison of the economic dynamics of the 
Russian Empire in the last decades of its existence with analogous 
data concerning the USSR leaves no doubt. No one could neglect 
the obvious achievements in education, science or health care in 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is essential to remember that 
GDP per capita, if related to the level of more advanced countries, 
fell from 28% – 30% in 1913 to 16 – 18% in 1990 (Meliantsev, 
2004, pp. 106, 120). In other words, the balance of the old times 
was more impressive.
The problem obviously lies not only in the disputable 
achievements in the country’s economy. Under the early Bolshevik 
regime and in the USSR, the inhabitants of the huge territory 
experienced unprecedented terror. There are various estimates as 
to the number of victims in the Soviet Union. Hosking (2001, p. 
469) supposes that only in the 1930s the death toll reached about 
10-11 million. If one takes into account the victims of the Red 
Terror, the unnecessary casualties during WW2 and the prisoners 
of the Gulags, we are left with the image of a demographic disaster. 
Ruined health, broken personalities, and a slave mentality of the 
Homo Sovieticus are the next signs of destruction that became the 
daily bread of millions. 
Can the successor of the USSR be treated as a country that 
rejected all Soviet curses? It seems that pessimistic opinions prevail 
among average Russians. A clever explanation of the economic 
and civilizational failure was provided by Andrei Piontkovsky, 
who makes a distinction between the economic reforms in Russia 
and Central Europe. In the latter, privatization was clearly “unjust” 
since many of the previous managers came into property that had 
never been theirs in the legal sense. However, they took care of 
it anyway and were able to act in the circumstances of the free 
market. This led to natural competition, where the “unrighteous” 
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brainy leaders pushed the less efficient ones out of the market. 
The same was expected in Russia but the result was different. The 
“principle of injustice” was not limited to the moment of original 
distribution but was continued in the next two decades. The new 
formation is continually mutating, remaining neither capitalist 
nor socialist. The oligarchs became mandarins rather than 
business people and managed to rob Russia of enormous wealth, 
which then appeared on their accounts beyond the borders of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (Piontkovsky, 2011, p. 392).
The Russian Revolution not only became a tragically consistent 
attempt to realize a utopian gnostic vision, based on radical 
oppositions, but also a far-reaching process in which, willingly or 
not, the new distinctions appeared to be a deconstructed version 
of those which are dictated by the logic of Natural Order. In 
this sense the legacy of the Russian Revolution is a gigantic lie, 
a false mirror which still torments the citizens in the largest part 
of the post-Soviet area: the official rhetoric remains populist but 
the state – strictly oligarchic. The idea of international diversity 
and multipolarity is a hidden concept of leaving a great number 
of nations without security and the rejection of today’s internal 
and international leadership is only a hidden and selfish form 
of promoting another order of much more severe inequality. 
The idea of brotherhood justifies the invasion of brothers. The 
declared necessity of strength is in fact a desperate attempt to 
regain lost respect. New legal regulations are a result of fear rather 
than of self-confidence: the gnostic vision of us as the light side of 
the force and the internal and foreign challenge as a destructive 
element whose activity has to be averted, is another attempt to 
build oppositions that have nothing in common with natural 
order, where everybody is invited to compete and cooperate at the 
same time.
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